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The deadline for receipt of manuscripts is April 1, but early submission is strongly advised. All submitted work should be double-spaced, including footnotes. For questions of style, consult the University of Chicago *Manual of Style* or Kate L. Turabian *A Manual for Writers of Term Papers, Theses and Dissertations*. Manuscripts, including footnotes, should be no more than 40 pages in length. Because submissions are evaluated anonymously, the author's name should appear only on the title page.

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Front cover: Arthur Ashe was the first African American man to win the U.S. Open tennis tournament, in 1968. His hometown of Richmond, Virginia, created a controversy when they placed this statue of him on Monument Avenue alongside statues memorializing Southern heroes from the Civil War. *Photograph by Masaaki Okada. Reprinted courtesy of the Richmond Times-Dispatch.*

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Acknowledgments

WE ARE VERY PLEASED to present this sixteenth volume of the *UCLA Historical Journal*. The material in this general issue presents a number of diverse and interesting papers that demonstrate some of the intriguing new research of history graduate students.

This has been a very stimulating and sometimes difficult task, and we would like to thank all the people who have helped bring it to a successful conclusion. The editors and reviewers who have devoted so much of their valuable time and energy include Eric D. Altice, Houri Berberian, Donna Binkiewicz, D. Michael Bottoms, Constance Chen, Kevin Clark, Michael Fickes, Martha Foster, JenniferKoslow, Jill Lally, Kristin McClearly, Kenneth McDonald, Lisa G. Materson, Hiromi Mizuno, Sandy Moats, Gail Ostergren, Didier Reiss, J.E. Roddy, Jasamin Rostam-Kolayi,Christine Schoppe, Anastasia Christman Simmons, Jayne Spencer, and Tamara Zwick. We would also like to thank Professor Ronald Mellor, Chair of the History Department, for his consistent encouragement and support of the *Journal*. This year we also acknowledge the generous financial contributions ofour patrons, who are listed on the following page, as well as our othersubscribers. It is most encouraging that so many History Department alumni value the significance and quality of this enterprise long after theyhave left UCLA.

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—REBECCA J. MEAD
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Actors in the Politics of Fur: The Iroquois League and Louis de Baude, Comte de Frontenac, 1672–1682

Alisa Vladimira Petrovich

In France, Jean-Baptiste Colbert (1619-1683), minister of the marine to Louis XIV, puzzled over the communications sent from his colonial officials in New France concerning their contacts with Native Americans. French activity in Canada was not new, nor was the minister ignorant of its history. The French penetrated Canada in 1534, when Jacques Cartier made his first voyage, and in 1541–1542, the Cartier-Roberval expedition wintered at Québec while on a quest for gold and diamonds.[1] When the French realized they would find neither, they settled for fur-trading posts. In 1608, Samuel de Champlain came to New France to establish a trading post at Québec, and in the years to come Champlain founded important policies that helped shape the colony throughout most of the century.[2] Marc Lescarbot, a Parisian lawyer, noted that Canada was a paradise for the poor and the peasant who had the patience to build a model agrarian colony.[3] By 1610, the French colonization of Canada was an earnest endeavor.

A significant factor was the enmity between the Iroquois Confederacy and the French. The earliest recorded contact between the Iroquois and French occurred in 1534, when Cartier, having been welcomed by an Iroquois fishing party, kidnapped two sons of the party's leader. He later returned and abducted the leader, Donnacona, as well as nine other men, to report to King François I first hand about a supposed rich kingdom near the Great Lakes. In 1609, Champlain earned the hatred of the League when his party defeated the Mohawk on the banks of today's Lake Champlain. A year later, he and his Huron allies killed 100 Mohawks with guns. Continuing tension between the Huron and Iroquois, the fur trade, and alterations in demography and traditional lifestyles caused by disease and missionaries increased native hostility toward the French.

To the French side the Iroquois League committed unspeakable acts when they martyred Jesuit missionaries.[4] For example, in 1646 the Mohawk killed Father Issac Jogues, whom they probably perceived as a destructive force. Similarly, Fathers Jacques Buteux, Gabriel Lalemant, and Jean de Brébeuf met their deaths at the hands of the Iroquois.[5] These episodes turned French opinion against the Five Nations. For example, in the Bibliothèque Nationale in Paris, there is a map entitled "Novae Franciae Accurata Delineatio 1657," attributed to Jesuit François-Joseph Bressani, which has two large illustration of the martyrdom of Jesuits in the lower right hand corner.[6] Perhaps in the mid-seventeenth century no map of New France could be complete without making a reference to the violent deaths of the missionaries.

Likewise, the so-called Beaver Wars of the 1640s and 1650s cemented hostilities between the League members and the French. In the 1640s, the French and their indigenous allies, the Hurons, formed a fur trading unit hostile to the Iroquois League, so the members of the Five Nations did not hesitate to go on raids and create a general state of emergency in New France. By 1660, the Iroquois dispersed the Huron, Petuns, Nipissings, Eries, and Neutrals from the region that is now southwest Ontario. Although they were in a position to attack New France and her western native allies, subsequent warfare was not particularly effective, even through the League was determined to retain their hunting grounds around Lake Ontario and the course of the Saint Lawrence River.[7] In 1663,

Louis XIV assumed personal control of Canada from the Company of New France and put the colony on serious military footing. The new French strength and rampant disease caused the weakened Onondaga, Oneida, Cayuga, and Seneca leaders to sue for peace in 1665. While only the Mohawk remained belligerent, they saw the need for peace with the French after de Tracy's 1666 destruction of their villages and English assistance from Albany was not forthcoming. Suffering economically, bereft of European allies, and isolated from Five Nations members who made peace earlier, in 1667 Mohawk representatives surrendered to Governor de Courcelle at Québec.[8]

By Colbert's tenure, the French in New France had a full set of government officials, including a governor, an intendant, a sovereign council, a bishop, and numerous others.[9] Both the governor and intendant were under instructions to correspond frequently with Colbert and the king, and they were to write detailed letters about all Canadian affairs, including their impressions and suggestions. Colbert also communicated with the government officials frequently. In some of these missives, Colbert expressed his opinion that the Iroquois were

the "irreconcilable enemies of the colony" and their "inhumanities" towards the colonists made the growth of New France impossible without a force of arms for protection.[10] In 1665, Alexandre Prouville de Tracy led what he thought was a successful campaign against the Iroquois, and then returned to France.[11] Subsequently, cultural exchange would occur at gunpoint, or, preferably at the hands of missionary groups.[12] The French hoped that the Iroquois League would cooperate gracefully, but the natives had different ideas.

Colbert was confused, however, by some of the letters, especially those of the governor of New France, Louis de Baude, Comte de Frontenac.[13] The wayward governor dabbled in the fur trade and squabbled excessively with his subordinates, but his letters chronicled cultural contact through the medium of the fur trade. His reports increasingly described the Iroquois as savvy business people and the League as a sovereign group that made its own decisions about trade and friendship. There exists no documentary evidence that the king or Colbert questioned his facts, but they did not like his insistence on cultivating the Iroquois as consumers and trading partners even though other colonial officials agreed.[14] The interactions between this European nobleman and the members of the Iroquois League give a provocative perspective on European and Native American relations, especially relating to the fur trade.

Count Frontenac did not like the Iroquois, but his descriptions of their behavior indicated that he placed them within a spectrum of conduct very intelligible to Europeans. Before 1680 the governor described the Iroquois as intelligent potential allies; after this date, they appear as ominous enemies who had to be respected for their power and entrepreneurial skills. Gradually the governor realized that he was dealing with intelligent, cautious entrepreneurs, skillful at diplomacy, artful at trading, motivated by their interests, and the puppets of no European state. No doubt reluctantly, Frontenac assessed the Iroquois League as important in his world of New France.

How much faith can one place in Frontenac's perceptions of the Iroquois League, and in turn, how much do these perceptions reflect back upon him? To answer the first question, this paper considers an article by Bruce Trigger, who discusses the question of how possible it was for Europeans to describe the "Other."[15] He claims that the indigenous populations acted in rational, very intelligible ways, no differently than other peoples. Therefore, European informants could and did give a relatively accurate picture of Native American and European interaction, if, as suggested in an article by Peter Wogan, one carefully separates European preconditioned sentiments from accurate observations.[16] Such is the case with Louis de Baude, Comte de Frontenac, who served his first

term as governor of New France between the years 1672 and 1682.[17]

Indeed, the paucity of sources concerning the position and activity of indigenous populations in the northeastern areas of the Americas make the use of old material for new insights particularly important. Authors such as Trigger, Anthony Wallace, and Daniel K. Richter stress the interactive position of Europeans and the Five Nations in the politics and fur trade of France and England. They employ, often creatively, such sources as archaeology, linguistics, and the writings of religious orders, but they tend to ignore the possibility of using French colonial official correspondence to bolster their arguments.[18] Because of his position as a governor, the leader of the military, and a fur trader, Frontenac closely associated himself with indigenous populations. His sometimes negative comments may initially rebuff scholars interested in the contours of Iroquoian activities in the late seventeenth century. As will be demonstrated by this paper, however, a careful and judicious reading of the letters can allow one to evaluate some of his insights.

The count's acrid eye examined colonists, Amerindians, and renegade trappers and his pen carefully recorded his impressions, important because of his Francocentric views and the traditional New France hostility to the Iroquois. Frontenac compared Amerindians to the French of his homeland, considered his culture superior, and that his Roman Catholic religion was the one true creed. The count gave credit to the indigenous population where he thought it was due, but some of his comparisons had definite roots in his French background. For example, when Frontenac met with spokesmen for the Five Nations, he called them "the captains of the Five Nations."[19] In the count's realm of experience, only high-ranking personnel conducted diplomacy or discussed political and military matters with representatives of other nations. In fact, he insisted upon this formality when he had the colonists of New France swear their oath of allegiance to the French king.[20] He stated that he assembled "three or four gentlemen," some officers, and the most socially important colonists to take the oath separate from the clergy, upper level judiciary, and common settlers.[21] It was the gentlemen of the first group who expressed their pleasure at the contents of the oath, which gratified Frontenac.[22] It was not surprising therefore that the count considered that the men speaking for the Iroquois League had military or social superiority— thus his use of the title "captains."

Apart from Frontenac's superimposition of French hierarchical practices upon the Five Nations, the count was certain that the French culture and religion were far superior to any form of indigenous culture or belief. Following both his orders and his inclination, and he made it his business to learn some of the

indigenous customs in order to better "frenchify" the Amerindians within his realm.[23] He stated that he wished the Jesuits to understand:

> that I believed that in their missions they exercised rendering the Savages subjects of Jesus Christ, [and] subjects of the King. . .[to] inspire in them the envy of understanding our language. . . .to attempt to render them more sedentary, and of their leaving a life so opposed to the spirit of Christianity. . . .[24]

Like his king, Frontenac was certain the clergy did good work.[25] Similar to Louis XIV, however, the count did not always trust the Holy Orders, especially the Jesuits, and he was not certain that either the colonists or the indigenous populations received the best of care and ministering from them.[26] In fact, he noted that half a league from Québec, at Notre Dame de Foy, there were no Amerindians who could speak French, despite the concentrated presence of the Jesuits. He later linked this lack to the missionaries' conflicting interest in trade.[27]

To Frontenac, teaching Amerindians the French language, religion, and culture was important. However, he did appreciate that the indigenous population might resist these attempts at conversion. For example, he wrote that the Iroquois: "do not wish to learn [French]."[28] Typically, the count lumped the five separate nations of the Iroquois League under a generic name.[29] He failed to note that Iroquois villages were autonomous units, whose leaders struggled for alliances, competed with each other, and often worked at cross purposes. They were not by any means two unified groups of natives. However, despite his ignorance about tribal autonomy and mechanics, Frontenac did not put the blame wholly on the Amerindians who did not choose to learn French ways. In a curious letter to Louis XIV in 1679, Frontenac admitted that interaction with the French "polluted" the indigenous population and was "an obstacle to the instruction that [missionaries] give [the natives]."[30] The French offered a bad example and encouraged Amerindians to emulate colonists' vices such as inebriation and indolence. Like many of the count's observations, this letter tended not to demean the natives but indicated alternative explanations for events. Yet the count also tended to judge the world by how well it fit into his preconceived, pre-Enlightenment notions of reasonable behavior.

Thus Frontenac's vision was not always obscured.[31] Save for believing France and Catholicism were the pinnacles of civilization, he was able to view the Iroquois League as consisting of humans who behaved understandably. As a result, his writings are an important source for understanding the French colonial experience and Amerindian responses.

The very profitable commerce in beaver and other furs heavily influenced in France's politics in North America. Beginning in 1600, Europeans began to manufacture broad brimmed hats using the soft underbelly fur of the beaver, and as these hats became fashionable, the demand for pelts increased.[32] Russia was the traditional European source for beaver, and during the early decades of the seventeenth century the pelts were costly.[33] Thus the French government decided to obtain furs directly from French holdings.[34] The king and his ministers instituted trade monopolies and alliances with various indigenous groups.

The Iroquois League rapidly became involved in the European beaver trade. From 1620, the Dutch and Iroquois enjoyed a reciprocal trading alliance. The colonists gained lucrative pelts while the indigenous population got European goods, including guns, ammunition, and alcohol. The system broke down in the 1650s, when the Dutch colony experienced major economic and demographic setbacks. Cheating or stealing from natives became common. In 1664, the English conquered New Amsterdam, renamed the area New York, and began tenuous trading contacts with the natives. The Five Nations needed guns, something the English and French hesitated to trade because they were used to fight wars against Europeans as well as opposing native groups. French informants like de Courcelle and Talon noted that when the Iroquois exhausted the beaver supply south of Lake Ontario they moved into former Huron territory.[35] When the English conclusively gained rights to New York from the Dutch in 1674, a trade system developed between the Iroquois League, the Dutch at Albany, and the English at Manhattan. No longer did the antiFrench Iroquois need to court Catholic Iroquois francophiles or governors like Frontenac to obtain weapons, alcohol, or other European goods.[36]

Count Frontenac became not only an important observer but also participant in the pelt business. Born in 1622, Frontenac was a godson of Louis XIII, and his mother belonged to the influential Pontchartrain family. He entered the army as a teenager and fought in several campaigns during the Thirty Years War and for Venice. Like many other nobles of his era, the count lived luxuriously and amassed large debts. He married Anne de la Grange, whose wealthy father disinherited her to protest the marriage. In 1672, just as creditors were ready to seize Frontenac's belongings, they learned to their chagrin that he was appointed governor of New France, because with the commission he obtained an order from the council of state saying he could repay his debts at the king's pleasure. With a mind to recovering his fortune, Count Frontenac sailed to New France.[37]

Colbert's orders for the new governor reflected the minister's strategy. Colbert

wanted two things: to restrict the fur trade and to control westward expansion. His idea was to promote a stable, agrarian culture and large families in New France. Although the fur trade was New France's major revenue source, the minister regarded it as a force that if uncontrolled could undermine the compact colony he envisioned as the ideal. A booming fur trade would necessitate western garrisons, which Colbert rightly envisioned as sparsely populated, weak, and prone to attack.[38]

Frontenac immediately realized the wealth that could be made in the fur trade. A seasoned soldier with a pressing need for money, the governor ignored Colbert's order not to involve himself with the fur trade and swiftly went about making his contacts, both French and Amerindian. The mission Indians near Montréal undoubtedly helped the count, as did experienced Europeans trading partners. Using his office and his prestige, Frontenac attached himself to important New France entrepreneurs including Talon, Sieur Bairze, and Sieur le Bére, as well the ambitious adventurer, Robert Cavelier, Sieur de la Salle.[39]

Before Frontenac arrived in Canada, Colbert had refused permission for Intendant Talon to build a garrisoned fort on Lake Ontario to guard the area from Iroquois or English attacks.[40] Undaunted, the count improved upon Talon's idea and established not a garrison but a fur trading post on the Kataracoui River at eastern Lake Ontario (1673). When the governor finally reported to Colbert the existence of Fort Frontenac almost a year later, the minister predictably expressed displeasure.[41] However, Frontenac claimed that the fort and a soon-to-be-built boat would secure the lake for the French, while adding that its placement was strategic to tap incoming trade.[42]

Evidently, Frontenac and other French colonial officials were not excessively concerned about Colbert's instructions when they interfered with personal economic interests.[43]One should not assume that either the indigenous population or the French settlers who called themselves *habitants* realized the governor broke the law; such information was only shared by the highest level of government officials and was not a public concern. Thus, one cannot rightly analyze Iroquoian reluctance to trade with Frontenac as a reaction to the count's misdeeds. To further his ambitions Frontenac went into partnership with la Salle, whose land grant they used to promote their western fur adventures and to form a monopoly.[44] In 1676 the count neglected to inform Colbert that he had built a new fort at Niagara, in order to block the western Algonquian access to Albany and to monopolize the fur trade.[45] With Albany as a trade *entrepôt*, natives enjoyed excellent prices for their furs and inexpensive European goods, while the English and Dutch obtained pelts that they sold in Europe at a large

profit. It was into this trade Frontenac hoped to intrude, yet the governor was only beginning his fur trading enterprise. With Frontenac's backing, la Salle circumvented Colbert's nonexpansion policies and gained permission from the king on 12 May 1678 to explore the Mississippi Valley and set up forts as needed.[46] The same year, a trading post opened on the Saint Joseph River. In 1680, Frontenac and his partners built Fort Crèvecoeur on the Illinois, then Fort Prudhomme (1682) on the Mississippi below the Ohio River, and Fort Saint Louis (1684) at present-day Port la Vaca, Texas.[47]

Soon after his arrival in New France, Frontenac realized the importance of the Iroquois. He used two methods to handle the Five Nations: alliances with the Iroquois, as well as efforts to limit their ability to trade freely. To curtail the Five Nations middlemen, the governor built Fort Frontenac.[48] The presence of the fort irritated the League, which saw French fort building as expansion into their hunting grounds and thus a threat but they were not in a position to destroy it.[49] Frontenac also tried to obtain an alliance with the Iroquois League prior to 1680, when the Five Nations needed access to European weapons and goods and before the establishment of the Albany-Manhattan-Iroquois trade relationship. Apparently he thought that the Five Nations had some interest in becoming trading partners with the previously reviled French if the terms were good. Although he never directly reported any personal arrangements he might have had with the League, the count did reveal his opinion about their role in politics and the fur trade.

The count wanted to bolster his sagging fortunes from the fur trade, and he was not about to let the king or Colbert interfere with his fur trade scheme. For example, Louis XIV directed the governor to issue permits to trade in order to keep tabs on the number of traders and to discourage the outlawed western trappers known as *coureurs de bois*. The king did not envision that Frontenac would further his pocketbook by issuing trading licenses to his clients.[50] Colbert ordered an end to this practice on 30 May 1675.[51] Frontenac got around this ordinance by issuing not trading but hunting licenses, until the king commanded him to cease in 1676.[52] The enterprising Canadian governor improved his troubled finances at the expense of Colbert's policy. Such dealings caught the attention of many officials and colonists, especially of Intendant Jacques DuChesneau. An intendant was an official, of equal stature with the governor, whose responsibilities were all colonial judicial and financial matters. Old military men like Frontenac often had a problem keeping to their own affairs, namely the military, and often intruded into their intendants' domain. DuChesneau resented Frontenac's encroachments and thus began a bitter battle over juris-

diction, the fur trade, and personal matters. They fought over liquor trade to the natives, about the fur commerce, on questions of rank, over the law, with the sovereign council, and even on where they sat in church. In general, DuChesneau and Frontenac rarely agreed on anything. Tired of the incessant bickering and the concurring turbulent state of New France, Colbert and the king recalled DuChesneau and Frontenac in 1682.[53]

Colbert did not shy away from privately admonishing Frontenac for his misconduct. A stream of letters from Colbert to the count censured the governor for misusing his authority and disobeying the minister's policy against western expansion.[54] On 4 December 1679, the minister wrote a revealing dispatch to Frontenac. According to Colbert, Louis XIV hoped:

> that you can change the conduct that you have given up to the present, because [the King] sees clearly that you are not capable of adopting the spirit of concord and of tolerance necessary for impeding all the dissensions which arise and which are always the main cause of defeat and ruin in the new colonies.[55]

Following up DuChesneau's allegation that Frontenac dealt with *coureurs de bois*, Colbert accused the governor of protecting the outlawed *coureurs* and indigenous traders.[56] Frontenac's answer was to put an accusing light on other people, like DuChesneau and his secretary, Denis Riverin.[57] Frontenac received a harsh letter from Louis XIV, charging him with self-promotion and poor service.[58] To the king's indictments the governor replied: "Your Majesty will clearly understand that I never suffered more than when I was represented as violent and as a man who would trouble the Officers of Justice in the performance of their duties."[59] Frontenac refused to be held accountable for his illicit colonial dealings, and not surprisingly, the king and Colbert had their fill of the count.[60] His actions, his behavior, and his schemes demonstrate amply that France did not have an overseas empire but rather a nascent colony whose leaders often did as they pleased. Frontenac's recall came on 9 May 1682.[61]

Despite his illegal and imperious activities, Frontenac was a keen observer of the Iroquois League. His evolving views of the League should be understood within the contemporaneous political situation. His early letters from 1672 to 1679 were written at a time of increasing tensions between the French, English, and Iroquois in North America. The Dutch War (1672–1679) caused French and English colonial authorities to ally against the Dutch until 1675, but between them peace in 1679 did not reduce the strain over land and trade. Frontenac's partner la Salle had voyaged into Illinois country and opened trad-

ing posts, while England made the most of its seizure of the lucrative trading area of New York to cultivate a friendship with the Iroquois intending to thwart French expansion. Frontenac responded by courting the indigenous traders and consumers and joining in the struggle for Amerindian allies and fur trading routes. From 1680, tensions in North America escalated. In September 1680, angered by la Salle's voyages and French-Illinois trade, six to seven hundred English-supplied Iroquois attacked the Illinois and Miamis, the prelude to a deadly war.[62] It was within this context that Frontenac wrote his comments.

The count's first recorded observations concerning the Iroquois League were written soon after his arrival in New France, before tensions had escalated and when the Five Nations considered replacing their former Dutch trading partners with the French. Frontenac's need for money caused him to see the Iroquois League as potential partners who needed to be cultivated. He hoped to offer them terms of trade beneficial to the French and, of course, himself, but he did not consider them unintelligible nor without business sense. In 1672 his opinion mixed as he tended to see the natives as both primitive and modern.

Frontenac's 1672 memoir to Colbert proves instructive.[63] The lengthy letter consisted of an explanation about the need to protect New France's widening boarders, hinted at the desirability of building a fort on Lake Ontario, and made observations about the Iroquois. In the first portion of the letter, Frontenac established the Iroquois League as important actors in the fur trade. He stated that they were "threatening to build forts and to repair [the trading activity] towards Manatte and Orange [Manhattan and Albany]," a perceptive observation that proved prophetic.[64] The Five Nations did hope that their old Dutch trading partners and the new English intruders could help them obtain needed European goods and guns at a fair price, yet even at this early date, the natives were also willing to listen to French offers.[65] Here Frontenac understood the savvy Iroquois League as ready to threaten if their economic terms were not met, a strategy quite intelligible to a European gentleman. Thus he tried to demonstrate to Colbert the importance of capturing their clientage from the English.

Because of his lack of knowledge about native customs, however, Frontenac contradicted the image of the indigenous people as agents. Perhaps to reassure the minister that he remembered the warnings about the danger of the Five Nations, Frontenac claimed that the Iroquois were warlike savages, fickle, and inconstant, and whose going to war only depended "on a dream that one of their old women has at night. . . ."[66] In this deprecating and misogynistic statement, the count assured Colbert that the Iroquois were ignorant and hostile.

Disparaging the dreams of old women completed the picture of irrational "savages" who had a propensity for war without cause. Frontenac showed his unfamiliarity with the crucial role of women in the Five Nations, provided an example of the negative attitude of some Frenchmen towards native women in New France, and hinted, but failed to understand, the importance of dreams to the Iroquois.

In the tribes of the Iroquois League, women determined the fate of captives and kept an eye on new adoptees. The family of a woman received thirty strings of wampum compensation if she were murdered, while a male murder victim was worth only twenty.[67] The clans were matrilineal, in that the child received a name belonging to his or her mother's clan.[68] When a clan "chief" died, the clan mother (a recognized senior woman) consulted other women in that clan of the same tribe and chose the man who would be successor.[69] Also, the dream had a special significance for the members of the Five Nations. Dreams were respected and interpreted as wishes of the spirit.[70] An unfavorable dream might mean disaster in battle, and therefore the clan matron's dream might stop a war party. Frontenac was apparently unaware of ideas so alien to his patrilineal world where the children took the father's last name and social position. While some outstanding French women of the seventeenth century led battles, planned military campaigns, and served as governors, a strong sexism pervaded many aspects of society, especially in the writings of religious orders. Nor were dreams taken too seriously in Europe. Frontenac, a product of his era, would use an elderly woman and her dream as an example of primitive superstition.[71] This characterization was inconsistent with the image of savvy, entrepreneurial Iroquois, but given the nature of the memoir, Frontenac probably emphasized the "savagery" of these Amerindians to thrust home his opinion about the need to contain hostile excursions into French fur-trapping land.

This lack of understanding of tribal customs and the role of women caused him to fall into an old trap of criticizing something he did not understand, yet his failure to grasp some crucial aspects of Iroquoian society did not mean that the count was completely oblivious.[72] Understanding potential allies and previous enemies was important in order to secure trade and peace, and Frontenac was not blinded completely by prejudice. His increasingly informed opinion of the role of the League in trade relations during this era can be demonstrated from the pages of his 1673 letter to Colbert and his journal recording his voyage to Lake Ontario. This journal, intended for both public consumption and as a private record, detailed the long trip through the wilds of New France.[73] In the opening, he wrote that breaking off trade would disrupt peace because the

> Iroquois... being in a position to dispense with us, and finding greater facility in their hunting and trade, would more easily resume that inclination they naturally feel for war, inasmuch as they had an idea that they could undertake it with less risk on the arrival of a new governor, whom they knew had no troops.[74]

These were astute Iroquois taking initiative, cognizant of economic and military advantages, and not Amerindians motivated solely by fickleness or threats. Despite Frontenac's stereotypical analysis of the indigenous people's "natural" inclination for war, he perceived their active role in trade and politics.[75] The fact that he had limited troops in New France also shaded the description. Perhaps Colbert would be more likely to send reinforcements if he thought that the enemies were warmongers, that Frontenac was vulnerable with few soldiers, and that the natives did not depend upon the French for trade goods. The tenor of the letter implied that if the French could capture Iroquoian commerce, war might be averted. Thus Frontenac hoped to justify his insubordinate establishment of new forts. Self-service was not new for a French colonial governor.

In another section of the journal, Frontenac discussed how he tried to win the Iroquois League to a partnership in fur, a proposition that could only be made before the start of the Illinois conflict (1680). Forming strong trade bonds with the Iroquois, and of course profiting personally on the side, would bond the Five Nations to the French and help pay back the governor's creditors in the likely event he lost his post.[76] The governor noted that the Iroquois spokesman, Tarontishaty, was "the most skillful and the most experienced" of the leaders of the Five Nations.[77] Indeed, he paid him a compliment when he called him an "orator."[78] He was quite impressed with the Iroquois delegation. He wrote to Colbert that

> You would have assuredly been surprised, Monseigneur, to see the eloquence, the address, and the finesse with which all their deputies spoke to me, and if I had not the fear of looking ridiculous before you, I would tell you that they behaved to me reminiscent of the manners of the Senate of Venice, although their skins and their coverings were rather different from the clothes of the procurators of St. Mark.[79]

Frontenac opined that Tarontishaty could be persuaded that Iroquois policy should include trading with the French because it would be a mutually beneficial experience.[80] The way Frontenac planned to gain the goodwill of this prominent individual was by courting him with all the attention that would be lavished on a fellow entrepreneur.[81] If Frontenac thought the League consisted of

articulate "savages," as he stated in one portion of his early 1672 letter, then wooing Tarontishaty would entail some serious talk. The actual 1673 negotiations were quite revealing.

Frontenac discussed the fort's benefits with Tarontishaty in an intelligent and balanced fashion. The count tried to persuade Tarontishaty to choose his fort because the post was convenient and the League members would receive the same good treatment and terms as a French trader.[82] Appreciating Iroquois trade skills and independence, Frontenac offered an explanation for the possible disparity of price between Albany and Fort Frontenac, observing that because of the great distances involved in transporting trade goods to the isolated fort, prices might seem a little higher in comparison.[83]

In turn, Frontenac recorded how the indigenous spokesman, "in an address which exhibited nothing barbarous," stated that the League needed to know precisely how much it could get for pelts and the cost of the trade goods.[84] Frontenac avoided committing himself to price but also spoke reasonably when he replied that until the fort was built and material shipped in, he would not know the cost of the merchandise.[85] The Iroquois, according to Frontenac, appeared satisfied to come to the fort when it opened and discern the advantages for themselves.[86] Frontenac's depiction of the Iroquois League was one of careful, thoughtful consumers and merchants who had a voice in how they managed their furs and their alliances. They had a rational policy of creating competition for their furs by choosing, at times, not to deal with the Dutch at Albany.

Another interesting section of the journal concerns Frontenac's meeting with the "Captain General of all the Five Nations," in whom the count was delighted to report that he could see "submission and peace."[87] Many seventeenth-century letters used to word "submission" to denote compliance or general agreement, while the word "peace" meant not just the opposite of war, but also being satisfied with oneself and one's situation. The next portion of his sentenc was striking, however. Having assured his reader that the League was now in general agreement and satisfied, the count continued that the captain general "assured him he should ever entertain [peace and submission], though naturally he might be induced to wage war, and his interests may obviously lead him there."[88] Significantly, Frontenac realized that Iroquois interests might require war to fulfill, so all the more reason to obtain their friendship and make them dependent upon trading posts that could compete with the Dutch and English!

In 1674, Frontenac reinforced his observation that the Five Nations consisted of careful consumers and central agents in the fur trade. The governor informed Colbert that only two things kept the Iroquois trading with the French:

the general fairness of Frontenac's dealings with them, and the convenience of fort.[89] The count's boasting about his "fairness" aside, he noted that accessibility won over the indigenous consumer, not threats or manipulation. By 1674, the count's experience with the Five Nations did not cause him to like them, but he did stop deprecating native customs and society. He had come to respect the Amerindians as savvy business people who resisted even his best laid plans if terms were not favorable.

Frontenac's respect for the Five Nations as astute traders only increased with time. In his 6 November 1678 missive to Colbert, Frontenac informed the minister about the latest trading news and colonial difficulties. He noted that indigenous groups were coming in large number to Québec, but this trade gave the French little profit as they brought only a few pelts.[90] The English gave a higher price for beaver skins and sold their goods quite inexpensively, thus, the convenient Albany fort was "a great lure" for Amerindians, who shopped in a discriminating fashion.[91] Business was so good, claimed Frontenac, that the English wondered if "they will not completely attract [indigenous peoples] there and not destroy from there all commerce that we have with [Amerindians]."[92] Once again, the governor demonstrated discernment concerning native people, but perhaps such observations explained why Frontenac did not have greater success in bringing the League into the French trade circle, since the governor was an old soldier, not a diplomat. Yet instead of calling the League members "savages" because they were reluctant to trade with the French, the count blamed French prices, merchandise, and policy against establishing trading posts in areas convenient to the natives.

Nine years in New France sharpened Frontenac's business sense and his assessment of the Iroquois League. Written during the uneasy early years of the Illinois conflict, these letters demonstrated that the Iroquois League were volatile potential enemies, people who needed to be handled with care, and yet acknowledged them as rational individuals. In his correspondence of 1681, the count openly recognized the Iroquois as autonomous actors. As tensions mounted, the count's respect for the indigenous trader grew, and even sometimes overshadowed his dislike of dangerous "savages." For example, in a letter to Louis XIV dated 2 November 1681, Frontenac informed the king about important events in Canada. He detailed his efforts against the *coureurs de bois* (renegade fur trappers), problems with the English, and relations with the indigenous populations. The count noted that the Iroquois League had been maneuvering trade between Montréal and Albany for some years.[93] He even wrote the word "*entrepôt*" to describe the Iroquois use of Montréal.[94] The indig-

enous people persisted in this endeavor not because they were threatened or manipulated, but because, as noted in an earlier letter, they discerned that

> the English rate the Beaver. . . one third higher than it is rated [in New France]. . . and they pay ordinarily in piastres, without making a distinction about who brought it, and when merchandise is preferred, they furnish it at a lower rate by half than do our merchants.[95]

Military alliance also played a part in the Iroquoian penchant for English trade, because Frontenac continued to note that the Iroquois favored the English with permission to cross their lands.[96] The Five Nations seemed to approve warring against the French on the side of the English, thus making them a dangerous and cunning ally.

A year later, in 1682, Frontenac wrote an angry letter concerning the Iroquois to the intendant, Jacques DuChesneau. The purpose of the missive was to acquaint the intendant with the count's preparation for the possibility of a League uprising against the Illinois. Refraining from discussing trade, Frontenac stated that the indigenous people were "insolent" and possessed great "arrogance" because they insisted that the king's representative in New France, the governor, come to *their* land for a peace talk, rather than the meeting place at Fort Frontenac.[97] From the Iroquois point of view, such a demand was not unreasonable, since earlier they met the count near the fort.

To Frontenac, however, such a request was an affront to the dignity of his office, and it was not unlike the insults he had received from his intendant. Frontenac confessed that he would not come to this peace talk, not because the action was beneath his dignity, but because it would "give them reason to believe that we fear them dreadfully, and that it is in their power to dictate the law to us."[98] A complex nobleman of the seventeenth century, Frontenac was alert to any potential deprecation of his lofty station, and he was certainly not going to go begging after the Iroquois. However, he was frustrated that the Five Nations often actively dictated terms. Such a meeting might have proven beneficial to both sides, but Frontenac could not bow to anyone but his superiors, the king and (usually) Colbert. In this instance, the count used strong language against both the League, whom he accused of an affront, and the intendant.

Frontenac answered the speech of the "deputy" of the Five Nations on 12 September 1682. Optimistic that war could be averted, the governor paternalistically threatened the Iroquois and asked them "not to undertake anything without considering well all the inconveniences and evil consequences that may

follow on the one side and on the other."[99] Frontenac was not in a military position to carry out his threats of war and punishment, so his only hope to avert war between the Iroquois and Illinois was diplomacy. The count's words suggested his opinion of the Iroquois mind. His association with the indigenous people had shown him their intellect and their ability to evaluate situations. Frontenac would not have asked them to look at the Illinois side of the argument, to put themselves in the other person's place, had he believed they were witless "savages." If that were the case, the governor would have appealed to Iroquoian suffering and loss alone. Instead, he asked that they consider their options as well as the plight of their neighbors. He knew that the welfare of the French and his job depended upon peaceful solutions to problems with natives. Always prepared to hedge his bets, Frontenac left an interesting memoir concerning the state of Amerindian affairs before his recall to France. His purpose was to highlight his own usefulness in Canada and to blunt the edge of ministerial criticism. His recall did not include the possibility of a prison sentence, and despite Iroquoian reluctance to join Frontenac's fur trading ventures, the count left New France fairly wealthy. His recall did not embitter him about the League; instead, his correspondence demonstrated a mature and informed opinion about the natives.

The letter opened with the governor's summation of the Iroquois perched on the brink of war against the French-allied Illinois. He stated: "This nation, moreover very warlike, also aims at the subjugation of all the others, and at making itself feared by them, so that there is no difficulty in persuading it to go to war and to avenge itself when it has any cause thereof."[100] This portrayal contained conflicting ideas. One can appreciate that Frontenac wanted Colbert to understand that without adequate troops he could do little to avert a war between two peoples with such great a sense of honor. He depicted the Iroquois League as a deadly enemy and yet ambitious in a fashion that a European soldier understood. He mentioned that the Five Nations, in response to French friendship to the Illinois, refused to trade beaver pelts for French goods, a form of early day economic sanction.[101] His tenure of office caused him to see the agency of the Iroquois, to appreciate (if dislike) their business sense, and to emphasize their warlike features as peace moved into conflict.

Count Frontenac did not necessarily like the Iroquois, but his descriptions of their behavior indicated that he placed them within a spectrum of behavior very intelligible to Europeans. Indeed, as a principal player in the fur trade and French colonial politics, he provided an interesting look at the activity of the Iroquois. Before 1680 the governor characterized the Iroquois as intelligent

potential allies. After this date his writings showed them as ominous enemies who were to be respected for their power and entrepreneurial skills, a difference no doubt created by impending war. For their part, the Iroquois discerned no advantage to trading with the French because the cost of French merchandise was higher than English goods. Thus they went about forming their own commerce with the Dutch and English. Yet instead of lashing out verbally at the natives for his lack of trading success with them, Frontenac continued to admire their savvy and to look for ways to obtain their pelts. His deprecating statements were the result of misunderstanding, a need to make the urgency of military help felt in France, and from the wounded ego of a seventeenth-century French count coming to terms with the realities of the New World.

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Notes

1. King François I also claimed he gave permission for the Cartier-Roberval expedition in order to convert the natives to Christianity. However, no missionaries sailed with the expedition. For a brief overview, see Philip Boucher, *Les Nouvelles France* (Providence, RI: John Carter Brown Library, 1989), 5–6.
2. For example, Colbert and Champlain desired stable, agrarian communities and alliances with indigenous peoples such as Algonquian nations like the Ottawas and Montagnais and Iroquois-speaking Hurons.
3. Marc Lescarbot, *Histoire de la Nouvelle France* (Paris: 1609).
4. See Bruce Trigger, *The Children of Aataentsic*, 2 vols. (Toronto: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1976), Chapter 10 and Matthew Dennis, *Cultivating a Landscape of Peace: Iroquois-European Encounters in Seventeenth-Century America* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1993), 92, 221–22. For an interesting view of internal Iroquois friction over Jesuit missionaries, see Daniel K. Richter, "Iroquois versus Iroquois: Jesuit Missions and Christianity in Village Politics, 1642–1686," *Ethnohistory* 32 (January 1985): 1–16.
5. Although, as Trigger rightly points out, Hurons captured and adopted by the Iroquois played a major role in killing Brébeuf and Lalemant. They had intimate knowledge of French missionaries among the Hurons and blamed them for the destruction on the Huron. See Trigger, *Natives and Newcomers: Canada's 'Heroic Age' Reconsidered* (Kingston and Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1985), Chapter 5, especially pp. 267–68.
6. A more accessible reproduction can be found in Dennis, *Cultivating a Landscape*, 241–42.
7. J.A. Brandão and William A. Starna, "A Triumph of Iroquois Diplomacy," *Ethnohistory* 43:2 (1996): 210.

8. See George T Hunt in *The Wars of the Iroquois: A Study of Intertribal Trade Relations* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1940), 66–144.
9. The governor was in charge of military matters, indigenous affairs, and relations with other European colonies. The intendant who was theoretically something of an equal, presided over judicial and civil matters, as well as finances. The bishop named council members, and had charge of all religious matters. Finally, the sovereign council was a group of men including the governor, intendant, and bishop, as well as other individuals appointed by the king, the governor, the bishop, or voted into office. The council promoted the king's laws, prosecuted criminal and civil cases, appealed cases to higher courts, and heard petitions. An excellent explanation of their positions and duties can be found in William J. Eccles's *Le gouvernement de la Nouvelle France* (Ottawa: La Société historique du Canada, Brocheure Historique 18, 1975).
10. Jean-Baptiste Colbert, *Lettres, mémoires, et instructions de* Colbert, vol. III, part 2, Pierre Clément, ed. (Paris: Imprimerie Nationale, 1861–62), III,2: 391–92. He always neglected to mention the inhumanities and outright slaughter perpetrated by the French against the members of the Iroquois.
11. Bibliothèque Nationale, Mélanges Colbert (henceforth B.N., Mel. Col.) #142*bis*, ff881–81v.
12. For example, Colbert, *Lettres*, III,2: 444–47, 450, 451–52, 511–20.
13. As will be noted at the conclusion of this paper, other officials gave valuable observations that should not be neglected. However, for the purposes of this work, only Count Frontenac will be examined.
14. Indeed, usually corroborating information came from other colonial officials such as Intendant Jacques Talon (dates of office: 1666–1668, 1670–1672), Intendant Jacques DuChesneau (1675–1682), Governor Daniel Rémy de Courcelle (1665–1672) and Governor Antoine le Febvre de la Barre (1682–1685), for example, whose papers reinforced many of Frontenac's assertions and impressions. The correspondence of Talon, DuChesneau, and de Courcelle is mostly in Paris, at the Bibliothèque Nationale and Archives Nationales. De la Barre's correspondence may be perused in *La Nouvelle France sous Joseph-Antoine le Febvre de la Barre*, Pauline Dubé, ed. (Sillery, Québec: Septentrion, 1993).

    When Frontenac was not corroborated it generally occurred when he or his antagonists wrote about personal feuds, such as his battle with his hated intendant, DuChesneau, or when he tried to justify his importance and his accomplishments in order to gain or regain royal favor.
15. Bruce Trigger, "Early Native North American Responses to European Contact: Romanticism vs. Rationalistic Interpretations," *Journal of American History* 77(1991): 1195–1215.
16. Peter Wogan, "Perceptions of European Literacy in Early Contact Situations," *Ethnohistory* 41:3 (Summer 1994): 407–429. While his argument concerns the indigenous perception of European literacy, Wogan's article has a valid caution for scholars using European informants.
17. A position held by cultural relativists such as Marshall D. Sahlins, *Historical Metaphors and Mythical Realities: Structure in* the Early History of the Sandwich Islands (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1981).
18. Trigger, *The Children*; Anthony Wallace, *Death and* Rebirth of the Seneca (N.Y.: Alfred Knopf, 1970); and Daniel K. Richter, "Cultural Brokers and Intercultural Politics: New York-Iroquois Relations, 1664–1701," *Journal of American History* 75:1 (1988): 40–67. Hunt in *The Wars of the Iroquois* introduced the scholarly notion that the Iroquois fought the French and French-allied tribes for economic reasons. This idea was opposed by subsequent scholars such as Karl H. Schlesier, "Epidemics and Indian Middlemen: Rethinking the Wars of the Iroquois, 1609–1653," *Ethnohistory* 23:2 (1976): 129–45.
19. *Rapport de l'Archiviste de la province de Québec*, 1922–55. P.G. Roy, ed., *Literary and Historical Society of Quebec, Historical Documents*, 1926–1927, vol. 1. (N.P.: L.-Amable Proulx: 1927), henceforth *RAPQ*, 1: 38. Richter notes that only "ritualized generosity" toward kin and other

villagers kept clan headmen in their position. See "Cultural Brokers," 42. A spokesman for the Iroquois was not necessarily a headman.

20. Ibid., 1: 21–22, 27; and *Collection de manuscrits contenant* lettres, mémoires, et autres documents historiques relatifs à la *Nouvelle-France*, vol. 1 (Quebec: Imprimerie A. Côté et Cie, 1883), henceforth *CDM*, 1: 225–26.
21. *RAPQ*, 1: 21. Frontenac seemed to have trouble remembering if there were three or four estates in the French Estates General (there were three). Since the last Estates General met in 1614, there is little reason to wonder why sixty-eight years later the count was confused.
22. Ibid.
23. Ibid., 1: 44, 35.
24. Ibid., 1: 20.
25. Ibid., 1: 33, 35. See also 1: 62.
26. There are many examples of these sentiments contained within Frontenac's letters. For examples, see Ibid., 1: 20–21, 31–34, and 1: 63.
27. Ibid., 1: 21. These Iroquois were the so-called francophile Christians, who quit their tribes in the mid-1670s to join missionary communities in New France as *domiciliés* or mission Indians.
28. Ibid., 1: 20.
29. The Iroquois League, or Five Nations, was not a unified body of homogenous Amerindians but a great league of peace consisting of the Mohawks, Oneidas, Onondagas, Cayugas, and Senecas. This confederacy had a group of autonomous villages.

    The Mohawk controlled the eastern part of the Iroquois Confederacy. Their proximity to Albany and their access to the fur trade made them a powerful part of the Five Nations. Likewise, their proximity to the east gave them early contact with Europeans. Early French alliance with their enemy, the Algonquin, caused many costly raids and losses of warriors in the early decades of the seventeenth century. Becoming dependent on Dutch trade, the Mohawk continued the tradition under the English flag (William Fenton and Elisabeth Tooker, "Mohawk," *Handbook of North American Indians: Northeast* (henceforth *HNAI*), vol. 15 (Washington: Smithsonian, 1978), 466–70.

    The Oneida controlled Oneida Lake and the upper Mohawk valleys. At the time of European contact, there was a single Oneida village of about sixty-six houses. Soon involved with the fur trade, the Oneida faced hard times in the 1640s when the fur supply could not match their demand for European goods. Competition for furs and goods between the Oneida-Iroquois Confederacy and the French-Huron-Algonquin caused the Oneida to war furiously and to adopt replacements for deceased warriors captured from enemy tribes (Jack Campisi, *HNAI*, "Oneida," 481–82).

    The Onondagas were the most central of the tribes of the League. Such a location kept them relatively safe from invasion from the east and west. They were the designated "firekeepers" of the League, thus they kept wampum records and convened meetings. In the seventeenth century, the Onondagas had two villages: a large capital and a smaller village. They were the diplomatic center of the Five Nations and housed a pro-French faction. They traded with the Dutch as well as the French (Harold Blau, Jack Campisi, and Elisabeth Tooker, *HNAI*, "Onondagas," 491–94).

    The Cayuga were located between the Onondagas and the Seneca, the keepers of the western Iroquois region. The Cayuga relied heavily upon hunting, and in the seventeenth century they had three main villages. As their dependency upon the fur trade increased, so too did their raids on neighboring Huron, Petun, and Neutral lands. In 1661, a Cayuga chief lead a delegation to Montréal to arrange a peace settlement with the French, with whom they and the rest of the League had fought for years. The establishment of peace would allow the Cayuga to pursue their fight against the Susquehannock. However, by 1687, relations with the French worsened and the Cayuga enjoyed the singular good fortune of being the only

League member whom the French did not raid (Mariane White, William Engelbrecht, and Elisabeth Tooker, *HNAI*, "Cayuga," 500–01).

The last member of the Confederacy was the keeper of the western lands, the Seneca. The biggest group of the League, they enjoyed large hunting grounds. Archaeological evidence points to two groups of Senecas, an eastern and western branch, during the seventeenth century. Like the rest of their Confederacy, the Seneca became involved in the fur trade as their desire for European goods increased. As beaver thinned out, they looked to expand their territory to the north, against the Huron. Hatred and fear of the Susquehannock caused the Seneca to band with other League members when traveling to Albany to trade furs, and also to seek peace with the French to free their braves for war against their indigenous enemy. With the Susquehannock defeated in 1675 and the French expanding westward, relations deteriorated between the Seneca and the French (Thomas Abler and Elisabeth Tooker, *HNAI*, "Seneca," 505–07).

Political ties depended upon economic trade between kin groups. Personal alliances between leaders also formed the alliance. See Daniel K. Richter, "Cultural Brokers and Intercultural Politics: New York-Iroquois Relations, 1664–1701," *Journal of American History* 75:1 (1988): 40.

30. *CDM*, 1: 268.
31. For a concise explanation of those traditional frameworks, see Olive Dickason, *The Myth of the Savage and the Beginning of French* Colonialism in the Americas (Edmonton: University of Alberta Press, 1984).
32. Some of the literature on the North American fur trade includes Eccles, "The Fur Trade in Colonial New England," in *HNAI*, vol. 4: 324–32; Daniel Francis and Toby Morantz, Partners in Fur: A History of the Fur Trade in Eastern James Bay, 1660–1870 (Montréal: McGill-Queens University Press, 1983); Thomas E. Norton, *The Fur Trade in Colonial New York* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1974); Paul Phillips, *The Fur Trade*, vol. 1 (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1961). For a look at the Russian connection, see Raymond Fisher, *The Russian Fur Trade, 1550–1799* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1943), 360. For a closer look at North America, see Eccles's article, "The Fur Trade" *HNAI*, 4:324–34. For the purposes of this paper, the vital link between French, English, and Dutch politics and the fur trade will not be examined.
33. See Fisher, *The Russian Fur Trade*, 190.
34. In a classic work on mercantilism, Eli Hecksher defined the economic system as one with strong government intervention in areas of bullion, agriculture, manufacturing, trade, and creating overseas monopolies (Eli Hecksher, *Mercantilism*, 2 vols., Mendel Shapiro, trans. (London: Unwin and Allen, 1955), 1: 1 and *passim*). For the French viewpoint, see Charles W. Cole, *Colbert and a* Century of French Mercantilism, 2 vols. (Columbia: Columbia University Press, 1939; reprint, Hamden, Ct.: Archon Books, 1964) 1: 3–5. For the English perspective, see Adam Smith, *An Inquiry* Into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations, vol. 39 in Great Thinkers, William Benton, ed., (Chicago: Britannica, Inc., 1952), 183–92.
35. *Documents Relative to the Colonial History of the State of New* York (henceforth *NYCD*), 15 Vols. E.B. O'Callaghan, ed. and trans. (Albany: Weed, Parsons, and Company, 1856–87), 9: 80 and 64–65.
36. For the rift between Catholic Iroquois and non-Catholic Iroquois, see Richter, "Iroquois versus Iroquois," 1–16.
37. *Dictionary of Canadian Biography* (henceforth *DCB*), vol. 1, George Brown, ed. (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1966; reprint, 1979), 1: 442–45. See also William J. Eccles, *Canada Under Louis XIV* (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1964), 78 and his earlier work *Frontenac: The Courtier Governor* (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1959), 18–30.
38. This policy becomes clear when perusing Colbert's letters and instructions to the governor of

New France. For examples see Colbert, *Lettres*, and *NYCD*, 9: 39–44. Eccles, *France in America*, (N.Y.: Harper & Row, 1972) shows this traditional notion of a compact colony, as does Gustave Lanctot, *A History of Canada*, 3 vols. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1964).

39. *Royal Fort Frontenac* (henceforth *RFF*) Richard Preston, ed. (Toronto: Champlain Society for the University of Toronto Press, 1958), 121 and 319; and *RAPQ*, 1: 26–52, 60–78.
40. The refusal came because Colbert wanted to stop Canadians from migrating west, and Lake Ontario constituted the west. See *RFF*, 102 and 300. In the margin of the letter is Colbert's answer: "Establishment on Lake Ontario. To wait."
41. *RAPQ*, 1: 58, 68.
42. Ibid., 1: 26–52.
43. For a comparison, see A.V. Petrovich, "At Wit's End: Colbert and the Governors Jean-Charles de Baas and Louis de Baude, Comte de Frontenac," *Proceedings of the French Colonial Historical Society* 20(1996): 50–58.
44. *RAPQ* 1: 78; and *Loix et Constitutions des colonies françoises de l'Amérique sous le vent*, 6 vols., Louis E. Médéric Moreau de Saint Méry, ed. (Paris: Published by the editor, 1784–90), 4: 402.
45. *Jesuit Relations and Allied Documents*, 72 vols., R.G. Thwaites, ed. (Cleveland: 1896–1901), 60; 134.
46. *RFF*, 125 and 323.
47. Eccles, *Canadian Frontier*, 109.
48. *RAPQ*, 1: 33–39.
49. *NYCD*, 3: 347, 772. For later dates, see 3: 442 and 510.
50. See *Archives de Québec: ordonnances, commissions, etc., etc. de gouverneurs et intendants de la Nouvelle France*, 2 vols., P.G. Roy, ed. (Beaucerville: L'eclaireur, 1924), 1: 210 for a sample of the permits. Trading licenses were supposed to limit how many French could go into the wilds as Colbert did not want to allow the colonists to spread thinly in North America.
51. *RAPQ*, 1: 85.
52. *NYCD*, 9: 126.
53. The governor and his intendant created turmoil both in the colony and, no doubt, in Colbert's stomach. On his return to France, DuChesneau left government service and devoted himself to his family and estate at Ambrant in Berry, where he died in 1696 (*DCB* 1: 287–90).
54. See Colbert, *Lettres*, III,2: 557–61, 574–81, 585–90, and 641.
55. Ibid., III,2: 641.
56. Archives Nationales, Colonies, C11 A5, 198–204. Both men used *coureur de bois* and their official capacity to get rich on the fur trade, and they took turns arresting the other's *coureurs* and setting free their own imprisoned men like La Salle and Greysolon de Dulhut attached themselves to Frontenac and Charles Auburt de la Chesnaye and Jacques Lalande belonged to DuChesneau's illegal fur operation (*DCB* 1: 289).
57. *RAPQ*, 1: 120–24.
58. Colbert, *Lettres*, III,2: 644–49.
59. *RAPQ*, 1: 129.
60. The governor excelled at imperious behavior when he decided someone undermined his authority. For example, once he arbitrarily jailed a clerk of the court, and another time he had a Montréal judge who annoyed him put in prison for two months and fined 200 *livres*. In the winter of 1678–79 he tried to subjugate the council and intendant by planning to preside over meetings, which was illegal since the king's edict of 1675. When the sovereign council refused to allow Frontenac to preside, the governor sent the attorney-general, council member Ruette d'Auteuil, and two other members packing to France for refusing to submit to the command of the king's representative. In the end, only one member went to France, and he convinced the king and Colbert that Frontenac was to blame. It took all the influence of Frontenac's

friends and family to retain his position in the face of such abuses (*DCB*, 1: 136). Eventually, however, their lobbying failed to soothe the anger of the minister and Louis XIV.

61. Because of the lack of qualified individuals for high posts in colonial areas, the crown gave the count back his position as governor of New France in 1689. He died in office on 28 November 1698 at Québec and was laid to rest in the church of the Recollets of Québec.
62. Eccles, *The Canadian Frontier, 1534–1760* (N.Y.: Holt, Rinehart, & Winston, 1969), 109–14.
63. *RAPQ*, 1: 14.
64. Ibid.
65. The role of the Iroquois as sort of middlemen is disputed by authors such as Schlesier in "Epidemics and Indian Middlemen," 129–145. He states, "The Iroquois never attempted to become middlemen of the fur trade, neither did other Indian tribes, including the Huron and Ottawa" (131). He goes on to suggest that disease, especially smallpox, and not economic fights, decimated the natives. Ultimately his argument is not convincing because weapons necessary to compete with French-supplied natives and with Europeans in general came from the fur trade.
66. *RAPQ*, 1: 15.
67. *HNAI*, 15: 423, 482.
68. Ibid., 424.
69. Ibid., 425–26.
70. Ibid., 319.
71. A fascinating look at sex roles, Catholic conversion, and the repression of Huron females, especially by Jesuit missionaries, can be found in Karen Anderson, *Chain Her By One Foot: Subjugation of Women in Seventeenth Century New France* (N.Y.: Routledge, 1991).
72. Since Frontenac did not understand that in a matrilineal society a mother's brother had a more important role in the family than a father, he often referred of himself as the "father" of the Iroquois League and not as their mother's brother (*NYCD*, 9: 85, 95–96). For more information on this interesting nomenclature, see John Steckley, "The Warrior and the Lineage: Jesuit Use of Iroquoian Images to Communicate Christianity," *Ethnohistory* 39:4 (1992): 500–01.

    This is not to diminish the possibility that European perception of indigenous customs caused a possibly erroneous form of address, or the problem of interpreters changing Amerindian speeches to conform with preconceived European norms. See Lawrence Leder, ed., *Livingston Indian Records, 1666–1773* (Gettysburg: Pennsylvania Historical Association, 1959) and *Archives de Québec*.
73. *NYCD*, 9: 85, 95–96. A letter repeating some of the information in the journal can be found in *RAPQ*, 1: 26–52. See also *NYCD*, 9: 106–07.
74. *NYCD*, 9: 96.
75. According to a memoir from 1 October 1668, the French on Madagascar also had a "natural" inclination for war and rapine (B.N., Manuscrits Française, Nouvelles Acquisitions #9342, 66).
76. Frontenac only needed to consider the fate of the Marquis de Mondevergue, lieutenant-general of the East Indies and governor at Madagascar. Accused of ill deeds, de Mondevergue lost his post and died in prison at Château Saumar, France, in 1672.
77. *RAPQ*, 1: 38.
78. Ibid.
79. Ibid., 1: 39.
80. Ibid.
81. Ibid.
82. *NYCD*, 9: 105–107.
83. Ibid.

84. Ibid., 9: 110.
85. Ibid., 9: 111.
86. Ibid.
87. Ibid., 9: 113.
88. Ibid.
89. *RFF*, 1125.
90. *CDM*, 1: 266.
91. Ibid.
92. Ibid.
93. *RAPQ*, 1: 126.
94. Ibid. No doubt, these were *domicilés* who were settled near Montréal in fair numbers. The French treated them carefully, and they were not subject to the French judicial system in most cases. See Jan Grabowski, "French Criminal Justice and Indians in Montreal, 1670–1760," *Ethnohistory* 43:3 (1996): 405–29.
95. *RAPQ*, 1: 127.
96. Ibid.
97. *NYCD*, 9: 175.
98. Ibid.
99. Ibid., 9: 188.
100. *RAPQ*, 1: 141.
101. Ibid., 1: 143.

Freedom without Equality: Maine Civil War Soldiers' Attitudes about Slavery and African Americans

Andrew J. DeRoche

Civil war soldiers from Maine brought preconceived notions about African Americans into the army, and these attitudes fell across a broad spectrum. Some empathized with African Americans, some disdained them, and many held ambivalent views somewhere in between. Among the majority of soldiers, Republican free labor ideology resonated much more strongly than radical abolitionist sentiments. Wartime experiences convinced Maine soldiers to advocate emancipation, but often for reasons unrelated to the welfare of African Americans. By the end of the war, most Maine soldiers favored emancipation for military reasons but not racial equality. Private John Haley of the Seventeenth Maine Regiment wrote of African Americans in 1864: "I desire that their freedom should be established but don't consider that freedom involves social equality."[1]

Why examine the attitudes of common Maine Civil War soldiers? What makes these Mainers historically significant, or makes their views unique? These soldiers deserve attention because of Maine's inordinately large contribution to the Northern war effort. Over seventy thousand Maine men served during the war, which represented over sixty percent of the eligible military population—the highest figure for any Northern state.[2] During the Civil War millions of African Americans gained freedom—some with the Emancipation Proclamation in 1863 and the rest with the Thirteenth Amendment in 1865. Documents drafted in Congress or by President Abraham Lincoln were important, but the most instrumental factor in ending slavery was Northern armies.[3] While African American soldiers played a key role, the vast majority of Northern soldiers were white, as were all Maine regiments.[4] The words and actions of Maine soldiers regarding African Americans reveal much about the meaning of the

Civil War to whites who fought. This study examines the letters and diaries of Maine soldiers to investigate the meaning of the war for them and to focus on their views regarding African Americans.[5]

Maine soldiers gradually accepted emancipation during the war, as years of fighting and traveling in the South convinced them that it would benefit the Northern effort. Lincoln justified it as a military necessity to save the Union, as he explained in a letter to James Conkling: "I issued the proclamation on purpose to aid you in saving the Union."[6] This reasoning was agreeable to most soldiers. They advocated emancipation as a tool to help save the Union, but did not necessarily think it should lead to social equality for the freedmen.

Contact with African Americans during the war had a wide assortment of effects on Maine soldiers, but those who came out calling for racial equality were very few. To convince Mainers to advocate equality, interaction with African Americans often had to overcome negative attitudes that the soldiers had brought into the army. Most soldiers viewed African Americans as peculiar at best, and many considered them inferior. Attitudes of respect and concern for African Americans were rare among Mainers. Indeed, few Maine soldiers joined the army with a strong sense that African Americans were equal human beings. Not many had black friends or had belonged to abolitionist societies. Since the antislavery movement in Maine produced few abolitionists in the population in general, however, it is not surprising that few soldiers were abolitionists. By 1855, the antislavery movement in Maine had virtually disappeared. The Maine Antislavery Society had disbanded in the 1840s, as did the abolitionist Liberty Party. The Free Soil party, a weaker opponent of slavery, folded in 1854.[7]

The Republican Party emerged in 1855 from the cloud of dust caused by the Kansas-Nebraska Act. The attitudes of the vast majority of Maine soldiers reflected the influence of Republican ideology, rather than that of radical abolitionism. Republicans espoused a system of free labor, which offered any white man the opportunity to improve his condition through hard work. They judged it an infinitely better system than slavery, which they believed degraded labor, retarded education, destroyed the soil's productivity, and was inefficient.[8] The leading spokesman for the Republicans' free labor ideology in the late 1850s was William Seward of New York, who later served as Secretary of State during the Lincoln Administration.

By the late 1850s, abolitionism and other components of evangelical reform had lost saliency among the masses of Maine. The leading party, the Republicans, downplayed both slavery and temperance. Yet both issues had stamped an indelible mark on a vocal minority of Mainers, many of whom would become

influential leaders during and after the Civil War. The prohibitionists, led by Neal Dow, had gained their greatest triumph with the prohibitionary Maine Law of 1851. Dow became a general during the war, but his fight against liquor had lost much of its support by then, and prohibition would not achieve national success until 1920.[9]

Abolitionists triumphed during the Civil War and in the early years of Reconstruction. Two Maine men, Hannibal Hamlin and Oliver Otis Howard, occupied pivotal positions in these events. Hamlin, Lincoln's first vice president, advocated emancipation from the early days of the war.[10] After serving as a Union general at many battles including Gettysburg, Howard accepted leadership of the Freedmen's Bureau in 1865. Howard strove to succor some four million former slaves as best he could and founded Howard University in Washington to provide them with the opportunity for higher education.[11]

Hamlin and Howard were exceptional individuals, however, and did not exemplify the attitudes of the majority of Maine soldiers, very few of whom were abolitionists. While antebellum antislavery did not produce large numbers of abolitionist soldiers, the movement may well have contributed to the empathy for African Americans expressed by a small number of common Maine soldiers. Some Mainers did come into the war feeling compassion and respect for African Americans, as manifested by the letters of Chandler Perry. A farmer from South Thomaston, Perry died in a Southern prison early in the war. Few of his letters survive today, but they make clear his concern for blacks.

On 30 June 1861, Chandler Perry described the newly freed slaves around camp as "a happy set of fellows." About two weeks later he informed his wife that "we had five good looking runaway slaves come to us yesterday for protection and they were cared for you may depend."[12] This statement sheds light on the attitude not only of Chandler Perry, but also on that of his wife. "They were cared for you may depend" suggests that she was also concerned about the treatment of African Americans, and that her attitude may have shaped his. In any case, Perry was concerned about the welfare of African Americans very early in the war. He expressed this attitude without extensive contact with African Americans and long before the Emancipation Proclamation.

Henry McIntire's attitude early in the war was also sympathetic towards African Americans. Regarding former slaves streaming into camp in April 1862, he wrote, "God knows I pity them poor little children hurrying they hardly know where but to suffer in our citys."[13] McIntire's words predicted the later hardships of African Americans in Northern cities with uncanny accuracy, and his compassion indicates possible sympathies with antebellum abolitionism.[14]

Like Perry and McIntire, Mark Waterman voiced concern for African Americans shortly after enlisting. Letters to his wife written four months into his service express concern and respect for former slaves. Although Waterman was writing after Lincoln's Proclamation, his words go beyond Lincoln's military necessity justification. During February 1863 African Americans came to his quarters near Arlington every day looking for food, and he would "never send them away emty." He added that "some of them are quite intelegent and speak of how hard there Masters used them." In another letter he told his wife that "the white people here don't know as much as the Nigroes."[15]

Waterman, McIntire, and Perry expressed similar attitudes concerning African Americans. Although they did not write a great deal about the subject, what they did write was basically positive. They praised the intelligence of African Americans or showed concern for their welfare—stronger sentiments than Lincoln officially uttered. Such attitudes of respect and compassion early in the soldiers' tour hint at the influence of antislavery movements in prewar Maine or a general empathy encouraged by the strong religion of the times. In addition to abolitionism and evangelical Protestantism, however, antebellum Maine was the home to significant prejudice. The primary component of the prejudice in Maine was a strong belief in white superiority, and many soldiers brought such feelings into the army.

Danville Chadbourne of isolated Macwahoc Plantation served along the Georgia coast and then in Louisiana. From Baton Rouge he informed his father that he was helping to guard the quarters of a large number of African Americans. "They are a black nasty looking set any way one can fix it," he wrote. Peleg Bradford of Carmel echoed this opinion. He explained to his father that "I am a grate friend to a dam negro... I love a negro so well that when I meat one I make them go out side of the fence and give me all of the road." In another letter Bradford bemoaned his chances of finding a wife while in the South: "there is nothing but negro girls out here and they are too dam black to suit my eye."[16]

Meshack Larry had also been influenced by the prejudice common in prewar Maine. A blacksmith from South Windham, Larry served in Virginia. In three separate letters to his sister he indicated that a higher level of output was expected from whites than from African Americans. He rejoiced at the opportunity to "breath the fresh air and see people working like white men." Later he wrote, "I hope to be able to do my duty as becomes a white man." Finally, he added, "What ever turns up we will try and meet like white men."[17] Larry's view reflected the growing sense among white workers from 1800 to 1865 that their

"whiteness" was a key factor differentiating free laborers from slaves.[18] Larry not only considered African Americans inferior workers, but also agreed with Bradford that African American women were less attractive than white women. To his sister he wrote: "Some say they have ben so long with out seeing a white woman that the feet of these Ebony images look hansome but I can't see them in that light yet."[19]

The negative attitudes of Larry, Bradford, and Chadbourne towards African Americans reflect the prejudice of the mid-nineteenth century. These soldiers believed in white superiority. Other soldiers felt that while African Americans might not necessarily be inferior, they were certainly peculiar. Such views were probably due in part to the scarcity of African Americans in Maine. According to the 1860 census, of the 628,274 people in Maine, only 1,327 were black.[20] Most of this small number lived in the larger coastal towns, so soldiers who had grown up on inland farms or in smaller villages may not have ever seen an African American person before the war. For many of them, the blacks they saw in the South were strange and exotic. Maine soldiers often portrayed African Americans as peculiar and perhaps even of a different species.

Marching by a group of roadside slaves after a battle, Abner Small of Readfield observed: "The crazy contortions of their bodies and the grimaces of astonishment that spread over their faces... would have driven a circus crowd wild." Daniel Brown never mentioned contacting African Americans, but did attend a minstrel show. According to Brown, "the Battery boys Black up and act out the nigger. It is quite a show."[21] Minstrelsy amused men who had not had personal contact with blacks, but it went beyond fun by perpetuating stereotypes and fueling prejudice. Union soldiers enjoyed the Zip Coon and Jim Crow characters in blackface because they identified them as an inferior other. In the words of one scholar, minstrelsy was "empty of positive content."[22]

Minstrel shows featured a blending of humor and prejudice, which also took the form of kidding about bringing an African American child home to Maine. Levi Perry jokingly promised to reward his sister Hattie for good behavior. To their mother he wrote: "Tell Hattie to be a good girl and I will send her a little Nig if I can find one that I can get into a letter." Albert Manson made a similar promise for his son Charley, in two letters to his wife. First he wrote: "Tell Charley I will bring him home a little Niggar." A few weeks later he added: "Tell Charley I will try to get his Niggar."[23] The tone of these suggests that Manson and Perry viewed young African Americans more as pets for white children than as friends.

The promises of Perry and Manson were not serious, and neither brought a

black child home. They both felt that African Americans were peculiar and had brought these attitudes with them to the South. Other Mainers, as seen above, brought attitudes ranging from respect for African Americans to notions of white superiority. During the war, however, attitudes could be influenced by actual contact with African Americans. Men who interacted with many African Americans became convinced to take actions that they may not have considered before the war. Some Mainers, for example, did unofficially adopt African Americans from the South. In fact, Colonel Wentworth of Manson's own regiment brought home an African American boy.[24] At least one other Maine soldier, Elisha Goddard, returned to his home with a young African American. Goddard had hired the boy to be his servant while stationed in New Orleans.[25]

Though perhaps motivated somewhat by paternalism, Goddard and Wentworth did open their homes to African Americans. In the case of another Maine soldier, Hannibal Johnson, the roles were reversed. He and a few other soldiers escaped from a prison camp in Georgia in late November 1864. In order to escape to the North, they turned to blacks for assistance. As Johnson put it: "At night we approached a negro cabin for the first time; we did it with fear and trembling, but we must have food and help." The African Americans supplied Johnson's group with food and a hiding place. The next night a black guide led them on the first leg of their journey. About a week later, Johnson and the others reached Union lines in Tennessee. As they were passed from one guide to another along the way, they were treated kindly and fed well. In his diary Johnson observed: "If such kindness will not make one an abolitionist, then his heart must be of stone."[26]

Johnson owed his personal freedom to the compassion of slaves who had bravely and skillfully led him to safety. To him, African Americans were caring and able people who merited freedom—but this attitude was rare. His war experiences had convinced him of the need for emancipation because African Americans deserved it, but most Mainers came to advocate emancipation for different reasons. Most Maine soldiers became supporters of emancipation during the war for reasons having little to do with the welfare of African Americans, and were at best ambivalent about the effects of freedom on former slaves.

After ascending to the presidency in 1861, Abraham Lincoln emerged as the dominant influence on Republicans throughout the United States. Personally, Lincoln was a lifelong opponent of slavery. He believed its spread must be prevented in order to allow the spread of free labor. When it came to formulating a policy by which to erase it, however, he struggled. As early as 1852 he began to publicly advocate voluntary colonization of slaves in Africa or South America.

He believed such a policy would gain the support of whites in the North and South for the emancipation of slavery, whereas they might otherwise oppose it. Indeed, colonization would eradicate two of whites' central concerns about blacks: competition for jobs and interracial sex and marriage. He also believed it would give African Americans a chance to prove themselves in an independent state of their own. He never seemed to have grasped the simple fact that colonization could not succeed because virtually no African Americans wanted to move to Africa. Lincoln still talked about colonization as late as 1863.[27]

The majority of Maine soldiers embraced the tenets of Republican free labor ideology, and traveling in the South served to reinforce their views. Some felt ending slavery would help Southern whites financially, and others believed it would improve Southern whites' morality. A crucial benefit from emancipation understood by all was its strong contribution to the military effort to save the Union. Most Mainers, then, supported emancipation as a military necessity but did not support racial equality, echoing Lincoln's public pronouncements from before the war.

Henry McIntire was one of the Maine soldiers convinced of the economic benefits of emancipation. McIntire, a farmer from the western Maine town of Peru, explained the results of slavery to a friend at home. The farmland in Virginia was as fertile as that in Maine, but "slavery curses everything." The effects had been evident since entering the South, and "the line of demarkation is as perceptible as in passing from light to darkness."[28] White southern farmers, he concluded, would reap much better harvests without slavery. While historians still debate the actual productivity of slavery, McIntire accepted the Republican view that free labor was more efficient.[29] Frank Dickerson also thought that southern whites would benefit from the abolition of slavery. Of slave owners in Maryland he observed, "It will be two years before they can recover from the ruin which slavery has brought upon them, but eventually they will be much better off for its abolishment."[30] The view that contact with African Americans and association with the degrading institution of slavery had harmed southern whites reflected the aspect of Republican ideology that supported colonization and feared racial mixing.

Charles Barnard of Bucksport, a captain in a regiment stationed in Louisiana, was in continuous contact with African Americans. He reported to his wife, "Officers and men are having an easy time. We have Negroes to do all fatigue work." Exploiting blacks did not seem to bother him and ordering them punished did not either. With no expression of remorse he wrote: "I was obliged to order four Negros whiped 25 stripes each." Nonetheless, Barnard supported

emancipation as a wartime expedient. He explained: "I would emancipate the slaves so long as the war lasts... No measure could injure the South more... The fact is freeing the negro will starve the South into submission."[31] Mark Waterman concurred with Barnard that emancipation was a strategic move to help save the Union. He doubted that the efforts of men like himself would be enough to preserve the Union, but felt the Emancipation Proclamation would turn the tide. On 3 January 1863 he wrote that as far as saving the Union "the President's Message will do it sure."[32] The views towards emancipation of Barnard and Waterman revolved around its military benefits to the Union army, and their views were shared by the leader of the heroic Twentieth Maine Regiment, Joshua Chamberlain.[33] Chamberlain advocated emancipation for the damage it would do to the Confederate cause, but he never called for racial equality. That Maine's most famous soldier, and later its Republican governor, would hold views similar to Lincoln and the majority of soldiers is not surprising and helps explain his political success.[34]

Leander Cram supported emancipation for many reasons beyond military necessity, perhaps because his interactions with African Americans were extensive and rewarding. A teacher and farmer from Baldwin, Cram took part in the occupation of an island off the South Carolina coast. While there, Cram started a school for former slaves. He believed they deserved freedom and were capable of helping achieve it. "There is talk of raising negro troops on this Island. I find that the negro can learn about the same as any other people."[35] Cram's war experiences thus led him to cautiously advocate racial equality.

Cram's attitude was an exception. Meshack Larry's attitude was more typical, as he considered blacks to be inferior to whites and expected better conduct and performance by whites. A disappointment of his war experience was that white soldiers and politicians did not always live up to these expectations. As a result, African Americans looked better in comparison. To his sister he explained the following: "What I believed to be the curses of slavery has become knowledge and instead of thinking les of a negroe I have sadly learned to think them beter than many white men that hold responsible positions." In another letter he expressed a similar sentiment: "I am no Negro wosheper nor never was but when I think of some men that have acted importent parts in this show he appears to me like a herow and a Saint."[36] Disappointment with the conduct of white officers and politicians, rather than respect for African Americans, seems to have made Larry a supporter of emancipation.

While Larry felt blacks performed better than certain leading whites, John Sheahan felt African Americans were superior to poor Southern whites. A teacher

from Dennysville, Sheahan was stationed around Washington, D.C. He wanted to free the slaves but did not think that they could fend for themselves in the United States. "They talk about sending them to Africa and I think that they will have to for certainly they cant always keep guard round them and feed them as they do now." Thus Sheahan's vision of emancipation included colonization.[37] Support for colonization by Mainers like Sheahan revealed their uncertainty about the future of African Americans in the United States, considering the reality of white prejudice.

Lincoln's plans for colonization during the war failed. A late addition to his evolving plan for blacks—using them as soldiers—was very successful. African Americans, most notably Frederick Douglass, sought permission for their people to fight from the first days of the war.[38] As early as July 1861, Mainer Chandler Perry observed that runaway slaves wanted to "take the musket and fight for their liberty they say if their massa would only come in sight they would rap him." These men finally got their chance in 1863 when Lincoln officially sanctioned African American troops.[39] Maine's Hannibal Hamlin, then vice president, evidently convinced Lincoln to arm African Americans by bringing several whites who were willing to be officers to the White House shortly after the Emancipation Proclamation took effect.[40]

Maine soldiers supported the arming of African Americans for a number of reasons. As seen above, Leander Cram believed they "learn about the same as any other people" and deserved to help win their freedom.[41] Others saw it as a chance for personal advancement, and many Maine soldiers became officers of African American regiments.[42] Such men included John Appleton and Josiah Sturtevant, who rejoiced at his chance to be a lieutenant of the Eightieth U.S. Colored Regiment. Appleton was the son of a powerful Bangor judge who actively opposed slavery before and during the war.[43] The primary factor behind most Mainers' support for arming African Americans, however, remained military necessity.

Black soldiers would significantly aid the cause of saving the Union, as Abial Edwards concluded while serving in Louisiana and after observing African American troops. Regarding them he wrote, "I think they make a very good soldier. But still we have got that dislike which can not be overcome at once." In a letter a few days later Edwards expressed a similar attitude. He described how black troops had cheered the passing white troops, but that the whites could not bring themselves to cheer in return. He explained, "The negroes make a neat looking soldier and our Reg has come to the conclusion that they can and ought to fight as well as white folks but as for cheering them they can't do it."[44]

White soldiers appreciated African Americans' contribution to the cause as soldiers but were not ready to treat them as equal people.

After the war, Edward's regiment occupied Charleston for a year, where he became especially friendly with a freed slave named Jim. Edwards did not believe, however, that African Americans should be granted voting rights immediately. He feared Southern whites would manipulate them and seize control: "Still I don't believe in the Negroes voting right away. They aint as yet capable of it... now they are too easily influenced."[45] Lincoln was killed before his stance on African American suffrage was clear, but Maine Governor Joshua Chamberlain shared Edward's hesitancy. Veterans, who made up a huge part of the Republican party, would quickly lose interest in helping southern African Americans during Reconstruction.

How comparable were the views of Maine soldiers regarding African Americans to those of white Union soldiers from other Northern states? Historians have concluded that in general white Union soldiers were similarly influenced by abolitionism, prejudice, scarcity of African Americans, and their war experiences.[46] A closer examination of this conclusion reveals how and why Mainers were typical.

Very few white Union soldiers volunteered in order to abolish slavery, so the lack of abolitionists among Mainers was not unusual. Some soldiers praised blacks who had helped them, and some taught them to read—demonstrating that Mainers who praised or aided African Americans had counterparts from other states.[47] Such men, however, were rare in the white regiments of all Union states. They were not particularly numerous among Mainers, either. The antislavery movement did not enjoy exceptional success in Maine, so the influence of abolitionism was not profoundly greater on Mainers than on other Union soldiers. New York, Pennsylvania, and Massachusetts all featured stronger antislavery forces than those in Maine. Although the antislavery movement resulted in few abolitionist volunteers in Maine or anywhere, it did contribute to the respect for African Americans that some soldiers expressed.

More commonly Mainers and soldiers from other Union states shared ambivalent attitudes towards African Americans. Northern soldiers who considered African Americans to be a different species harassed and abused former slaves. According to one scholar, "Many soldiers were deeply prejudiced before entering the service. . . . Initial prejudices sometimes were softened by army experience, but usually the reverse was true."[48] So the prejudice that existed among Mainers was characteristic of many Union regiments. The negative opinions about African Americans expressed by Mainers were echoed by their counterparts from New Hampshire to Minnesota.

Whether or not they were prejudiced, most Mainers looked upon African Americans as too strange to understand. The idea that blacks were exotic or ludicrous was shared by white soldiers from throughout the North. The scarcity of African Americans in Maine (about one black per six hundred whites) contributed to the Mainers' attitude, but several Northern states actually contained a lower percentage of African Americans than Maine.[49] Furthermore, the Northern states with relatively high African American populations like New York or Pennsylvania consisted of a few cities with high numbers of African Americans and predominantly white rural farmlands. The fact that many Maine soldiers may have never seen a black person before the war also applied to soldiers from the rest of the rural North. Understandably, then, the view of many Mainers that African Americans were exotic was typical of white Union soldiers. Ignorance, abolitionism, prejudice, and the scarcity of African Americans influenced Mainers and other Union soldiers similarly. The wartime experiences of Mainers were also typical of other white Union soldiers, few of whom cared about the fate of the slaves, but who supported emancipation as a military measure.[50]

The complex attitude of one John Haley regarding African Americans contains the military necessity component but it also reveals more blatant prejudice and exemplifies the views of the majority of Maine soldiers, and by extension, Union soldiers. While serving in Virginia, Haley encountered blacks in a variety of circumstances, some of which brought out his negative biases. On one such occasion he ventured onto a plantation. The owner had fled, "leaving his estate in charge of a lot of niggers, who chattered and grinned like so many monkeys." This description resembles those of other Mainers who considered African Americans as peculiar—even subhuman. Another time, several young blacks came into camp and evidently became bothersome. Haley described the result as follows: "We bounced them up in blankets and made them butt against each other - also against some pork barrels. . . one young nigger had an arm broke, and several others were more or less maltreated."[51]

Though tolerant of such brutality toward African Americans, Haley did not approve of slavery. He made this clear when discussing a Southern minister: "A theology that sanctions slavery savors too strongly of Satan to be tolerated. The religion of Jesus Christ has nothing in common with the auction block or the lash." Like several of the other Mainers in this study, Haley's major criticism of slavery was not its effect on blacks. He believed that the overly close relations between the races, evident in the range of skin colors in the South, served to lower the superior whites to the level of the slaves. The South and her white people had great potential, "but too much dependence on the darkey and too

much intimacy with them has lowered the standards of decency and morality." The system of slavery had "destroyed much of the finer sensibilities of the Southern people, even of the better class."[52]

Like most of the Maine soldiers in this study, John Haley empathized much more readily with Southern whites than with African Americans. He wanted to end slavery but at the same time held prejudiced views. He encountered blacks in a wide range of circumstances, but did not completely overcome his conviction that they were in some way inferior. In October 1864, Haley approximated a synthesis of the complex attitudes of Maine soldiers regarding slaves when he wrote, "I desire that their freedom should be established but don't consider that freedom involves social equality... They might be just as good, clean, just as intelligent, and possess all the qualities of gentlemen, but they are a different species of bird."[53]

Thus the typical Maine soldier did not volunteer to abolish slavery, but by 1864 supported emancipation as military necessity, even if indifferent to the welfare of the freedmen. Indeed, many supporters of emancipation held views that African Americans were inferior or too different to be understood. Some Mainers believed southern whites would benefit economically from ending slavery, while others felt they would benefit morally. Maine soldiers' attitudes made it clear that preserving the Union was the primary goal of the war, so they accepted the emancipation of the slaves, but very few ever supported racial equality.[54]

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Notes

1. Ruth Silliker, ed., *The Rebel Yell and the Yankee Hurrah: The Civil War Journal of a Maine Volunteer, Private John W. Haley, 17th Maine Regiment* (Camden: Down East Books, 1985), 204.
2. William B. Jordan, Jr., *Maine in the Civil War: A Bibliographical Guide* (Portland: The Maine Historical Society, 1976), 72.
3. For a one-volume narrative of the events of the Civil War see James McPherson, *Battle Cry of Freedom: The Civil War Era* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1988). McPherson sparked the author's interest in Maine soldiers by assigning Michael Shaara, *The Killer Angels* (New York: Ballantine, 1974) back in 1986 at Princeton, and later directing his initial investigation of the topic.
4. All Maine soldiers were officially white, but there is some evidence of African American men "passing" for white to enlist.
5. This article is based on a chapter of the author's M.A. thesis, "Maine Civil War Soldiers:

Their Attitudes about Alcohol, Combat, Blacks, and Politics," (University of Maine, 1993). Both the Maine Historical Society in Portland (hereafter MHS) and the Fogler Library at the University of Maine in Orono (hereafter FL) listed Civil War soldiers' collections in their indexes. The author methodically examined them all, and found that letters are generally much richer than diaries. Of the thirty-seven soldiers studied, thirteen either made no mention of blacks or slavery or did not clearly indicate their attitudes.

6. Lincoln to Conkling, August 26, 1863 in *Abraham Lincoln: Speeches and Writings 1859–1865* (New York: Viking Press, 1989), 498. George Fredrickson argues that the very nature of Lincoln's emancipation policy allowed for the denial of social equality. In his words, "Abolition from military necessity would not guarantee a national commitment to racial equality." George Fredrickson, *The Inner Civil War: Northern Intellectuals and the Crisis of the Union* (New York: Harper and Row, 1965), 122.
7. See Edward O. Schriver's *Go Free: The Antislavery Impulse in Maine 1833–1855* (Orono: University of Maine Press, 1970), especially 109–110. Schriver concluded that antislavery in Maine basically failed, but he made clear that the abolitionist message was heard throughout Maine, though not often acted upon.
8. See Eric Foner, *Free Soil, Free Labor, Free Men: The Ideology of the Republican Party before the Civil War* (New York, 1970), 19, 41 and 51. For the importance of "whiteness" to Northern workers see David Roediger, *The Wages of Whiteness: Race and the Making of the American Working Class* (New York: Verso, 1991), 80–87.
9. For the story of Dow see Frank L. Byrne, *Prophet of Prohibition: Neal Dow and His Crusade* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1961). On alcohol and temperance movements in general see W.J. Rorabaugh, *The Alcoholic Republic: An American Tradition* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1979) and Clifford S. Griffin, *Their Brothers Keepers: Moral Stewardship in the United States 1800–1865* (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1960).
10. H. Draper Hunt, *Hannibal Hamlin of Maine: Lincoln's First Vice-President* (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1969).
11. John A. Carpenter, *Sword and Olive Branch: Oliver Otis Howard* (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1969), 82.
12. Chandler Perry Sr. to his wife, June 30 and July 12, 1861, Perry Papers, MHS.
13. Henry McIntire to Lyman Bolster, Apr. 30, 1862, McIntire Papers, University of Maine.
14. McIntire was a farmer in the small western Maine farming community of Peru, which did have a female antislavery society. See Schriver, *Go Free*, 141.
15. Mark Waterman to his wife, Feb. 28 and May 2, 1863, Waterman Papers, MHS.
16. Danville Chadbourne to his father, Jan. 13, 1863, Chadbourne Papers, FL; Peleg Bradford to his mother, Sept. 26, 1863, Bradford Papers, FL; Peleg Bradford to Eliza McPherson, May 14, 1863, Bean Collection, FL. Bradford later married Eliza. Ironically and perhaps unbeknownst to Bradford, four black men served in his very regiment. Described in a regimental history as being "of African descent," these four Maine men may have had light-enough colored skin to be accepted into the all-white regiment. See Charles J. House, *The First Maine Heavy Artillery: 1862–1865* (Portland, 1903), 210. The names and hometowns of the four blacks are all listed.
17. Meshack Larry to his sister, Nov. 30, 1862, Apr. 12 and Sept. 25, 1863, Larry Papers, MHS.
18. For discussion of the growing importance of a sense of "whiteness" among Northern labor from 1800 to 1865 see Roediger, *The Wages of Whiteness*, 14 and 87.
19. Meshack Larry to his sister, Sept. 28, 1862.
20. James McPherson, *The Negro's Civil War* (New York: Pantheon Books, 1965), appendix A. For each African American person in Maine, there were about six hundred whites.
21. Harold A. Small, ed., *The Road to Richmond* (Berkeley: Univ. of Cal. Press, 1939), 95; Daniel Brown to his brother, Sept. 18, 1863, Letters of D. Brown, MHS.

22. Roediger, *Wages of Whiteness*, 116.
23. Levi Perry to his mother, Sept. 2, 1863, Perry Papers, MHS; Albert Manson to his wife, Oct.31 and Dec.3, 1862, Manson Papers, FL.
24. Albert Manson to his wife, April 23, 1863; John J. Pullen, *A Shower of Stars* (Philadelphia: Lippincott, 1966), 26–27. The colonel of Manson's regiment, Mark Wentworth, sent an African American boy home with his wife during the war. The youth's name was Tom Murray. Before becoming a porter, he attended school in Kittery where he was the only African American student.
25. Stuart Martin, *New Pennacook Folks* (Rumford: Martin, 1980), 97–99. The servant, William Thomas, was 13 when he came to Maine in 1865. He worked on Goddard's farm in Andover until he was 25, then bought a small farm nearby. He married a local widow and raised a family. Locals still refer to the area where Goddard lived as "nigger field."
26. From Johnson's published diary, *The Sword of Honor* (Worcester: Blanchard Press,1906), 27–33. Quotes from 27 and 30.
27. David Herbert Donald, *Lincoln* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1995), 166–167, 221, 234–235, 343–345, and 430.
28. Henry McIntire to Lyman Bolster, Apr. 30, 1862, McIntire Papers, FL.
29. For one example of the view that slavery was less productive see Eugene D. Genovese, *The Political Economy of Slavery* (New York: Random House, 1967), 43–51. For view that it may have been at least as productive as free labor see Kenneth M. Stampp, *The Peculiar Institution: Slavery in the Ante-Bellum South* (New York: Random House, 1956), 399–401.
30. H. Draper Hunt, ed., *Dearest Father: The Civil War Letters of Lt. Frank Dickerson, A Son Of Belfast, Maine* (Unity: North Country Press, 1992), 96. This volume is reviewed by Elwood Watson in *Maine History* (Winter-Spring 1995), 219–220.
31. Charles Barnard to his wife, Aug. 30, Oct.2, and Nov. 23, 1862, Barnard Papers, MHS.
32. Mark Waterman to his wife, Jan. 3, 1863, Waterman Papers.
33. For a detailed and thoroughly researched military history of Chamberlain's 20th Maine and their exploits at Gettysburg see Thomas A. Desjardin, *Stand Firm Ye Boys From Maine: The 20th Maine and the Gettysburg Campaign* (Gettysburg: Thomas Publications, 1995.)
34. Alice Trulock, *In the Hands of Providence: Joshua Chamberlain and the American Civil War* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1992), 59, 60, 83, 315, and 352–3. While Michael Shaara's novel *Killer Angels* and the movie *Gettysburg* attribute abolitionist motives to Chamberlain, Trulock's extensive research turned up no such evidence.
35. Diary of Leander Cram, Oct. 3 and Nov. 13, 1861, July 15–20, July 29, and Aug.27, 1862. Cram Papers, MHS.
36. Meshack Larry to his sister, Feb. 16 and Aug. 7, 1863.
37. John Sheahan to his father, Oct.14, 1862, and to his father and sister, Sept.22, 1862, Sheahan Papers, MHS.
38. For Douglass' actions after Lincoln sanctioned African American soldiers see William S. McFeely, *Frederick Douglass* (New York: Norton, 1991), 217–37.
39. Chandler Perry to his wife, July 19, 1861, Perry Papers. Approximately 186,000 black troops fought for the Union. For discussion of their exploits see James McPherson, *The Negro's Civil War* (New York: Pantheon Books, 1965), or Dudley Cornish, *The Sable Arm* (New York: Norton, 1966). The story of the 54th Massachusetts and their assault on Fort Wagner is portrayed superbly in the 1989 film *Glory*.
40. Hunt, *Hamlin*, 163; Donald, *Lincoln*, 430. Hamlin's son Cyrus was among the whites who told Lincoln they would gladly lead African American troops, and he subsequently did.
41. Diary of Leander Cram, Nov. 9, 1862.
42. No figure is readily available for how many white Maine soldiers became officers of black regiments. From a sample included in Joseph T. Glatthar's *Forged in Battle: The Civil War*

Alliance of Black Soldiers and White Officers (New York: The Free Press, 1990), 265–66, it can be estimated that approximately four hundred white Maine soldiers served as officers of black regiments.

43. Arnold H. Sturtevant, ed., *Josiah Volunteered* (Farmington: Knowlton and McLeary, 1977), 85; David M. Gold, "Frustrated Glory: John Francis Appleton and Black Soldiers in the Civil War," *Maine History* (Summer 1991), 174–204.
44. Beverly Kallgren, ed., *"Dear Friend Anna": The Civil War Letters of a Common Soldier From Maine* (Orono: UMaine Press, 1992), 79–80.
45. *"Dear Friend Anna"*, 135.
46. Bell Wiley, *The Life of Billy Yank* (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1952); Reid Mitchell, *Civil War Soldiers* (New York: Viking, 1988). In researching his classic study, Wiley visited the Maine Historical Society and read the letters of three soldiers featured in this study—Sheahan, Barnard, and Larry.
47. Mitchell, *Soldiers*, 14; Wiley, *Billy Yank*, 40, 115–117.
48. Wiley, *Billy Yank*, 109, 113–115.
49. Mitchell, *Soldiers*, 91, 119; McPherson, *The Negro's Civil War*, appendix A. According to the census of 1860, New Hampshire, Wisconsin, Minnesota, and Iowa all had lower African American percentages of population than Maine, and Vermont had about the same percentage. Maine's percentage was about one-fifth of one percent. For an interesting discussion of African American culture in New England, see William Piersen's *Black Yankees: The Development of an Afro-American Subculture in Eighteenth—Century New England* (Amherst: UMass Press, 1988).
50. Mitchell, *Soldiers*, 131, 101–2, 127. James Robertson also concludes that most white Union soldiers accepted emancipation as a war measure, in *Soldiers Blue and Gray* (Columbia: USC Press, 1988), 11.
51. Ruth Silliker, ed., *The Rebel Yell and the Yankee Hurrah* (Camden: Down East Books, 1985), 45, 273. Reid Mitchell argues that brutality towards blacks by Union soldiers was not only due to prejudice or racism. It was to some extent an outlet for hostilities common during an experience as violent as war. It was also reflective of the white soldiers' sense that blacks were the root cause of the war. See Reid Mitchell, *Civil War Soldiers*, 123.
52. *The Rebel Yell*, 163, 180–1, 60.
53. *The Rebel Yell*, 204.
54. Northern soldiers attitudes about the Union included strong feelings about how their families benefitted from its preservation. See the author's "Blending Loyalties: Maine Soldiers Respond to the Civil War," *Maine History* 35 (Winter-Spring 1996), 124–139. For Northern soldiers' relations with their families in general see Reid Mitchell, *The Vacant Chair: The Northern Soldier Leaves Home* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993).

"Research as Opportunity": Alrutheus Ambush Taylor, Black Intellectualism, and the Remaking of Reconstruction Historiography, 1893–1954

Stephen Gilroy Hall

The first half of the twentieth century witnessed a determined effort by black historians to legitimize African American history as a historical specialty. The scholar most widely recognized by historians in accomplishing this task is Carter G. Woodson, the second black to graduate from Harvard University with the doctorate in history. Woodson's establishment of the Association for the Study of Negro Life and History (ASNLH) in 1915 and the *Journal of Negro History* in 1916, has been widely discussed in a number of historical works ranging from August Meier and Elliott Rudwick's *Black History in the Historical Profession, 1915–1980* (1986) to Jacqueline Goggin's *Carter G. Woodson: A Life in Black History* (1993). However, despite the focus on Woodson, very little attention has been paid to ASNLH's work in the hiring and training of investigators. These investigators not only became the first generation of professionally trained historians, but they also laid the groundwork for much of what we call African American studies today. The first and one of the most significant of these was Alrutheus Ambush Taylor (1893–1954).[1]

Relegated to the fringes of black historiography, Alrutheus Ambush Taylor's roles as both a scholar and administrator at Fisk University in Nashville, Tennessee begs for greater exploration. In the first half of the twentieth century, in an attempt to combat segregation and discrimination, black intellectuals utilized different strategies. Some like W.E.B. Du Bois skillfully combined scholarship with advocacy. Taylor, relied exclusively on the power of education and research to effect change. As an educator, Taylor's philosophy involved enhancement of the academic stature of black colleges through membership in professional educational organizations. His activities on Fisk's campus as Dean were simply an extension of this philosophy. Taylor believed that education could

benefit those who demonstrated leadership qualities. Educational excellence and demonstrated leadership among students could only help in the struggle toward the amelioration of segregation and discrimination. Taylor also applied this philosophy to his personal life through his involvement in various social organizations such as the black fraternity Alpha Phi Alpha.

Taylor's extensive scholarly work on Reconstruction in South Carolina, Virginia and Tennessee which laid the groundwork for subsequent publications on Reconstruction such as W.E.B. Du Bois's *Black Reconstruction* (1935) as well as his advocacy on behalf of the Association for the Study of Negro Life and History demonstrated his belief in "research as opportunity." His writing laid the foundation for many of our modern conceptualizations of this turbulent era. Most importantly, Taylor was a forerunner. His work as ASNLH's first investigator situates him as a primacy force in the establishment of the modern African American historical tradition.

Born in Washington, D.C. in Garfield, a neighborhood of Anacostia on November 22, 1893, to Lewis and Lucy Johnson Taylor. Alrutheus was the youngest of nine children. As a result of the era's severe economic depression, Taylor's early years were precarious at best.[2] Despite the family's poverty, however, Washington, D.C. was a thriving mecca boasting a prosperous middle class. Moreover, the most outstanding feature of Afro-American life in the District of Columbia was the high quality of the "colored" school system. Although segregated and lacking in basic equipment, these schools attracted the "best and the brightest" black teachers and administrators the District had to offer.

Taylor benefited immensely from his education in this system. He attended James A. Garfield Elementary School from 1898 to 1906. After graduating from Garfield, Taylor enrolled at Armstrong Manual Training School (1906–1910). Armstrong offered the traditional vocational curriculum—shopwork, domestic science and architectural drawing—as well as numerous academic courses such as English, mathematics, and foreign languages. Taylor demonstrated a high aptitude in mathematics, and as a result of his excellent scholastic record and the high academic standards of the District of Columbia's schools, he, in 1910, became the third student from Armstrong to obtain a scholarship to attend the University of Michigan.[3]

At this time, the University of Michigan had an enrollment of 5,339 students which made it the third largest university in the country behind Columbia University and the University of Chicago. Although perceived as a bastion of midwestern progressivism by white students, Michigan's social environment for black students was hostile. By 1910, the situation for black students had not

improved. As a student at Michigan, Taylor enrolled in the College of Literature, Science & Arts. Although his major was mathematics, Taylor also demonstrated aptitude and interest in history. He took almost as many hours of coursework in history (36 weeks) as in mathematics (38 weeks). Taylor's interest in history led him to apply to the history graduate program. However, his application was denied by Ulrich Bonnell Phillips, later an authority on the antebellum South and the Civil War. In rejecting his application, Phillips cited the fact that Taylor had majored in mathematics as an undergraduate.[4]

Outside the classroom, Taylor's greatest social outlet was his membership in the black fraternity, Alpha Phi Alpha which he joined in 1912. Founded at Cornell University in Ithaca, New York in 1906, Alpha Phi Alpha was a mutual aid society designed to provide social, cultural and intellectual outlets for black student at predominantly white universities. Michigan's Epilson's Chapter was established in 1908. It was the second black fraternity on campus. During the 1913–1914 school year, Taylor served as Scriptor (secretary) for the group.[5]

In 1916, Taylor's position as Scriptor led to the editorship of Epsilon's column in the *Sphinx*, official organ of Alpha Phi Alpha. Founded in 1914, the *Sphinx* contained news concerning the fraternity's activities, personal notes, and editorials. It also facilitated a broader network of communication between the various chapters of the fraternity. In a December 1916 entry, he detailed the activities of alumni members. In another entry which appeared February 1917, Taylor described the seriousness the fraternity members preparing for exams: "The humdrum of impending examinations is having its usual effect upon the brothers, thus they are burning the midnight oil with a view to meeting the enemy. Only an incidental game of whist or an argument of great social moment is allowed to creep into the sublime solitude of these embryo savants."[6]

His account of the study habits of his fellow fraternity members provides some insights into Taylor's own conceptualization of the importance of education to the advancement of African Americans. In the collegiate context, determination and a willingness to engage the subject matter were prerequisites for "meeting the enemy," that is, the exam. However, outside of the classroom, the enemy, was segregation and discrimination. "Meeting this enemy" required the same skills. Taylor's life work would be dedicated to the "meeting of the enemy" through the attainment of higher education and the accumulation of the facts.

After completing his degree in mathematics in 1916, Taylor accepted a "broken stipend fellowship" with the New York Urban League. The League, founded in 1911 by a coalition of white progressives and black intellectuals addressed the problems of blacks in urban areas. During Taylor's two years with the Urban

League, the organization spent the majority of its resources assisting the resettlement of Southern migrants in the Northern urban centers. Taylor received training at the national headquarters in Manhattan. Later, he was promoted to Industrial Secretary of the New York Branch. Most likely, his responsibilities included assisting new immigrants in finding jobs and providing information about lodging in New York City. [7]

In 1919, in addition to marrying Harriet Ethel Wilson, a languages major whom he had met during his undergraduates years at Michigan, Taylor accepted a position as Membership and Social Secretary of the Twelfth Street Young Men's Christian Association (YMCA) in Washington, D.C. led by John W. Davis. There Taylor initiated a successful lecture series which attracted Washington's black elite to discuss issues related to racial advancement.[8]

In 1919, Taylor's tenure at the YMCA ended when John W. Davis was appointed as president of West Virginia Collegiate Institute in Institute . Davis hired Taylor as an instructor in Mathematics and Economics. Harriet Wilson., Taylor's wife, was also hired as a Critic Teacher in the English Department.[9] While an instructor at West Virginia Collegiate Institute, Taylor participated in a number of activities. During the 1921–1922 school year he took correspondence courses through the University of Chicago. More importantly, he continued to strengthen his social investigation skills and promote enhanced educational opportunities for blacks in West Virginia by serving as a delegate to the National Conference of Social Workers, and drafting a report on the centralization of social welfare activities in the state. Taylor's report was presented at the Conference of Social Work in Parkersburg on March 8, 1922. He also worked closely with other faculty members to compile a report entitled *Early Negro Education in West Virginia*.[10]

Teaching at West Virginia Collegiate Institute also gave Taylor an opportunity to become better acquainted with Carter G. Woodson, Dean of the College and an instructor of history whom he had only been briefly acquainted with while at the YMCA. Woodson and Taylor established a friendship based on certain social and ideological similarities. Both were self-made men. Woodson was a product of the coal mines of West Virginia, while Taylor grew up in poverty in Washington, D.C. Moreover, both men used education to lift themselves "up from poverty" to become race men—Woodson as a graduate of Berea College (Litt B., 1903), the University of Chicago (B.A. and M.A., 1908) and Harvard University (Ph.D., 1912) and Taylor as a graduate of the University of Michigan. As founder of the Association for the Study of Negro Life and History, Woodson's life was dedicated to the study, collection, and preservation of

African American history. Although not yet a historical researcher, Taylor's membership in Alpha Phi Alpha as well as his subsequent work with the Urban League also demonstrated nascent interest in issues concerning African Americans.[11]

In Taylor, Woodson found an intellectual counterpart whose interests closely reflected his own. Woodson rekindled Taylor's dormant interest in historical investigations, by enabling Taylor to pen several articles for the *Journal*. Taylor's first article, "Making West Virginia a Free State," appeared in 1921. This article is an historical examination of the struggle to curtail the development of slavery in West Virginia. In the article Taylor posited the question of slavery's abolition in Virginia (before 1863) as a fundamental factor in the development of West Virginia's social, political and economic future. To buttress his case, Taylor examined the slavery debates in the Virginia Assembly in 1829–30, 1831–32, and 1850–51. Furthermore, Taylor contended that the origin of the debate over slavery was rooted in economic expediency rather than abolitionist fervor. As he noted: "The responsible leaders in the movement against slavery were not concerned with any moral or religious theories on the subject but rather were acting because of their conviction that slavery was an economic evil."[12] This was especially true in the 1850s when the state experienced economic growth coupled with the influx of German immigrants.

"Making West Virginia a Free State" concludes with an analysis of the debate in the United States Congress to admit West Virginia as a free state. Ultimately Taylor concluded that West Virginia's successful admission to the Union was based on her antislavery posture than any other factor. Although this article has been criticized as "straightforward which showed a hesitancy to offer interpretative analysis," it does subtly accomplish its most important goal—to centralize the importance of the slavery question in determining West Virginia's admission to the Union as a free state. However, in this objective account, the facts spoke for themselves, helping to make blacks an important factor in shaping the history of West Virginia and the United States.[13]

Taylor's second article, "Negro Congressmen a Generation After," appeared in the *Journal* in 1922. This article was one of the earliest efforts to vindicate the legacy of the twenty-two African Americans who served in the United States Congress during and after Reconstruction making it the first of its kind. It also marked Taylor's first serious examination of a topic in Reconstruction history. Taylor's article was one of the first to challenge the "Tragic Era" portrayal of the period promoted by John Burgress and William Archibald Dunning of Columbia University The "Tragic Era", also referred to as the Dunning School

depicted the period of Congressional or Radical Reconstruction (1867–1877) as "an era of corruption presided over by unscrupulous "carpetbaggers" from the North, unprincipled Southern white "scalawags," and ignorant freedmen. After much needless suffering , the South's white community banded together to overthrow these governments and restore "home rule." Because the "Tragic Era" portrayal enjoyed its currency during a period reconciliation between the North and the South following the end of Reconstruction and the nadir (1877–1901) of black existence in the United States, it is not surprising that African Americans were used as scapegoats for the excesses of the period. In short, blacks represented a "mass of political inexperience, of childish ignorance , and domestic barbarism." [14]

At the outset of the article , Taylor constructed an evaluative criteria to assess the effectiveness of the black officeholders. These criteria included: an examination of their intellectual ability to perform the duties of a Congressmen, including formal and informal educational qualifications; their records in public office prior to Congressional service; and their chief concerns regarding legislation. Taylor found that more than half of the twenty-six black Congressmen had attended college. Many had previously served their communities as teachers, lawyers, and ministers. In the legislative arena, Taylor noted that the Congressmen safeguarded the civil rights of blacks by opposing amnesty measures for former Confederates.[15]

In the conclusion to "Negro Congressman a Generation After," Taylor addressed the black legislators' failure to have their bills enacted into law. Taylor gave two reasons for this problem—the small number of black Congressmen and the suspicions of white colleagues who viewed them as an experiment of the Reconstruction period. At the end of the 1921–1922 school year, Taylor resigned his position at West Virginia Collegiate Institute and Woodson promptly arranged for Taylor to work at the Association. Utilizing a portion of the $25,000 Laura Spelman Rockefeller Memorial Fund Grant for "researches into the history of the Confederate states." Woodson financed Taylor's graduate study in history at Harvard University. In June 1923, Taylor completed his M.A. thesis, "The Social Conditions and Treatment of Negroes in South Carolina, 1865–1880" and received his M.A. degree. While a student at Harvard, Taylor had begun work on a social and economic study of African Americans in Virginia during Reconstruction. Upon graduation, Woodson hired him as the first full-time investigator for the Association.[16]

Taylor's tenure at the ASNLH (1923–1926) coincided with the longest period of sustained economic viability the Association had experienced since its

founding in 1915. As the result of two sizable grants, one from the Carnegie Institution (1921) and another from the Laura Spelman Rockefeller Memorial Fund (1922), Woodson was able to concentrate more fully on conducting historical investigations in African American history. It was also during this period that Woodson established Associated Publishers, the publishing arm of the Association.[17]

Working at the Association involved both routine as well as scholarly activities. Utilizing his mathematical skills, Taylor verified data for Woodson's *Free Negro Owners of Slaves in the United States in 1830: Together with Absentee Ownership of Slaves in the United States* and *Free Negro Heads of Families in the United States in 1830: Together with a Brief Treatment of the Free Negro*. He also read and prepared galley proofs of articles for the *Journal*.[18]

While at the Association, Taylor's scholarly production included an article entitled "The Movement of Negroes from the East to the Gulf States from 1830 to 1850," and book length studies of Reconstruction in South Carolina and Virginia. "The Movement of Negroes from the East to the Gulf States from 1830 to 1850," was an overview of the reasons planters and blacks migrated to the Gulf States. Although not as descriptive and riveting as "Negro Congressmen a Generation After," this article utilized a number of primary sources, including the United States Census for 1830 and 1850. [19]

The publication of *The Negro in South Carolina During the Reconstruction* (1924) was a major accomplishment for Taylor and in light of the Tragic Era portrayal of Reconstruction which had dominated the historical profession for more than fifty years, Taylor's South Carolina study was a seminal contribution to the historiography of Reconstruction. Taylor's decision to conduct a study of South Carolina was inspired by a need to refute biased claims about the governance of the state which permeated the work of the Dunning school. South Carolina's demographics during Reconstruction were used to bolster claims that black domination of the state had led to numerous instances of fraud. In many instances, South Carolina was viewed as emblematic of what Reconstruction was like in other states. Recognizing that state studies played an important role in how Reconstruction was perceived, Taylor provided the first state study which examined the political, social, educational and religious situation of blacks during these years. This study also preceded W.E.B. Du Bois's *Black Reconstruction* (1935) by eleven years.[20]

Taylor's examination of Reconstruction in South Carolina differed markedly from those offered by the Dunning School. Not only in terms of centralizing the role of African Americans as active participants in the Reconstruction

experiment, but also his emphasis on utilizing objective historical sources, thematic approach and the conclusions reached. Taylor's selective and critical use of sources is vital in understanding his philosophy of history . From the outset of *The Negro in South Carolina During the Reconstruction*, Taylor addressed the problem of which sources could provide an accurate portrayal of Reconstruction in South Carolina. He also lamented the uncritical use of sources by white historians. Taylor also pointed out that many of these works "were written from newspaper material, speeches and records made by the very men who constituted the party of opposition and resorted to all sorts of methods to overthrow the governments against which they were arrayed." Moreover, Taylor suggested that in order to ascertain the truth of a particular situation the historian must balance "one side of the controversy with the other and by hearing the testimony of those who as indifferent observers left a record as to what was going on in the South."[21] Taylor also advocated a critical examination of the information provided by indifferent observers such as newspaper correspondents and travelers.

Taylor's thematic approach was also fundamentally different from earlier historians. Trained at Harvard in the early 1920s, Taylor was a student of the "New History" which emphasized a more expansive historical agenda. In short, this was an enlargement of the scope of history to include not only the political and constitutional but also the social, economic and intellectual aspects. This is clearly demonstrated by Taylor's emphasis on social, economic and intellectual aspects of the black experience in Reconstruction history. Another approach which influenced Taylor's thematic approach was the idea of contributionism. The idea that historical works should reflect the notion that African Americans were important participants in and contributors to American history. By combining these approaches, Taylor was able to consider additional data that strengthened his case and weakened that of the Dunning School.[22]

In the social arena, Taylor noted that numerous black denominations such as the African Methodist Episcopal Church and the black Baptists were instrumental in establishing schools to train ministers. Moreover, according to Taylor these denominations assisted in the moral improvement of the freedmen. In other spheres of human interaction, namely, the economic and intellectual, Taylor also documented black advancement. This was particularly important in the economic sphere because the Dunning School had largely portrayed blacks as lazy and inefficient workers. Relying on traveler's accounts, Taylor showed that blacks worked on various plantations throughout the state and in some instances, produced enough food to fed the entire community. Using the Census of 1890, less than twelve years after the official end of Reconstruction, Taylor demon-

strated that blacks had laid the foundation for economic success during Reconstruction. He noted that 223,496 blacks were involved in agriculture, fisheries and the mining industry; 44,755 in domestic and personal service; 12,198 in manufacturing and mechanical industries; and 7,043 in trade and transportation. [23]

In the intellectual sphere, Taylor documented the founding of numerous elementary, secondary and collegiate institutions for the freedmen. His sources included the personal diaries of Northern schoolteachers who went South to aid in the educational efforts of the freedmen and the records of the Freedmen's Bureau. The progressive nature of educational efforts was demonstrated by the fact that a number of black students enrolled in school rose in from 18,000 in 1870 to 72,853 in 1880. [24]

In contradistinction to the Dunning school, Taylor concluded that Reconstruction in South Carolina was a time when "Negroes and their friends were working for their uplift by laying a foundation for the acquisition of knowledge, the accumulation of wealth, the establishment of homes and the extension of Christian religion." He further maintained that:" Until all these affairs have been adequately treated in the study of the South during the Reconstruction period the public can never have the proper view as to what was going on there at the time."[25]

Taylor's scholarly refutation of the "Tragic Era" portrayal of Reconstruction as well as his expansive thematic assessment of the black role in Reconstruction drew praise from black reviewers. Writing in the *Crisis*, Augustus Granville Dill, business manager for the magazine, typified the black response to Taylor's work. Dill praised Taylor's objectivity and noted that his work was "a welcome and valuable addition to the literature dealing with the American Negro." Another reviewer, Ulysses S. Poston echoed Dill's sentiments when he stated that Taylor's study has added to the limited supply of literature dealing with the Negro and Reconstruction of the South a volume pregnant with fundamentals which is, and will be of significance to the American Negro."[26]

However, the most prominent white historian to review the work, .Carl Russell Fish, a professor of history at the University of Wisconsin-Madison, and member of the Association's Executive Council, was decidedly mixed on the question of whether Taylor's work was objective "Mr. Taylor's comments and adjectives fully indicate his sympathies, and that he has a case to present." Although Fish was critical of Taylor's lack of objectivity, he concurred with Dill that Taylor's "material is of the greatest value and his results will prove of interest to all students of the period."[27] Robert Park, former President of the Association and Professor of Sociology at the University of Chicago penned a re-

view of Taylor's book that was consistent with those penned which appeared in the black press. Park praised Taylor's writing style and his presentation of the facts, calling the book, "a sober account of events during that critical period. Park also noted that "Mr Taylor's investigations have added much that is new to our knowledge of reconstruction in South Carolina.[28]

Taylor's viewed his second state study, *The Negro in the Reconstruction of Virginia*, as a companion piece to his South Carolina study. Like the South Carolina study, the Virginia study sought to shed light on the conditions of blacks during Reconstruction in a state perceived to be the least affected by Reconstruction. Taylor employed the same organizational and thematic approach utilized in the South Carolina study. He also pointed out the biases present in newspaper and traveler accounts. Because of the severe conditions which existed after the Civil War, numerous efforts were made by whites to curtail the political, social, and economic freedom of the ex-slaves. Because, according to Taylor, "freedom was in struggle with slavery," governmental intervention was necessary on the part of the Freedmen's Bureau and Union Leagues to protect newly freed slaves.[29]

Despite political and economic repression, Taylor found that blacks continued to progress. Newspapers and travelers accounts reported that blacks were industrious and thrifty. Blacks were employed as carpenters and bricklayers as well as working in tobacco and cotton warehouses. They also acquired land in rural and urban areas. In addition, many owned restaurants, stores and barbershops. As with South Carolina, in Virginia, Taylor viewed the establishment of educational institutions as one of the most important elements in the progress of the freedmen. In the religious sphere, the African Methodist Episcopal and the Baptist churches took a prominent role in elevating the religious life of the freedman and training ministers. The church also began the primary site for political meetings.[30]

Although questions of interpretation resurfaced among white reviewers, in black intellectual and lay circles, interpretation was less important than providing a reassessment of the black role in Reconstruction. Letters received by the Association concerning *The Negro in the Reconstruction of Virginia* lauded the study as "admirable." Most of the letters provided details which they felt Taylor had left out. Historian James Hugo Johnston provided information about the Readjuster Movement in Virginia. Reverend George E. Bragg, Rector of the St. James Episcopal Church in Baltimore, wrote a series of letters which provided useful information about the black school system in Richmond. In sum, Taylor's years at the Association were extremely productive. One article and

two revisionist studies of Reconstruction in South Carolina and Virginia as well as well as his other duties at the Association firmly established him as a solid student of history.[31]

Although Taylor's tenure at the Association ended in 1925 due to the expiration of the Rockefeller grant, his formal academic career was about to begin. In 1926, Taylor accepted a position as professor of history at Fisk University in Nashville, Tennessee. Imbued with a pedantic devotion to scientific history as well as a belief in the soundness of the contributionist model of black history as a weapon to fight segregation and discrimination, Taylor embarked on a journey into the New South.[32]

When Taylor arrived at Fisk in the Fall of 1926, he found the college in the midst of reorganization after the student strike of 1924–1925. This season of student activism called into question the continued viability of a missionary based white control of black higher education. Fisk students and alumni had risen up against an oppressive and dictatorial president, Fayette Avery McKenzie. The white administrator had sought to placate Northern industrialists and Nashville's white community by rigidly controlling students through the imposition of restrictions on all facets of their behavior, both on and off campus. In addition, he limited the number of black department heads and ignored alumni concerns regarding the governance of the university. As a result of the strike, Thomas Elsa Jones, a Quaker and doctoral student at Columbia University with extensive experience as an educator, was installed as president. Jones' appointment began a new era for Fisk. He favored the strengthening of the college's academic and physical structure through the hiring of notable black academics and through an aggressive endowment campaign.[33]

Taylor's skills and interests were well suited to this program. He cultivated a close friendship with academics such as Zephaniah Alexander Looby, a Columbia University trained lawyer and later an active participant in the civil rights movement. During his first year at Fisk, Taylor taught courses in European, colonial American and English history. As Fisk's premiere historian, Taylor used his position to augment the resources of his department. On numerous occasions, he requested appropriations for the purchase of maps and history books for the university library. Taylor and his wife supported all endowment drives at the school in the late twenties. Jones appreciated Taylor's disciplined approach to managing the history department and indicated his desire to assist him in the production of scholarship.[34]

In 1926, Taylor presented a comprehensive overview of his educational and historical interests in an address at the Fisk Chapel. "Research as Opportunity"

elucidated his thinking on the relationship of scientific research to racial advancement. He sought to encourage students to further their education and declared his faith in research as a means whereby segregation and discrimination could be combated. In Taylor's view, advanced education would allow students to join the ranks of African American scientific investigators such as academic and social activist W.E.B. Du Bois, economist George Edmund Haynes; bibliographer Monroe N. Work, and most importantly historian Carter G. Woodson. Throughout the latter portion of the speech, Taylor noted that racial biases were prevalent in various historical treatments of African American history penned by white historians. "Some prominent historians have produced work based upon unsupported evidence to prove that slavery is the normal condition of the Negro," he noted "These investigators have also asserted that comparatively, the labor of the Negro is inefficient as a result of his inherent inferiority to other peoples." Taylor also suggested that black scholars could make valuable contributions to knowledge by correcting unscientific biases in several fields, including history, psychology and ethnology. He also stated that the work of black scholars should encompass the sciences and must "transcend the bounds of race and nation and embrace world interests."[35]

Taylor's belief in the power of research to change white perceptions of African Americans account for much of Taylor's scholarly insularity. Unlike other prominent black historians such as Du Bois—an ardent "race man" who skillfully combined scholarship and advocacy or Luther Porter Jackson, a professor of history at Virginia State University who also wrote a column for one of the Southeast's preeminent black newspapers, *The Norfolk Journal and Guide*—Taylor made few public pronouncements on race relations and confined his activities to Fisk and the Association. His separation of scholarship from race leadership was an affirmation of his faith in the power of "research as opportunity."[36]

Meanwhile , despite Fisk's hiring of prominent black academics such as Alain Locke, philosopher and father of the "New Negro" Movement (1927), sociologist Charles S, Johnson (1928), Gullah specialist Lorenzo Dow Turner (1929), poet and NAACP activist James Weldon Johnson, Taylor rose rapidly through the administrative ranks. In 1927, he was appointed Dean of Men. During the 1928–1929 school year, he was awarded a Laura Spelman Rockefeller Memorial Fund Fellowship to begin doctoral work in history at Harvard. After completing a year's study Harvard, he returned to Fisk to assume the position of acting Dean of College. In 1930, Taylor was appointed Dean of the College.[37]

The 1930s and 1940s found Taylor firmly situated at the helm of a strong research research-oriented faculty. Eager to continue promulgating his message

of uplift through education, he immersed himself in activities on the educational status of black colleges. Taylor's memberships included the National Association of Collegiate Deans and Registrars in Negro Schools a forum for administrators to share information about entrance requirements and to devise ways of improving the academic quality of black schools. He also belonged to the Association of Colleges and Secondary Schools for Negroes, an organization designed to promote the accreditation of black schools by white accrediting agencies. Taylor delivered papers before the National Association of Collegiate Deans and Registrars entitled "Some Effective Methods for Improving Scholarship Among Collegiate Students (1931) and "Discipline and Self-Government in Colleges and Universities," (1938). As a member of the Association of colleges and Secondary Schools, Taylor attended numerous meetings and served on its Commission on Institutions of Higher Education from 1934–1935 and 1936–1941. Taylor also penned a collaborative study for the Commission entitled "Community Life of Negro Youth with Reference to Social and Civic Organizations" in 1941.[38]

Alpha Phi Alpha's Graduate Chapter, Tau Lambda allowed Taylor another forum for articulating his philosophy of social uplift through education. As President of Tau Lambda (1930–1938), Taylor participated in the annual "Go-To-High School, Go-To- College" campaign. He also presented an address at one of Tau Lambda's meeting's entitled "Why Go to College." Here, Taylor stressed the necessity of sending only persons with leadership qualities to college. This was in tune with Taylor's goal of increasing the efficiency of black institutions. In Taylor's mind, the responsibility of educators was to hone the leadership abilities of students, enabling them to serve the greater good of society. He felt that a college education could benefit qualified students by making them more proficient in their chosen professions, helping them to become better citizens and better people. Although Taylor's remarks were couched in the rhetoric of moralism and spiritualism, his goal was similar to that expressed in "Research as Opportunity"—to prepare young minds to combat segregation and discrimination through efficient and moral leadership of the black community.[39]

As Dean at Fisk, Taylor's skillful management of the college's affairs, earned Fisk an "A" rating from the Association of Colleges and Secondary Schools of the Southern States in 1932. In addition to his activities as Dean, Taylor also taught one of Fisk's first black history courses, "The Negro in American History." The course description was consistent with the philosophy of the growing black history of which Taylor was a part. "The Negro in American History"

interpreted black history as an integral part of American history. Moreover, Taylor used every opportunity to promote black history. In the early 1930s, Taylor delivered a lecture entitled "The Significance of the Negro in American History," at Pearl High School in Nashville and "The Responsibility of Youth as It Faces a New World" before the Indianapolis Intercollegiate Club. During the 1932–1933 school year, he also took a year's leave of absence to complete requirements for his doctorate in history from Harvard. *The Negro in the Reconstruction in Virginia* was accepted in lieu of a dissertation, enabling Taylor to receive his Ph.D., in 1936.[40]

After completing his doctorate, Taylor penned a review of Du Bois's *Black Reconstruction in America*. Writing in the *New England Quarterly*, Taylor praised Du Bois's work as "a significant and substantial contribution to the historical literature of the period of reconstruction in American history."[41] "Historians of Reconstruction," Taylor's last article on the Reconstruction period, offered an historiographical overview of the literature on Reconstruction. He condemned the wok of the Dunning school and praised Du Bois's *Black Reconstruction* as "the best of the meritorious studies of this period."[42] At the Association, in addition to being elected to serve on the Executive Council in 1937, Taylor was active as Chairman of the State of Tennessee Sustaining Membership Drive in 1935, to keep the Association operable during the Depression and afterwards. In 1938, Taylor recruited Merl Eppse, a Professor of History at Tennessee Agricultural and Industrial College (now Tennessee State University), as Assistant Chairman of the Membership Drive. For advice on how to conduct a successful drive in Tennessee, Taylor turned to Luther Porter Jackson who conducted the Association's most successful membership drive in Virginia. Both Taylor and Eppse worked diligently in Tennessee to promote the Association's work through the organizing Negro History Week, recruiting members and soliciting funds.[43]

Although hampered by his administrative duties, Taylor continued to be a productive scholar. In 1941, he published a state study of Reconstruction entitled *The Negro in Tennessee, 1865–1880*. Taylor's work on Tennessee differed little from his earlier studies. Still wedded to his belief in scientific history and contributionism, Taylor presented a dramatic portrait of blacks in Tennessee during Reconstruction. His topical discussion was also similar to those earlier studies. Taylor examined the educational, religious, economic, and political progress of blacks during Reconstruction. Ably written and well documented, *The Negro in Tennessee, 1865–1880* is still the only full-length study of blacks in Reconstruction Tennessee.[44]

Most reviewers found that Taylor's Tennessee study "evidenced sound and

painstaking scholarship." However, two black reviewers, in contradistinction to positive reviews of his earlier studies of South Carolina and Virginia, William Brewer, head of Department of History in the Colored High Schools in Washington, D.C., and Ulysses Lee, an Assistant Professor of English at Lincoln University in Pennsylvania severely criticized the work for its lack of interpretative content. Lee's review was the most vitriolic. He called *The Negro in Tennessee* a "compendium of facts arranged neatly in a filing cabinet with little indication of interrelationships or interdependence among them." Lee also criticized Taylor's pedantic adherence to objectivity. "It cannot be emphasized too strongly that the logical result of rigid objectivity produces an anemic picture of the past in which the historian abandoning his right and duty of interpretation does little more than create a calendar of events."[45]

In 1942, Taylor read a paper, "Trends in Federal Policy Toward the Negro" before the American Historical Association's session devoted to "US Minority Problems." This was an exhaustive review of federal policies concerning blacks from 1865 to 1940. Intended as an overview, the paper did offer some tentative conclusions. Taylor felt that recent trends in federal policy, including Executive Order 8802 and the creation of the Fair Employment Practices Commission (FEPC), could "improve the status of the Negro."[46]

The 1940s also witnessed drastic changes at Fisk. In 1946, Thomas Elsa Jones resigned as president, Taylor and two other administrative officers ran the school until Charles S. Johnson was inaugurated as the new president in October 1946. Taylor remained as Dean until 1950. He resigned this position and became Fred L. Brownlee Research Professor of American History. During the early 1950s, Taylor penned favorable reviews of Herbert Aptheker's *A Documentary History of the Negro People in the United States* and Williard Range's *The Rise and Progress of Negro Colleges in Georgia, 1865–1949*. In addition, the death of Carter G. Woodson in 1950 brought a number of tributes to his life which were published in the May, 1950 issue of the *Negro History Bulletin* including one by Taylor. Taylor's tribute was entitled "Dr. Carter G. Woodson: Inspirer and Benefactor of Young Scholars." He characterized Woodson as a "man of integrity and character; serious and methodical and practical in his approach to men and things."[47]

However, the majority of Taylor's time was dedicated to researching and writing an officially commissioned history of Fisk which he had begun in the mid-1940s. During the 1949–1950 school year, Taylor received a leave of absence to begin writing the manuscript. In 1952, Taylor presented the completed manuscript to Johnson. The title was "Fisk University 1866–1951: A Construc-

tive Influence in American Life." It consisted of five sections and approximately eight hundred and sixty-eight pages with notes and bibliography suggesting extensive research in the university's archives as well as an intimate knowledge of the events which shaped the school's history between 1926 and 1950. Due to Johnson's extensive administrative duties, Taylor's study was never published, but a portion of it was presented at the thirty-eighth meeting of the Association in Nashville.[48]

Taylor continued to teach at Fisk throughout the 1953–1954 school year. On June 4, 1954, Taylor walked from the University library to the Registrar's office. While in the presence of Mary D. Shane, the Registrar, Taylor vomited. He promptly took off his hat and tried to vomit into it. Shane called for emergency help. Taylor was rushed to Hubbard Memorial Hospital where he died two hours later of a stroke and cerebral hemorrhage. [49]

In conclusion, Taylor's commitment to "research as opportunity" was evident in all aspects of his life. As an educator and historian, Taylor used Fisk University as a creative laboratory in which he could promulgate his philosophy of Christian values combined with liberal democracy which entailed a commitment to American values of life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness free from segregation and discrimination based solely on race. From his statement of purpose for black intellectuals in "Research as Opportunity" in 1926 to his unpublished "History of Fisk University," in the late 1940s, Taylor sought to champion research and by extension a commitment to education as a viable tool in overcoming social discrimination. His work as Dean at Fisk as well as his involvement in various educational organizations such as the National Association of Collegiate Deans and Registrars was simply an extension of this philosophy. For Taylor, the concept of 'research as opportunity" found its greatest expression in his pioneering revisionist studies of Reconstruction in South Carolina, Virginia and Tennessee. Each of these studies demonstrated a determined effort to overturn historically inaccurate portrayals of Reconstruction, by firmly situating African American as important contributors to and participants in American history. The promotion of African American history through his work with the Association helped to advance the contributionist theory of black history as a necessary ingredient in United States history making it more inclusive and thus, more democratic in its construction. The sum total of Taylor's life and work in a variety of fields serves as a necessary addition to the growing literature on black historians as well as the literature on black intellectuals whose scholarship has been neglected. Finally, Taylor found his creative voice and made his mark not as strident race man or as racial propagandist, but as one who believed in the infinite possibilities of "research as opportunity."

NOTES

1. For information on Carter G. Woodson and the seminal importance of both the ASNLH, see Patricia Romero, "Carter G. Woodson: A Biography," (Ph.D. diss., Ohio State University, 1971); Jacqueline Goggin, *Carter G. Woodson: A Life in Black History* (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1993). Also see August Meier and Elliott Rudwick, *Black History and the Historical Profession, 1915–1980* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1986).
2. Some of Taylor's older siblings, included Amanda Forrest, who worked as an elocutionist and teacher in the Washington, D.C. schools; William Taylor, who worked for the U.S. government in a statistical capacity; and Lewis Taylor, a professional candy maker. He worked for the Velatie Carmel Company in Washington, D.C. in the 1930s and 1940s. Ms Edna Browne, niece of Alrutheus Ambush Taylor, interview by author, Washington, D.C. 16 October 1992. There are only two complete studies of the life of Alrutheus Ambush Taylor. They are James Pleasant Woods's "Alrtuheus Ambush Taylor, 1893–1954: Segregated Historian of the Reconstruction," (M.A. thesis, Louisiana State University, 1969);and Stephen G. Hall's "Alrutheus Ambush Taylor: Pioneering Revisionist Historian of Reconstruction, 1893–1954," (M.A. thesis, University of Wisconsin at Madison, 1993).
3. For information on blacks in Washington, D.C., see Letita W. Brown and Elsie Lewis, *Washington in the New Era, 1870–1970* (Washington, D.C.: A Publication of the Education Department National Portrait Gallery, Smithsonian Institution, 1972): Constance McLaughlin Green, *The Secret City: A History of Race Relations in the Nation's Capital* (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1967); and James Borchert, *Alley Life in Washington: Family, Community Religion, and Folklife in the City, 1850–1970* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1980). Edna Browne recalled that Taylor was an outstanding student at both James Garfield Elementary and Armstrong Manual Training School. Browne interview. For information on Armstrong Manual Training High School from 1906–1910, see the *Report of the Board of Education* Vol IV in the *Annual Report of the Commissioners of the District of Columbia, Year Ended June 30, 1907* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1908), 221–226; *Report of the Board of Education* Vol IV in the *Annual Report of the Commissioners of the District of Columbia Year Ended June 30, 1910* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1911), 247–251.
4. For information on the University of Michigan during this period, see Howard H. Peckham, *The Making of the University of Michigan, 1877–1967* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1967). Information on Taylor's enrollment at the University of Michigan is contained in the admissions register for the College of Letters, Science and the Arts within the University of Michigan Registrar Collection. Taylor's years of enrollment at Michigan were: 1910–1911, 1911, 1912, 1913–1914, 1914–1915 and the summer of 1916. Cited in Karen Jania, Reference Assistant, Bentley Historical Library, University of Michigan to Stephen G. Hall, 29 October 1992 in possession of author. For information on the conflict between U.B. Phillips and Taylor, see Woods, "Alrutheus Ambush Taylor," 10–11.
5. For details on the founding of Epsilon chapter at the University of Michigan, see Charles Harris Wesley, *History of Alpha Phi Alpha: A Development in College Life* (Washington, D.C.: The Foundation Publishers, 1953), 80–82. Details on Taylor's membership in Alpha Phi Alpha at Michigan are contained in the *Palladium*, the senior annual of the secret societies of the University of Michigan and "The Fraternity Guide for Freshmen." Cited in Jania to Hall, 29 October 1992, in possession of author.
6. For details on the publication of the *Sphinx*, see Wesley, *History of Alpha Phi Alpha*, 130. For Taylor's entries in the *Sphinx*, see A.A. Taylor, Associate Editor, Episilon Chapter–Ann Arbor, Michigan," *Sphinx* 2 (December 1916): 13–14; A.A. Taylor, "Episilon Chapter—University of Michigan," *Sphinx* 3 (February 1917): 12.
7. For information on Taylor's tenure with the Urban League, see Yenser, *Who's Who in Colored*

America, 1930-1931-1932, 410; Franklin, "Personal," 240; and Woods, "Alrutheus Ambush Taylor," 18–19. For excellent treatments of the Urban League, see L. Hollingsworth Wood, "The Urban League Movement," *Journal of Negro History* 9 (April 1924): 117–124; Nancy J. Weiss, *The National Urban League, 1910–1940* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1974); Guichard Parris and Lester Brooks, *Blacks in the City: A History of the National Urban League, 1910–1940* (Boston: Little Brown & Co., 1971) and Avrah Strickland, *History of the Chicago Urban League* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1966).

8. For more detailed biographical information on Harriet Ethel Wilson, see Woods, "Alrutheus Ambush Taylor," 15–17. For information on Taylor's appointment with the YMCA, see the "YMCA Notes," *Washington Bee*, 12 (March 1919): 5.
9. For information on the history and course offerings at West Virginia Collegiate Institute, see the Bureau of Negro Welfare and Statistics of the State of West Virginia, *The Negro in West Virginia, 1921–1922*, by T. Edward Hill in the *Public Documents, West Virginia 1921–1922* 4 vols. (Charleston: Tribune Printing Company, 1924), 28–29. For information on the hiring and salaries of Taylor and his wife, Harriet Wilson, see the State Board of Control, State of West Virginia, *Seventh Biennial Report* in the *Public Documents, West Virginia, 1921–1922*, 618–619. Also see "GEB Fellowship Application Blank, " 27 March 1928, LSRM Papers; box 98, folder 994.
10. For information on Taylor's correspondence courses through the University of Chicago, see the "GEB Fellowship Application Blank," 1928–1929, LSRM Papers; box 98, folder 994. For information on Taylor's appointment as a delegate to the National Conference of Social Work, see "Receives Valuable Year's Scholarship/A.A. Taylor to Continue Research at Harvard/News of Colored Folk," *The Indianapolis News*, 8 September 1928, newspaper clipping in the Thomas Elsa Jones Papers; Box 41, Folder 6, Fisk University Archives,Nashville, Tennessee (hereafter Jones Papers). For information on Taylor's selection to conduct the social welfare agency's study, see Bureau of Negro Welfare and Statistics of the State of West Virginia, in *The Negro in West Virginia (1921– 1922)*, 93.
11. For biographical information on Woodson, see Patricia Romero, "Carter G. Woodson: A Biography," 1–29 and Jacqueline Goggin, *Carter G. Woodson: A Life in Black History* (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1993).
12.. See Alrutheus Ambush Taylor, "Making West Virginia a Free State," *Journal of Negro History* 6 (April 1921): 131–173. .
13. See Taylor, "Making West Virginia a Free State," 153–173. 14. See Alrutheus Ambush Taylor, "Negro Congressmen a Generation After," *Journal of Negro History* 7 (April 1922): 127–171. For an overview of the work on Reconstruction which adhered to the "Tragic Era" legend, see Kenneth Stampp, *The Era of Reconstruction, 1865–1877* (New York: Alfred Knopf, 1965), 3–23; John Hope Franklin, "Mirror for All Americans: A Century of Reconstruction History," *American Historical Review* 85 (February 1980): rpt in John Hope Franklin's *Race and History: Selected Essays, 1938–1988* (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1989), 384–398. Also see Eric Foner, *Reconstruction: America's Unfinished Revolution, 1863–1867* (New York: Harper & Row Publishers, 1988), xix–xxvii.
15. See Taylor, "Negro Congressman," 129–135, 135–139, 142–150, 158–165.
16. Ibid., 168–171. For information on Taylor's resignation from West Virginia Collegiate Institute, see Romero, "Woodson: A Biography," 139. For an announcement of Taylor's duties at the Association, see *Journal of Negro History* 7 (October 1922): 454. For information on Taylor's graduation from Harvard, see "Notes," *Journal of Negro History* 8 (October 1923): 465. For information on Taylor's promotion to a full-time investigator for the ASNLH, see the *Annual Report of the Director of the Association for the Study of Negro Life and History Incorporated, July 1, 1922 to June 30, 1923: Together With the Financial Statement of the Secretary-Treasurer, the Official Staff and Life Members* (Washington, D.C.. The Association for the Study of Negro Life and History, 1923), 4–5.

17. For information on the ASNLH's grant from the Carnegie Institution, and the Laura Spelman Rockefeller Memorial Fund, see "The Proceedings of the Annual Meeting of the Association for the Study of Negro Life and History," *Journal of Negro History* 8 (January 1923): 116–121. For information on the founding of the Associated Publishers, see "Notes," *Journal of Negro History* 6 (July 1921): 380.
18. For a description of Taylor's role in verifying data for the studies, see Carter G. Woodson, *Free Negro Owners of Slaves in the United States in 1830: Together with Absentee Owners of Slaves in 1830* (Washington, D.C.: The Association for the Study of Negro Life and History, 1924), viii, and *Free Negro Heads of Families in the United States in 1830: Together with a Brief Treatment of the Free Negro* (The Association for the Study of Negro Life and History, 1925), foreword.
19. See Alrutheus Ambush Taylor, "The Movement of Negroes from the East to the Gulf States from 1830 to 1850," *Journal of Negro History* 8 (October 1923): 367–383. Taylor presented his findings at the Spring Conference of the Association in 1924. See the "Proceedings of the Spring Conference of the Association for the Study of Negro Life and History Held in Philadelphia, April 3 and 4, 1924," *Journal of Negro History* 9 (July 1924): 376.
20. See W.E.B. Du Bois, *Black Reconstruction in America: An Essay Towards a History of the Part Black Folk Played in the Attempt to Reconstruct Democracy in America, 1860–1880* (New York: Harcourt and Brace, 1935; rpt New York: Athenueum, 1985). Also see James A. Pike, *The Prostrate State: South Carolina under Negro Government* (New York: D. Appleton & Co., 1874; rpt New York: Harper & Row, 1968), 12, 18, 50, 83, 88
21. See Alrutheus Ambush Taylor, *The Negro in South Carolina During the Reconstruction* (Washington, D.C.: The Association for the Study of Negro Life and History, 1924), 2–3. Initially Taylor's study of Reconstruction in South Carolina was published in two portions in the *Journal*, see A.A. Taylor, "The Negro in South Carolina During the Reconstruction," *Journal of Negro History* 9 (July 1924): 241–364 and "The Negro in South Carolina During the Reconstruction (concluded)," *Journal of Negro History* 9 (October 1924): 578. .
22. See Pike, *The Prostrate State*, 12. For information on the emergence of scientific history within the American historical profession, see Peter Novick, *That Noble Dream: The "Objectivity Question" and the American Historical Profession* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), 1–111; John Higham, *History: The Development of Historical Studies in the United States* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall Inc, 1965), 92–103. . For a discussion of the contributionist model of black history, see Robert Harris, "Coming of Age: The Transformation of Afro-American Historiography," *Journal of Negro History* 67 (Summer 1982): 107–121.
23. See Taylor, *The Negro in South Carolina During the Reconstruction*, 54–69.
24. Ibid., 122–124.
25. Ibid., 2.
26. See Augustus Granville Dill, "Negro History, Harvard Style," review of *The Negro in South Carolina During the Reconstruction* by Alrutheus Ambush Taylor, in the *Crisis* 30 (April 1925): 225–226, and Ulysses S. Poston, review of the *Negro in South Carolina During the Reconstruction* by Alrutheus Ambush Taylor, in the *Pittsburgh Courier*, 20 February 1926, p. 16.
27 See Carl Russell Fish, review of *The Negro in South Carolina During the Reconstruction* by Alrutheus Ambush Taylor, in the *American Historical Review* 30 (April 1925): 653
28. See Robert E. Park, review of *The Negro in South Carolina During the Reconstruction* by Alrutheus Ambush Taylor, in the *Virginia Magazine of History and Biography* 33 (January 1925): 427–428.
29. See Alrutheus Ambush Taylor, *The Negro in the Reconstruction of Virginia* (Washington, D.C.: The Association for the Study of Negro Life and History, 1926), 3, 227–242, 153–173, 121–136. Reviews of Taylor's *The Negro in the Reconstruction Virginia* by Alrutheus Ambush Tay-

lor, in the *American Historical Review* 33 (October not show the dull style of 1927): 202; Robert E. Park, review of *The Negro in the Reconstruction of Virginia* by Alrutheus Ambush Taylor, in the *American Journal of Sociology* 33 (March 1928): 832–833; and "Books in Brief," review of *The Negro in the Reconstruction of Virginia* by Alrutheus Ambush Taylor, in *The Nation* 125 (November 2, 1927): 484.

30. See Taylor, *The Negro in Virginia*, 105–207.
31. For a reprint of the letters pertaining to Taylor's study of Reconstruction in Virginia, see "Communications," *Journal of Negro History* 11 (October 1926): 669–682. Lorenzo J. Greene an investigator for the Association after Taylor's departure also felt that Taylor's study gave, "much information about Reconstruction otherwise omitted from the average book on the subject." See Avrah E. Strickland, ed., *Working With Carter G.. Woodson: A Diary of Lorenzo J. Greene* (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1989), 178.
32 For information on Taylor's job offer at Fisk, see Woods, "Alrutheus Ambush Taylor," 68–70. For an announcement of Taylor's appointment at Fisk, see "Notes," *Journal of Negro History* 12 (April 1927): 357.
33. For an excellent discussion of the philosophy of black education in the South, see James D. Anderson, *The Education of Blacks in the South, 1860–1935* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1988), 238–278. For an overview of the McKenzie administration, see Joe E. Richardson, *A History of Fisk University, 1865–1946* (Alabama: University of Alabama Press, 1980), 71–90. Also see Lester Lamon, "The Black Community in Nashville and the Fisk University Strike of 1924–1925," *Journal of Southern History* 60 (May 1974): 225–244.
34. For a listing of Taylor's position at Fisk during the 1926–1927 school year, see "Officers of the Administration, 1926–1927," *The Greater Fisk Herald* 2 (November 1926): 17–18. For biographical information on Zephaniah Alexander Looby, see Yenser, *Who's Who in Colored America, 1930–1931–1932*, 276. Ms. Graftah Looby, Looby's wife , noted that Looby and Taylor were very good friends. Looby always referred to Taylor as the best friend that I have here." Graftah Looby, wife of Z. Alexander Looby, interview by author, Nashville, Tennessee, 26 August 1992. For information on Taylor's request for appropriations for the history department, see Taylor to Jones, 7 July 1927; Jones to Taylor, 9 November 1927; Jones to Taylor, 16 November 1927, Jones Papers; box 41, folder 4 and Taylor to Jones, 18 August 1929, Jones Papers; box 41, folder 6. For Jones's offer of scholarly assistance to Taylor, see Jones to Taylor, 9 November 1927, Jones Papers: box 41, folder 8.
35. See Alrutheus Ambush Taylor, "Research as Opportunity," *The Greater Fisk Herald* 2 (October 1926): 8, 18–19.
36. For information on Du Bois's varied careers, see his two autobiographies, *Dusk of Dawn: An Essay Toward an Autobiography of a Race Concept* (New York: Harcourt Brace and Company,1940); and *The Autobiography of W.E.B. Du Bois: A Soliloquy on Viewing Race from the Last Decade of its First Century*, 2 vols. (New York: Vintage Books, 1971). For information on Luther Porter Jackson's historical career, see Meier and Rudwick, *Black History and the Historical Profession*, 85–92. For information on Jackson's activities in Virginia's black community, see Raymond Gavins, "Hancock, Jackson and Young: Virginia's Black Triumvirate, 1930–1945." *Virginia Magazine of History and Biography* 85 (October 1977): 470–486. Taylor and Jackson presented papers at the Ninth Annual Meeting of the Association, see "Proceedings of the Ninth Annual Meeting," *Journal of Negro History* 10 (January 1925): 108–109.
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41. See A.A. Taylor, review of *Black Reconstruction in America: An Essay Toward a History of the Part Black Folk Played in the Attempt to Reconstruct Democracy in America, 1860–1880* by W.E.B. Du Bois, in the *New England Quarterly* 8 (December 1935): 608–612.
42. See Alrutheus Ambush Taylor, "Historians of the Reconstruction," *Journal of Negro History* 23 (January 1938): 16–34. Taylor first presented "Historians of the Reconstruction," at the Annual Meeting of the Association in 1937. See the "Proceedings of the Twenty-Second Annual Meeting of the Association for the Study of Negro Life and History in Washington, D.C., October 31-November 3, 1937," *Journal of Negro History* 20 (January 1938): 1–9.
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United States Diplomacy and the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty of 1954

Ray Takeyh

The distinguished middle east scholar, Albert Hourani once noted that in absence of the Suez Crisis of 1956, the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty of 1954 would have been the model of Western relations with the Middle East.[1] However, this important episode has received scant attention in the existing historiography.[2] The one scholarly work that critically examined this episode has misperceived the accord as another step in the America's attempt to supplant Britain as the primary power in the Middle East.[3] The tortuous course of Anglo-American diplomacy and the type of an agreement that it produced is the subject of this paper. A careful examination of the motivation and basis, as well as the perception of the accord by the United States, United Kingdom, and Egypt, will help us better understand a key and neglected episode in Western-Egyptian relations.

Moreover, given the fact that the current historiography is constructed through the prism of the Suez Crisis, there is a widespread claim that the administration of President Eisenhower came to power with a determination to pursue policies independent of Britain or even to undermine the British presence altogether in the Middle East.[4] This paper attempts to use American diplomacy toward the Anglo-Egyptian base dispute as a case study denoting the United States' eagerness to sustain a cordial relationship with its Atlantic ally. In its first foray into Middle East politics, the Eisenhower administration betrayed its partiality toward Britain and suspicion of the Egyptian regime. The global needs of Soviet containment and the ties of the Atlantic alliance would propel the United States and United Kingdom toward a careful coordination of both their global and regional policies. Subsequent to the treaty the two powers would cooperate in conceiving an Arab-Israeli peace plan code-named Alpha and in 1956 even

devised a covert program named Omega whose ultimate aim was the overthrow the nationalist Egyptian government headed by Colonel Gamal Abdel Nasser.[5] It must be noted that at the height of the Suez Crisis the United States never disagreed with Britain's goal of toppling Nasser but merely sought to persist with the gradual Omega plan as opposed to a precipitous resort to arms.

By 1954, evolving strategic considerations and persistent financial difficulties arising from World War II induced Britain to reduce its military presence in the Suez Canal zone. The accord was a culmination of an attempt initiated by the successive postwar governments to remove all the vestiges of colonialism and remodel British presence in the Middle East. However, the British lion was hardly ready to abandon the lands it had imperiously commanded for decades. Whitehall was now to achieve its aims through cooperation with Nasser and the emerging Arab nationalist forces.

The Eisenhower administration was equally sanguine about the accord. Before the Middle East could be organized for the containment of the Soviet Union, the thorny issue of British access to the Suez base had to be resolved. This would require concessions from both the British and the Egyptians. But, once more, the overall U.S. strategic objectives, combined with a continued desire to sustain a degree of British presence, would preclude pressuring the United Kingdom. The final settlement would be the result of internal political developments in both Cairo and London. However, the Eisenhower administration, which viewed its diplomacy as instrumental in crafting the accord, expected the Egyptians to reciprocate by settling the Arab-Israeli conflict and participating in an anti-Communist area defense network.

The Eisenhower administration clearly misread Nasser and did not understand his vision of the Arab world. As the leading exponent of Arab nationalism, Egypt sought to avoid the alignment with Cold War rivals that could only mean external intervention in its affairs. The Egyptians viewed the agreement as the beginning of the reduction of external influence in the Middle East. The treaty would usher in a new era of Arab nationalist activism. This hardly implied reconciliation with Israel or adhering to a regional pact.

The Suez base dispute has its origins in the initial British involvement in Egyptian affairs. By 1882, the official start of the British occupation, over ten thousand imperial soldiers were already in Egypt. The intricate global rivalries of nineteenth century Europe and the growing importance of East Asian and Indian trade routes necessitated direct British supervision of the Suez Canal. The ostensible purpose of the United Kingdom's presence, as enunciated by Foreign Secretary Lord Granville, was to ensure "that the order of things to be

established shall be of satisfactory character and possess the elements of stability and progress."[6] The confluence of imperial ambitions and reformist impulses resulted in a prolonged occupation of Egypt.

The Suez Canal continued to play a vital economic and increasingly important military role in British strategic planning. Before the outbreak of World War I, Britain formalized its power by declaring Egypt a protectorate. This move was more than justified because British control over the Suez Canal partly facilitated the Allied victory in 1919. Approximately 175,000 British and Commonwealth troops moved through the canal to the various war fronts.

A new explosion of Egyptian resentment and nationalist unrest toward the British occupation characterized the aftermath of World War I.[7] London was compelled to move to at least a perfunctory accommodation of Egyptian nationalism by offering Cairo qualified independence. While Egypt would enjoy autonomy over its domestic affairs, Britain would guide its foreign policy and maintain its hold over the crucial Suez base. The 1922 declaration removed the anachronistic protectorate status without endangering any of Britain's essential interests. This would be the prototype of treaties Britain would subsequently offer to other Arab states.[8]

During the 1930s, the specter of another global conflict led both Britain and Egypt to revise the existing arrangement without disturbing its essential foundation. The 1936 Italian invasion of Ethiopia generated fears in the Egyptian ruling elite about the ultimate aims of the fascist powers. Britain's prime minister, Stanley Baldwin, was also quick to recognize that the evolving international exigencies required a friendly, cooperative Egyptian populace. The resulting Anglo-Egyptian Treaty of 1936 embodied the key provision of ending British occupation of Egypt's population centers. Egypt's sovereignty was validated when Britain's chief representative in Cairo, the high commissioner became ambassador.[9] Despite the statutory recognition of Egyptian independence, the British ambassador remained the most important single figure in Cairo. Moreover, Britain sustained a large military force in the Suez Canal area.

World War II completely changed the region's political calculus by introducing a new power to the Middle East, the United States. Despite its anticolonial pretensions, the United States was eager to sustain the British presence. The development of a antagonistic relationship with the Soviet Union diminished U.S. interest in autonomous regional development. By 1946, the growing Soviet moves toward domination of the Turkish Straits, Iran, and the Balkans caused a great deal of alarm in Washington and ushered in a doctrine of containment. The most important articulation of the rationale of Harry Truman

administration's came from the Moscow-based diplomat, George Kennan. In a long telegram to the State Department, Kennan outlined how the voracious Soviet global appetite was cleverly complemented by a strategy of gradually, yet relentlessly, expanding its influence. Unlike Nazi Germany, the Soviet Union would not resort to the precipitous use of force but would exploit all vulnerabilities and openings to subvert Western interests.[10] The revival of the traditional Russian imperial policy coincided with the perception of the Soviet Union as a predatory, expansionist power motivated by an ideology that sought world domination.[11] Accordingly, areas such as the Middle East that had previously been peripheral to American concerns acquired new found importance.

The postwar British Labour government, beset by economic discontent and the competing demands of the welfare state, sought to reduce the cost of international obligations. Through accommodating moderate nationalism, Britain was to reclaim its empire and sustain its great power pretensions. The chief proponent of this view was Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin, whose strategy of re-establishing the British presence through new treaties was one of the turning points in Western relations with the Middle East.[12] In the new treaties, Egypt, Iraq, and Jordan were recognized as entirely sovereign nations with advantageous economic ties binding them to Britain. Through the promotion of social and economic reforms the British hoped to become aligned with growing middle class elements. Such an approach would hopefully prevent the nationalists from turning to the Soviet Union in their quest for independence.[13]

To his credit, Bevin realized that postwar nationalism made blatant colonial rule unrealistic in Egypt. Where the foreign Secretary's fertile imagination failed him was in the perception that there were moderate elements willing to extend the Pax Britannica into the postwar era. Six decades of occupation had left deep- seated anger in the Egyptian masses; even the pliable ruling class could not ameliorate the mass hostilities.

Bevin's ideas, which had much merit for American policymakers, served as the basis of U.S. policy until the Suez Crisis. For the Truman administration, it was absolutely imperative that no vacuum be created in the Middle East that could be exploited by the Soviet Union. The 1947 Truman Doctrine, which formalized the anti-communist strategy, also acknowledged a partnership with Britain in the containment effort.[14] The British foreign secretary keenly understood that the Cold War meant that the United States would "help His Majesty's government to maintain its position in the Middle East."[15] The feeling that the United States and Britain must secure each other's interests was given further impulse in the Anglo-American consultations of 1947 known as the "Pentagon

talks." The Foreign Office representatives assured their American counterparts that Britain had dispelled its overweening imperial pretensions and was ready to play the role of a "benevolent senior partner developing the Middle East in order to prevent further degeneration into acute nationalism."[16] The National Security Council (NSC) approved of this posture, proclaiming "it would be unrealistic for the U.S. to undertake to carry out our policy unless the British maintained their strong strategic, political and economic position in the Middle East and unless they and ourselves followed paralleled policies in that area."[17] The interesting point is the U.S. acceptance of the British position that intense expression of nationalism was utterly hostile to Western interests. The Pentagon talks were not merely an extension of the containment strategy in the Middle East, but a U.S. partnership with Britain in stymieing the emerging forces of nationalism.

The Western sponsorship of the state of Israel and the resounding triumph of the Israeli army in the 1948 War gave further impetus to the radicalization of Arab nationalism. The nationalists no longer emphasized the glory of past Arab empires, but focused on the failure to deal with the Zionist challenge.[18] An all-encompassing re-examination of Arab society took place. This powerful reassertion of nationalism stressed that the Zionist threat and external machinations required a categorical transformation of all aspects of society. The economic and political stagnation that had caused the defeat could not possibly be eradicated by the existing ruling elite that was tainted by decades of collaboration with the imperial powers.

Throughout the Middle East the governing elite attempted to expropriate the nationalists' slogans. This was particularly evident in Egypt when in 1952 the Egyptian premier, Nahas Pasha of the traditionalist Wafd Party, even abrogated the 1936 Anglo-Egyptian Treaty.[19] But increasingly the junior army officers were assuming the political leadership of the nationalists. No other sector of society was organized enough for an effective response to public demands and aspirations for a new order. It was from this group that the charismatic Colonel Gamal Abdul Nasser and the group of officers he headed, the Free Officers, emerged and overthrew the corrupt Egyptian monarch, King Farouk.

At this point, in 1953 the new Republican administration assumed control in the White House. Along with the arrival of the Eisenhower administration came rhetoric about a policy that was more independent of Britain or domestic Zionist interest groups.[20] However, the newly inaugurated president had a deep-seated commitment to North Atlantic Treaty Organization and European security. The rigid Cold War atmosphere of the early 1950s required British co-

operation and continued American access to its still- formidable global resources. Despite its economic problems, Britain still had military installations in many critical parts of the world. The Eisenhower administration acknowledged that the "remaining military and industrial power of the U.K. taken together surpass those of any other non-U.S. member of NATO and make its contribution indispensable to the North Atlantic alliance as a strategic position of strength."[21] Even in the Middle East, where the British establishment was being vigorously assailed by the nationalists, the U.S. perceived that "a rapid abandonment of the British position would leave a military vacuum that the U.S. would have difficulty in filling and which would accentuate insecurity and create further opportunities for the Soviet or local Communist exploitation."[22] The combination of global and regional considerations would compel the Eisenhower administration to follow the same policy as its predecessor and seek to sustain British influence and power. Despite all the rhetoric about the new, independent approach, American policy under Eisenhower would be characterized more by continuity than change.

The Anglo-Egyptian base dispute was by far the most significant obstacle blocking the development of an anti-communist orientation in the region. By 1953, domestic political factors were preventing both the Egyptian and British leaders from offering concessions designed to reach a compromise. The Free Officers' regional ambitions required the restoration of self-determination and the removal of the imperial powers which had done so much to retard the Middle East's political and economic development. This inspiring nationalistic message resonated throughout the area and offered Cairo an opportunity for regional leadership. Consequently, the new regime established as its minimum aim the reversion of the sovereignty, possession, and property of the Suez Base to Egypt. With the aid of civilian British technicians, the Egyptians would maintain the remaining equipment for an interim period.[23] The firm belief that the British presence constituted an illegal occupation was the essence of the Egyptian negotiating platform. Accordingly, they were not inclined to offer any concessions which detracted from this position.

Moreover, the Egyptians believed that they had already offered huge concessions by renouncing their claim to the Sudan. Since 1898, when England conquered Sudan and placed it under Egypt's dynastic control, successive Egyptian monarchies held firm to Khartoum and blocked agreement with Britain on the base issue.[24] After many development programs, the Foreign Office remained adamant on the issue of Sudanese sovereignty. The forces of Egyptian revolution which had removed King Farouk had no attachment to the preserva-

tion of his throne in the Sudan. The new regime quickly abandoned the domineering slogan of "evacuation and the unity of the Nile valley." The Free Officers seemed to have transcended the dogma of the past and realized their essential interest in the removal of the British forces.[25]

There were a number of factors which ostensibly should have propelled Britain toward a more conciliatory posture. The British Defense Chiefs' Global Strategy Paper of 1952, promulgated by the combined military leadership, signified a further shift away from the traditional concept of maritime defense and reliance on huge overseas installations. In the event of a general war, the Middle East was viewed as crucial, because once Europe was devastated, the bases in the region could be used for counterattack. However, the type of bases that this strategy required were small, mobile facilities on the periphery of the Soviet Union.[26] The extensive Suez base would be an easy target for the Soviet air force, which was about to acquire hydrogen bomb capability. Still, the Chiefs were not quite prepared to abandon the idea of land forces in the Middle East. Such a presence would demonstrate continued British resolve and sustain Britain's prestige. The defense officials' review stressed that the "withdrawal of all combat troops from the Middle East would finally convince the world that Britain is no longer a great power and we would be classified with the French."[27] To avert this horrendous fate, some troops would have to remain in the Suez base. This obviously did not mean the existing eighty thousand troops, but certainly a lessened presence.

As the negotiations with the Egyptians stalled, the prospect of violence led Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden to stress that "reoccupying Egypt with all its consequences which this would entail is likely to mobilize world opinion against us."[28] Clearly, continued British intransigence would only damage Anglo-American relations. The NATO partnership which so modulated American pressure on Britain had an equal influence on Whitehall, propelling it toward softening its attitude.

However, the British approach to the negotiations was greatly affected by domestic political considerations, particularly the varying sentiments within the Conservative Party. For a party that had regained power in 1952, partly by criticizing Labour's handling of Middle Eastern affairs, the status of the base would present a difficult challenge. The legendary Winston Churchill who had returned to the prime minister's office with a slim parliamentary majority, was hardly a leader prepared to abandon imperial missions. The combative prime minister's obdurate inclinations were buttressed by approximately forty Conservative backbenchers, who were extremely hostile to further reduction of British

presence in the Middle East.[29] The right-wing Tories were already condemning the agreement leading to Sudanese autonomy as another case of capitulation to irrational native regimes. The Suez base was a far more formidable prize than anything in Sudan. One of the leaders of the rebellious Tories, Julian Amery, warned that the base was the "Clapham Junction of Commonwealth communications and the keystone of the architecture of imperial defense."[30] For generations the installations were the basis and symbol of British power in the Middle East. It would be extremely difficult for masters of a waning empire to capitulate to the reality of nationalism and make the necessary compromises.

Ironically, one of the leading advocates of compromise with Egypt was Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden. Had Eden retired from public life in 1955 he would likely be remembered as one of the leading diplomats of his generation. Since the 1930s, Eden had displayed calm judgement and cogent analysis of international events. During 1954, Eden would prove a discerning observer of Middle Eastern political temperament and attempt to reach some kind of an accommodation with the Egyptian regime.

This is not to claim that Eden favored abandoning Britain's position in the Middle East, as he fully shared the idea that United Kingdom's world power status was contingent upon a vibrant presence in the Arab world. However, the foreign secretary perceived that a settlement with Cairo could open an opportunity to approach Arab nationalism on a more favorable basis. Not unlike his predecessor, Ernest Bevin, Eden of 1954 seemed to have sensed that the arrival of a new force in the Middle East was undeniable and required a more constructive policy.

Existing British plans included three scenarios which would guide negotiating behavior. The ideal outcome was Case A, which would leave seven thousand British troops to maintain the base. The installations would thus be immediately available in the event of an emergency. By and large, this was the only case that was somewhat acceptable to Churchill. Case B involved Egyptian takeover of the installations under the supervision of a skeleton British crew. The last plan, Case C, required complete British withdrawal while retaining the right for periodic inspection. The availability of the base in the last two cases would be delayed by sixty to ninety days, respectively.[31] Although each of these contingencies was elaborately devised, British policymakers viewed anything other than Case A as damaging their national security. The United Kingdom's prestige and influence required a continued presence in Egypt. However, even a reduced British presence reminded the Egyptian nationalists of their colonial past and the fact that the Suez garrison had so often been the

force behind Britain's interference in Egypt's internal affairs.

To overcome Egyptian opposition, Churchill sought American support. A unified Anglo-American stance would go a long way to toward convincing the Egyptians to be more forthcoming and make the desired concessions.[32] Churchill expressed to Eisenhower his hope that "Anglo-American unity in Egypt would enable us without bloodshed to secure our common military and political interests."[33] However, the stakes were high enough that Britain might have to proceed on its own. Field Marshall William Slim of the Chiefs of Staff captured this sentiment when he declared that "we should not be afraid on matters of importance or principle to let the negotiations fail. That would be much better than weakly yielding to either Egyptian or American pressure".[34] Throughout the subsequent proceedings the British negotiating platform remained impervious to American suggestions. In fact, the United States continuously revised its position to conform with British predilections.

The initial review of American policy occurred when Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles, traveled to the Middle East in May 1953. A careful examination of the records reveals that although the trip raised certain questions, it did not fundamentally alter the American path.[35] During his inspection trip, Dulles came to appreciate the magnitude of Egyptian disdain for the British presence. However, this did not imply re-evaluation of American policy on the need to cooperate with Britain and sustain its military presence. Indeed, Dulles attempted to temper Egyptian aversion to the British presence by stressing that the danger of the Cold War required compromise on the pure definition of sovereignty. Dulles even went so far as to compare the British establishment in Egypt with the U.S. military presence in Britain.[36] As with its predecessor, the new administration continued to misperceive the historical conflict which had so thoroughly poisoned Anglo-Egyptian relations.

To be sure, from the outset the U.S. did diverge to a certain degree from British views. President Eisenhower seemed to recognize that "defeating the Communist aims does not include objecting to national aspirations."[37] But American understanding of those aspirations was not consistent with the Free Officers' interpretation. Eisenhower elucidated the American view in a letter to General Mohammed Naguib, the nominal leader of the Free Officers. The president advised the general that the British intentions were merely that the "immensely costly base facilities can be readily usable by the Free World; and that Egypt herself will stand militarily with the Free World against a possible Communist aggression."[38] This revealing letter established the American position, which would not change dramatically. The United States continued to appreci-

ate the continued importance of the Suez base and agreed with Britain on the question of availability of the installations in case of an emergency. While the U.S. had already agreed that the principles of Egyptian sovereignty required reform of existing arrangements, those reforms were still to take note of the need for continued British access to the facilities. As Dulles informed the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, "Our military people attach importance to the maintenance of the base in event of general war although they do not think it necessary to hold out for the full terms which Churchill at present is holding out for."[39] The difference with Britain was a question of degree which still required the Egyptians to recognize the important task of containment and offer the necessary compromises.

On the crucial question of military aid, the U.S. betrayed its preference for Britain by denying the Egyptians the military hardware they most desired. For the Free Officers a steady supply of arms was absolutely critical for both internal and external security. The power of the new leadership was partly based on the goodwill of an army that was in desperate need of modern weaponry. Colonel Nasser, the architect of the 1952 coup, professed that the "revolution was spearheaded by elements from the army, that although it was a popular revolution, it was the army that led it, and with the background of the ammunition scandal of 1948, the officers are determined to have a strong army."[40] But U.S. policymakers withheld any aid package pending progress in the Anglo-Egyptian talks. Eisenhower assured Churchill that the United States was in full "agreement with what your government is trying to do in the Canal zone."[41] In this regard, U.S. policy was shortsighted. The Eisenhower administration chose not to pursue an important avenue toward gradually building up a relationship of trust with Cairo.

By July 1953, the disintegrating situation in the Middle East implied that American policymakers could not remain entirely impervious to the nationalists' demands, particularly in light of the reduced strategic significance of the Suez base. Eisenhower informed Churchill that he was "convinced it is not possible to concluded a settlement on the basis of Case A, despite its desirability from a military point of view."[42] The Americans seemed to have moved markedly beyond the unrealistic Case A and settled on retaining the absolute minimum number of technicians necessary for the efficient operation of the Suez base. This was essentially Case B and that was still unacceptable to the Egyptians. The administration seemed to be moving to accommodate certain Egyptian claims as a means of reversing the neutralist trends that were strengthened by the stalemate.

The U.S. position was hardly a radical revision of its previous perspective. The administration persisted with its futile attempt to reconcile the two sides and harmonize their differences. Dulles claimed that "we continue publicly to stand with the British, but that Case A is unattainable and therefore a move should be made in direction of Case B."[43] More importantly, the switch was not based on any far-reaching evaluation of the essence of the differences between the U.S. and Britain. Dulles merely blamed the divergence on the "fact that our official reports regarding Egyptian attitude do not agree with London's estimate of the situation."[44] The differences were obviously not the result of varying field assessments, but were based on a more significant disagreement.

This position was still unacceptable to Britain. The emerging differences between American and British perceptions spurred much high- level activity, culminating in an official visit to U.S. by the Lord Salisbury, president of the Council, who assumed control of the Foreign Office when Eden entered the hospital. Lord Salisbury's trip hardly signified the British propensity for compromise as Churchill advised him not to accept "any changes in principles in terms which we have decided."[45] The improbability of obtaining U.S. support for such dogmatic aims seemed to be an issue to be resolved through insistence and pressure. Even if U.S. support was not forthcoming, Salisbury proclaimed, "I should be obligated to make clear to them that we should retain full liberty to conduct our negotiations with the Egyptians as seemed good to us, and that we should be prepared to accept the consequences of a failure to reach agreement with them."[46] The point is important given the limited impact of any American pressure when the British saw their national interests at stake.

To break the impasse in the Anglo-Egyptian talks, the U.S. sought to conceive a formula that would be acceptable to the British, presenting it as an Egyptian proposal. Dulles informed the embassy of the desirability of General Naguib presenting an agreement that "might last 5 years and limit the number of technicians to 4000."[47] Egypt's response went slightly beyond Dulles's formula and reiterated its insistence on an Egyptian commander, limiting the duration of an accord to three years upon which the four thousand remaining British technicians would be withdrawn. While this represented a unique American intervention, the deteriorating situation required it. The U.S. was still not ready to collude against its principal ally as the State Department concluded that "it is an American objective in Egypt to convince the Egyptians that the defense against Communism can only be successful when carried out on a world wide basis and that the Suez Canal and Base as part of this world-wide pattern, must be kept in instant readiness and be immediately available to the West."[48] The

U.S. position cannot be seen as an embrace of the nationalists and abandonment of its ally. The persistent deadlock over facilities of dwindling importance led to a more creative diplomacy still based on existing predispositions.

The formula remained unacceptable to Britain. During the much anticipated July summit, acting Foreign Secretary Salisbury fully adhered to his cabinet instructions and contemptuously dismissed the proposal. The British government's draft reply continued to insist that "we cannot accept an agreement which does not retain essential features of what was described as Case A, namely the technical control of main installations in the Base should remain in the British hands."[49] The formula only elicited British hints that lack of American cooperation could induce a similar U.K. response in other critical regions, such as East Asia. The global value of the Atlantic alliance was the trump card that the British continued to play with great effect.

Precipitously, the U.S. began to abandon the proposal that it had initially inspired. The president did not need to be convinced of the value of the NATO alliance. In his reply to Churchill, Eisenhower merely stressed that the American estimation of the situation was more grave and negotiators would have to be granted more flexibility. There was no thought of parting with Britain over the issue of Egyptian sovereignty, as the president assured his ally that "you can dismiss any thought of our seeming to desert our agreed positions or exhibiting weakness."[50] Dulles went even further and actually criticized the plan that he had conceived. The secretary of state now stressed that "as to availability and duration our defense people fully share desirability of the British formula."[51] The baffled Egyptian leadership received a letter from the president stating that "in all candor I find certain points adversely affecting the security interests of my own country."[52] Although the administration did seem to recognize that the existing Egyptian temperament excluded an agreement based on Case A, the overall strategic objectives necessitated compromise with the British view.

By December 1953, the continuation of the impasse impelled the State Department's Near East Bureau to began to strengthen the U.S. position. Given the administration's recent diplomacy, there seemed to be a need to take some measure to placate the Egyptians. The idea was to begin discussions on extension of economic aid to Egypt while still holding back the promise of military hardware. As Assistant Secretary of State Henry Byroade claimed, "the aid will enable us to assist more efficiently in overcoming the remaining obstacles to a base agreement."[53] Dulles also recognized that withholding aid to Egypt would have a "very great effect on our Arab relationships."[54] This issue had become particularly acute, for an aid package of twenty six million dollars for Israel had

just been announced. An administration which came to power proclaiming a balanced policy between Arabs and Jews could hardly withhold aid from a key Arab country while dispatching material aid to Tel Aviv.

The reaction from London was nothing less than apocalyptic. Fully recovered from his medical problems, an invigorated Eden stressed that such a move would "give publicity to a major divergence in British and American policies and thus have a serious effect on the Anglo-American relations."[55] Churchill also contributed to the fray by again warning Eisenhower that this issue "might well cause a deep and serious setback to relations between America and Great Britain."[56] The British policymakers' clever appeal to the delicate global balance of power was once again successful. The Americans finally agreed to postpone the aid delivery until after the allied summit scheduled to take place in Bermuda in December. Thus, by the end of 1953 the United States had made some tactical divergences from the British perspective only to be brought back into the fold by Churchill's clever use of the value of the Anglo-American relationship.

On the eve of the important Anglo-American talks, the American embassy in Cairo realized the extent of Egyptian disenchantment with the U.S. The failure of the administration to offer any evidence of support, particularly after Egyptian concessions during Salisbury's visit at the behest of the U.S., further increased the Revolutionary Command Council's already substantial reservoir of suspicion. The Egyptians had an inflated estimation of U.S. power and perceived it as the latter's responsibility to cajole Britain into abandoning some of its positions. The failure was only compounded by refusal to extend aid that had long been promised and was seriously needed.

At the Bermuda Summit, both Churchill and Eden pressed hard for American support. By this time, the essential issue of withdrawal had long been decided and the remaining questions concerned reactivation and uniforms. The British delegation appeared reluctant to concede on both these issues. Their basic strategy was to exert American pressure as a means of obtaining Egyptian agreement.[57] The president, attuned to Cold War requirements, was inclined to support the British on issues of availability, while viewing the prime minister's insistence on an ostentatious display of British military personnel as excessive. The neutralist trends in the region were proceeding at an alarming rate and an accord was absolutely necessary to pave the road for America's grandiose regional objectives. The administration remained reluctant to accept the British terms and intimated that it would be unable to withhold aid much longer then the beginning of January 1954. The Americans were pragmatic enough to rec-

ognize certain inevitable realities. Eisenhower may have sympathized with Churchill's imperialism, but also recognized that a failure to constructively engage the nationalists would breed "bitter conflict that would cause much damage to the Western powers."[58]

The Bermuda Summit cannot be viewed as ushering in a bold, independent U.S. policy, as the inevitable value of the Atlantic alliance influenced the direction of American policy. Once more, the U.S. altered its views to conform to the British perspective. Despite the initial January deadline, British protests induced Eisenhower to assure Churchill, "at your request we have not only withheld military aid, but likewise postponed the initiation of economic aid."[59] Eisenhower further stressed that although the importance of the Middle East required the improvement of relations with Arab countries, "this government has always refused to do so at the cost of anything we believe detrimental to Anglo-American relations."[60] The deferral of any deadline for commencement of aid "delighted and heartened" the British.[61] The Cold War restrictions and Churchill's powerful appeals prevented yet another opportunity to make a meaningful overture to the nationalist regime in Egypt.

In 1954, the convergence of a number of factors made an accord possible. Despite American diplomacy, the final agreement was the product of internal British re-evaluation and the changing political situation in Egypt. Both strategic and economic factors combined to betray Churchill and the right-wing parliamentary backbenchers. The first blow came when the chancellor of the exchequer informed the cabinet of the need to cut 180 million pounds from defense expenditures by the fiscal year 1955-56. The manpower section was the obvious place for the excisions.[62] The choice was between reduction in troops in the critical NATO area or in the militarily less significant Egyptian garrison.

This position was not necessarily unacceptable to the military leadership. In the early 1950s there were significant changes in British defense planning. The already extreme pressures to trim the military budget forced the Chiefs to base their deterrent strategy on less costly atomic weapons. The anticipation that any future global conflict would be waged through nuclear weapons, along with economic factors, reduced the need for reliance on conventional forces.[63]

The crucial turning point on the Suez question was the Chiefs' study of January 1954 which acknowledged that there would soon be two basic alternatives: to remain indefinitely in Egypt or to withdraw completely. Both options were problematic, as the former would entail violence, while the latter would seriously impair British influence. The Chiefs became convinced that given the available resources and political factors "the present plans for defense of the area

were unrealistic and that a reappreciation of the position was required."[64] The strategic changes made retention of a large number of troops in a base that was completely exposed to atomic air strikes an unattractive option.

Anthony Eden, who was seeking a rationale for withdrawal that would impress the cabinet on the need for a settlement, quickly grasped the military leadership's strategic re-evaluation. The foreign secretary emphasized that a "treaty with Egypt, accompanied by redeployment which would show that we have no intention of abandoning our interests, while it would release some of our forces, need not diminish our influence."[65] Eden's pragmatism was not based on a recognition of how Arab nationalism was altering the region's politics, but on a realization that the limited value of the base simply required a reduced presence. The foreign secretary who would later wage war over Suez was hardly inclined to abandon existing commitments.

At least Eden seemed to realistically address the question of true alternatives to Britain's negotiated withdrawal from the Suez. The Churchillian preference for confronting the Egyptians seemed futile and ineffective. There was simply no way that the base could be maintained in the midst of Arab animosity. Between October 1951 and July 1954, 47 British servicemen were killed and 3,279 thefts of British property were reported.[66] The morale of the forces was on a precipitous decline as they lived in fear of continuous siege. Without effective local collaboration, the operation of the base was seriously hampered as its primary function ceased to be safeguarding the Middle East and became self-protection. Failing a march on Cairo and the imposition of a military regime, Britain could not afford to sustain the status quo.

The Chiefs' endorsement of Eden's analysis was the most important factor in convincing a skeptical cabinet. The military leadership viewed the facilities in Libya, Iraq, and Jordan as absolutely essential for the defense of the Middle East and warned, "we believe that a failure to secure an agreement with Egypt will seriously affect our relations with those countries, and in particular will prejudice our ability to obtain Iraqi agreement to use their air fields."[67] Given the move toward advanced mobile air bases the Suez Base was no longer an absolute necessity. The military men, whose job would be to quell an Egyptian insurrection, did not welcome failure in the negotiations. Although the idea of losing the elaborate facilities at Suez seemed unpalatable, the Chiefs noted, "we consider it so important from a general strategic point of view to reach an agreement that we are prepared to accept the disadvantages."[68] Out-betting Churchill and the militant backbenchers, the generals stressed that "if it would tip the scales in favor of an agreement we would be prepared to a even go further on

question of uniforms."[69] The Foreign Office, the unified opinion of military leadership, and Britain's great ally all presented the same case for an accord with Egypt.

However, no agreement would be possible without Churchill's endorsement. The embattled prime minister seemed unable to prevent the tide leading to an accord. The event that pushed the reluctant Churchill over the brink was the 1954 American detonation of the hydrogen bomb. The prime minister conceded that the question of troops in the Suez Base "has become less urgent because of all this hydrogen business that has swooped down on us."[70] To the cabinet Churchill formally presented his recognition "that our strategic needs in the Middle East have been radically changed by the development of thermonuclear weapons."[71] At least for Churchill, nuclear developments seemed to have made the undesirable task of withdrawal less distasteful. The important point about the British cabinet deliberations is that the final decision to withdraw was not in any way affected by American diplomacy. Neither Churchill, Eden nor the Chiefs arrived at their positions because of American prodding or suggestions.

The Egyptian decision to compromise was equally unaffected by U.S. diplomacy. Egyptians reached an agreement as a result of the internal political factors. Since the beginning of the revolution there was an uneasy coexistence between Nasser and Neguib. As the two vied for supreme power, they embraced uncompromising platforms on the base issue in order to galvanize their supporters. By March 1954, Nasser finally succeeded in undermining Neguib, replacing him as the premier. The problem was that the regime had done much to popularize Neguib as the symbol of the revolution. The general's demise left the Free Officers in desperate need of some kind of an accomplishment to legitimize their power. An accord stipulating the final withdrawal of the British combat forces would serve as a means of reclaiming national confidence.

The mutual re-evaluation finally produced an agreement. The Egyptians compromised by offering reactivation of the base in case of an attack on the Arab states or Turkey and consultations in case of an attack on Iran. Britain compromised by agreeing to civilian maintenance of the Base during peacetime. The final Anglo-Egyptian Agreement, singed on 27 July, 1954, allowed one thousand civilian technicians to maintain the base. The duration of the accord was to be seven years.

The 1954 Anglo-Egyptian Treaty was viewed as a great triumph in both London and Washington. The two powers had failed to coordinate their policy in a systematic manner as their tactics seemed propelled by the circumstances.

Nonetheless, far from using the occasion to consolidate its position in Egypt and supplant Britain, the United States revealed a penchant for siding with Britain whenever U.K.'s fundamental interests collided with the Egyptian perspective. This characteristic would resurface as the Eisenhower administration's hierarchy ranked the value of NATO alliance much higher than cooperation with local nationalists.

The process of negotiations also revealed the internal dynamic of Anglo-American relations, as Britain demonstrated a determination to act independently of the United States whenever it perceived its national interests at stake. Far from acting as a junior partner, Britain pursed its objectives tenaciously and obtained critical concessions from the United States. The resultant American attitude was the result of the convergence of the Anglo-American aims, as both powers shared a similar perspective and a common distrust of Third World nationalists.

Could the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty have served as the basis of relatively cordial relations between the Western powers and Egypt? It seems unlikely, as upon the signing of the treaty set the Middle East on a collision course in which all parties involved strove for regional hegemony.

For its part, the United States was confident that its diplomacy had facilitated the accord. The NSC staff concluded that "the mediation of the U.S. was a major factor in the successful termination of the Suez Base dispute."[72] Given American assistance in achieving Egypt's national aspiration, the administration naturally anticipated the nationalists' support in resolving the Arab-Israeli dispute and reorientation of the region to the great task of containment. Indeed, the president's mind was already contemplating the uses to which regional nationalism could be put to use now that the Western presence was unfettered by the burdens of the past. In a letter to Churchill, Eisenhower noted "if we are intelligent enough to make a constructive use of this force, then the results, far from being disastrous, could rebound greatly to our advantage, particularly in our struggle against the Kremlin's power."[73] In his view, the end of this Suez base problem and the prospect of economic aid were as sufficient to ameliorate any nationalistic qualms Cairo might have had about advancing America's agenda. The Egyptian reluctance to subordinate their objectives to the American aims would lead to much recrimination and anger.

If the Egyptians anticipated that the accord would lead to a diminished British presence in the region, they were quite mistaken. Part of the reason Britain was predisposed to an agreement was its newfound determination to shift its focus to the Northern Tier defense concept. This revised strategy, adopted as early as

May 1953, pledged that Britain's "intention is to deploy Northeast-ward with the object of holding the enemy land forces as far as forward as practical if possible in the passes leading to Persia and Iraq."[74] As recent converts to the "outer-ring" strategy, the British would pursue it with missionary zeal.

The ramifications of the agreement were also interpreted differently in Cairo. In a cogent article, Albert Hourani observed that the foundation of the British presence in the Middle East was power and "this fact molded the attitude of both of those who pursued power and those against whom it had been used."[75] For Egypt, the treaty was the final removal of that power and the beginning of a new era in the Middle East. Egypt was now finally free to pursue her regional ambitions without concern over troop movements in the Suez garrison. The aim of Egyptian foreign policy would be to assume influence over the pan-Arabist sentiments and to secure the leadership of the Arab world. Given the long struggle with Britain and resentment of foreign influence Egyptian pan-Arabism would be distinctly neutralist and not prone to serve the cause of the Great Powers. Such a policy necessitated an anti-Western stance, as Egypt had to defuse potential challenges and their attempts to reorient the region toward Cold War priorities.

The Middle East was about to enter one of its most turbulent decades. Despite the promises and potential of the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty, the conflicting assumptions, aims and ideologies would result in much tension. At the end, a Middle East incorporated in Western containment strategy was incompatible with Egypt's ambitions, just as an Arab world under the influence of Egyptian pan-Arabism was unacceptable to the Western cold warriors. Whatever its achievements, the treaty failed to bridge this fundamental gap.

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Constrained Yet Not Forgotten: Continuities in Feminist Intellectual History, 1945–1972

Shira Tarrant

Academic accounts of recent women's political history and feminist intellectual developments tend to focus either on the turn-of-the-century suffrage movement or on Second Wave feminism; activities between these two eras, in contrast, are somewhat obscured. The historical myth is that after winning the right to vote, American feminists of the 1920s and 1930s retreated from the public limelight to enjoy the comforts of domesticity. After brief forays into the factory to support the 1940s war effort, the myth continues, Rosie and her companions quietly returned home again, voicing their anger and dissatisfaction with women's condition only when the social and political upheavals of the late 1960s provided an appropriate outlet. But feminist politics never entirely disappeared. Emerging from this myth of feminist inactivity is therefore a curious and inviting gap regarding women's intellectual efforts toward sociopolitical change during the mid-twentieth century.[1]

During World War II women entered the labor force in record numbers and many wished to remain there after the war ended. This change on the homefront generated debate about women's proper role in society. Domestic ideology, a revision of the nineteenth century "cult of domesticity," glorified the homemaker, arguing that woman's true source of happiness resided in the home and that working women endangered children's well-being and threatened family cohesion. In 1947, psychiatrist Marynia Farnham and her partner, Ferdinand Lundberg, attacked feminism as the source of America's social problems. The independent woman was an oxymoron, they claimed: Women were created to be biologically and psychologically dependent on men.[2]

Margaret Mead, Viola Klein, and Simone de Beauvoir, preeminent scholars

of the postwar period, fought against these currents of domestic ideology in an effort to maintain a feminist tradition in intellectual life. Not only do Mead, Klein, and de Beauvoir represent theoretical progress which transcends national boundaries, but they reflect cross-disciplinary developments, as their work emerges from the fields of anthropology, sociology and philosophy, respectively. The work of each conveys a feminist interest with the social features of gender, and the relation between dominant ideology and the political status of women.

These three seemingly disparate minds are united by their critical attention to the social construction of gender, particularly questions regarding the innateness of sex roles (Mead), the sociology and the social construction of knowledge and epistemological dualism (Klein), and women as Other (de Beauvoir). Highlighted is the ambivalence, or interlinking tension, between theoretical issues of women as an essential being versus "woman" as a socially constructed category. While each scholar acknowledges the physical reality of the female body *qua* female, far greater emphasis is placed on the social forces which would deem this body inferior. Compared with modern standoffs between Anglo-American "individualist" feminism and French "relational" theory (or related stalemates in the equality/difference debate), there is no distinct split in theoretical allegiance down national lines found in the work of Mead, Klein, and de Beauvoir.

Understanding the political challenges and theoretical struggles facing women of the mid-twentieth century within the context of feminist intellectual history brings to light the ways in which the issues of the past are strikingly connected to those of today. Attention to the feminist past highlights historical antecedents to our present concern with the social construction of gender, and may perhaps even suggest ways out of more contemporary dilemmas concerning equality and difference, essentialism versus constructionism, and matters of epistemological dualism.

Post-World War II Political Climate and Ideological Trends

Developments in the social sciences after the Second World War posed important questions regarding the character of human behavior and the relationship between freedom and the state. Academic works which questioned the links between women's political status and dominant concepts of womanhood also fall within this period of intellectual history. While Mead, Klein, and de Beauvoir labored in their ivory towers (or South Pacific islands), the quiet rumbling of cultural, legal, and political battles could be heard in America, Britain, and France. Ideological conflicts spilled over into the political realm just as certainly as political changes wore away at strongly held notions about the female character.

Feminism of the mid-twentieth century certainly lacked the vigor and organizational character of either the suffrage movement of the past, or the Second Wave of the future. Yet after passage of the Nineteenth Amendment, American women never entirely stopped organizing and theorizing, nor did feminists in England and France disappear during this period of time: modern feminism did not spring out of the abyss. It seems highly improbable that a powerful social and political crusade such as the women's movement could suddenly wither away, only to reappear just as quickly, and seemingly out of nowhere, around 1970.[3] There is, to the contrary, distinct evidence of women's political activity during the post-World War II period. To a large degree, legislative issues of the postwar years hinged upon the following concepts and tensions: Equality equals danger (i.e., removing special labor protections harms women); special protection equals danger (i.e., gender specific labor laws keep women in a secondary status and in "need" of special protection); and motherhood versus wage labor, or the conflicts between women's role as nurturer and worker.

In the United States, the National Woman's Party (NWP), the League of Women Voters, and efforts to ratify the Equal Rights Amendment (ERA) continued the fight for women's rights throughout feminism's putative dry spell. The NWP was, in fact, instrumental in defining the boundaries of American feminism during these decades.[4] In particular, the NWP advocated passage of the Equal Rights Amendment, first introduced into Congress late in 1923. The ERA initiated a long and bitter debate between those who argued for equal opportunity, compensation, and recognition for women's work efforts, and those who sought to protect woman's difference—essentially, her capacity for maternity.

Supporters of protective legislation such as maximum hours or minimum wage worried that without such legal restrictions, women were easily exploited and their health endangered. The American Federation of Labor (AFL), for example, supported legislation limiting women's work hours, since these laws "protected women's needs," but objected to the proposed equal pay law of 1945 because it reduced women to wards of the state and perpetuated the assumption that women "need" special protection.[5] Essentially, the AFL argued that while women were *too strong* to need equal pay legislation, they were at the same time *too weak* to work equal work weeks. One aspect of Margaret Mead's argument—that women cannot be at once too weak *and* too strong—indirectly reflected sex-based protective labor legislation disputes such as these.

Feminists continued this argument during the 1950s and 1960s. Supporters of the ERA, such as the National Woman's Party, maintained that special legal protections and exemptions for women effectively nullified sexual equality and

perpetuated discrimination. Members of the Women's Bureau and other ERA opponents argued that passage of the amendment would threaten the legal benefits that women had so painstakingly acquired over the years. They held fast the notion that nurturing families and society took precedence over women taking part in the opportunities of the marketplace. Labor unions vigorously continued to oppose passage of the ERA, claiming that women needed protective labor legislation—not equal rights—to gain the protection that men won by collective bargaining.[6] Overall, the ERA was shrouded by nuance, ambivalence, and tension, factors which contributed to its eventual defeat.

In Britain, the postwar nation was notably marked by the devastation of war and immediate economic concerns. The move from "warfare" to welfare state policy addressed the citizens' needs for economic well-being, but in so doing masked uncertainty and conflict over women's proper place. Health care policy, for example, minimized women's unequal position by providing maternity coverage and emphasizing careful spacing of children. At the same time, these policies linked women to parenting, placed sexuality within the locus of the family, and reinforced female behavioral prescriptions. The welfare state in Britain after the war was intended to "ease the lot of the breadwinner" and to improve the economic condition of his family. As a result, it left unexamined the predominating ideologies regarding women and domestic affairs. British welfare policies supported male-headed households not out of a conspiracy but simply because those in power did not think of doing things differently.[7] Even so, organizations such as the Six Point Group and the Open Door Council maintained their efforts to promote women's position throughout the postwar period by focusing on equal pay issues and other economic concerns.

After Frenchwomen gained political enfranchisement in 1944, they tended to participate within already established political parties and pressure groups, in voluntary associations, social work, and other traditionally "female" ventures. The concerns of more radical feminist activists were subsumed under the umbrella of socialist and other Left political groups until after the student uprisings of 1968.[8] With the Catholic church wielding strong authority over the French, the political Right feared that women's vote, along with increasing numbers of women in the workforce, threatened to destroy the family and traditional values. Embedded within France's postwar welfare state programs were conservative ideas about family, population, and reproduction. Pronatalist policies (contraception was illegal in France until 1967, and abortion until 1975) combined with only recently gained suffrage rights meant that French women still faced considerable pressure to maintain their traditional roles.

In the United States during the 1950s increasing numbers of women were

completing university degrees. Upon receiving these diplomas, however, they faced limited opportunities on the job market and great encouragement to marry. More women married right after World War II than ever before, and marriage and homemaking became requisite tasks in fulfilling social expectations of the 1950s. A 1962 Gallup poll revealed that women were committed to and fulfilled by "living through their husbands and children." Yet most women also wanted their daughters "to have more education and marry later," indicating the internal conflict produced by the pressures of domestic ideology, the political confines of the postwar period, and the desire for something more.[9] Post-World War II American ideology, Joanne Meyerowitz argues, was not in the least monolithic but "rife with contradictions, ambivalence, and competing voices." Popular literature expressing post-World War II mass culture advocated "both the domestic and the nondomestic, sometimes in the same sentence."[10] Although Meyerowitz's research focuses on American ideological trends, her attention to cultural tensions is a theme that may be extended beyond national borders. In an important sense, Meyerowitz makes an argument similar to the sub-thesis here: The "problem" of the postwar era (whether in Britain, France, or the United States) was not merely that feminist politics was muffled, but that intellectual dissent from domestic ideology during this time has been overlooked, ignored, or suppressed.

Although quite a number of women were dissatisfied with their social and political condition, dissenting voices were unable to turn the tide of the postwar years. Even in the face of expanding educational opportunities for women and the *possibilities* of professional achievement, McCarthyism and Cold War pressures in America, economic burdens in Britain, and religious demands in France produced an atmosphere of conformity. An extensive and successful postwar feminism was still out of the question, and in spite of continuing intellectual debate regarding concepts of womanhood, postwar domestic ideology maintained a strong hold over the general public. The period from 1945 to the mid-1960s was particularly resistant to a women's movement seeking further gains. With security and containment as the common theme, American Cold War and the domestic revival reinforced each other and reached out to the rest of the West. As historian Elaine Tyler May has pointed out, pervasive Cold War tendencies encouraged private solutions to social problems even though postwar domesticity never fully delivered on this promise.[11] Instead, the feminine mystique, combined with the rising popularity of Freudian psychology, defined feminist protest as a sign of neurosis and emotional instability.

Most feminist-minded thinkers agreed that discrimination against women based on crude ideas of masculine superiority must be eliminated. There was

general ambivalence, however, as to precisely what women's role *should* be. Postwar economic reconstruction, pronatalist welfare state policies, and domestic ideology combined to form a climate which certainly did not encourage a more overt political activism. Leila Rupp and Verta Taylor have noted that feminism managed to survive the doldrums mainly because it endured as an elite-sustained, academic enterprise.

Alongside the somewhat limited (but nevertheless evident) postwar endeavors to enact legal change in the status of women came scholarly contributions exploring women's position in her family, her workplace, in her body *politic*, and the ways in which the category "woman" was constructed and understood.

Margaret Mead: Socialization and Sex Role Ideology

Never overtly claiming to be a feminist, Margaret Mead nevertheless made surreptitious mention of the connections between her work and the feminist movement, writing that clearing away historical and traditional misconceptions about gender difference "frees the mind from using the sort of arguments that have been invoked for and against the feminist movement."[12] Although Mead's work has been clouded by accusations of inadequate methodological rigor, it has been very influential in regards to conceptions of gender, culture, and politics.[13]

The publication of *Sex and Temperament* (1935) and *Male and Female* (1950) produced strong empirical evidence sharply contradicting cultural justifications for women's subordination. In *Sex and Temperament*, a study of gender roles in three dramatically differing South Pacific cultures, Mead concluded that attitudes and personality traits are socially produced. What are "male" roles in one culture may be "female" roles in the next; in a third culture, temperament and sex roles may be blended or less distinct. *Male and Female* continued Mead's developing concern with the relationships between culture, gender, and human potential. In a century of social science, where great weight has been attached to empirical evidence and cross cultural comparisons, Margaret Mead often helped to provide both, and no one did more to persuade more skeptical minds that what were commonly considered women's "natural roles" were more properly viewed as culturally constructed behaviors and expectations.

It was Mead, in fact, who was invited to write the Introduction to the 1963 *Report on the President's Commission on the Status of Women*. The Commission, established by John F. Kennedy in 1961, was formed to study education, home and community services, private employment (particularly jobs under federal contract), employment in the federal government, labor standards, and federal

social insurance and taxes as they affected women. The President's Commission also explored in depth the legal treatment of women with respect to civil and political rights.[14] In her introductory essay, Mead wrote that both legal and social changes were necessary to expand women's participatory membership in American democracy. When compared with the relatively few high-ranking positions held by women in government and private industry, Mead observed that the great gains made by twentieth-century women in education, health, and literacy provided "a puzzling contrast between our claim to freedom of opportunity and our actual accomplishments."[15]

By the time the Commission's Report was completed, Lyndon B. Johnson had made fifty-six presidential appointments of women to responsible government posts. Mead, in her constant vigilance toward culture-bound ideology, cautioned that the Commission could only lay the foundation for removing legal restrictions to women's opportunity. Men and women "are freer to act because of the recommendations that have been made [by the Commission's Report], but the document itself is permissive, not coercive" wrote Mead. "If women regard these greater possibilities as essentially threatening to their sense of themselves as persons, they will be unable to take advantage of the legal support given to their greater freedom."[16]

By her attention to internalized coercion and ideological aspects of subordination, Margaret Mead clearly helped to change the terms upon which the debates about womanhood and legal constraint were based. In the Commission's Report she wrote that to the extent that men achieve a sense of masculinity through situations in which "women know less, earn less, achieve less, and win less recognition than they do, efforts to put the recommendations of the Commission into practice will be effectively, even though often unconsciously, sabotaged."[17]

The clear refrain heard throughout Mead's work was her observation that some form of sex-patterned behavior is found within each and every society. In contrast with the widespread appeal of unmovable Freudian "law," however, Mead was able to demonstrate that distinctions in behavior and divisions in labor according to sex were culturally specific customs. "We know of no culture that has said, articulately, that there is no difference between men and women" beyond the way the sexes biologically create the next generation.[18] All cultures have institutionalized the roles of men and women, but not necessarily in terms of opposition, or dominance and submission. The notion that behavior of the sexes is forever and unalterably innate, wrote Mead, must "be swept from the mind like tattered autumn leaves from the garden-paths before it is possible to

think clearly at all."[19] Human nature is almost unbelievably malleable and readily responsive to cultural conditions. Gender roles, Mead argued, are the product of particular cultural conventions, not examples of some essential ideal of feminine selflessness and masculine competitiveness. Although characteristic differences within a sex are enormous, attributes are synthetically assigned as masculine or feminine. "Every known society creates and maintains artificial occupational divisions and personality expectations for each sex that limit the humanity of the other sex."[20]

While acknowledging the need to take maternity into account in explaining sex roles and cultural patterns, Mead scorned biological determinism, a popular justification for female passivity and legal paternalism. As an example, drawing from psychoanalytic theory and the work of analysts such as Karen Horney, Mead suggested that women envied the privilege and power that societies granted to men, emphasizing that "power envy" ought not to be confused with penis envy. Counterbalancing any envy that girls *might* have was "the envy little boys often exhibited for the remarkable reproductive organs of the female sex." Primitive societies in which male ceremony imitated pregnancy and child birth clearly displayed examples of "womb envy."

Mead remained convinced that temperament was partly due to genetics, but for many years she carefully avoided direct discussion about the relation between individual differences and genetic endowment. Mead was concerned that any attempt to decipher this issue would lead to distortions of her work by others who evoked the crude dichotomy of nature versus nurture, and by those who manipulated biological theories of difference to justify and reinforce social inequalities. Mead argued passionately that "as long as people tend to move so quickly from concepts of diversity to concepts of superiority" questions of genetics and difference "cannot and should not be studied."[21]

Questions of genetics aside, how is it, Mead asked, that while "some peoples think of women as too weak to work out of doors, others regard women as the appropriate bearers of burdens, because their heads are stronger than men's"?[22] If there is any law regarding men and women, it must be that much behavior distinguished by the sexes, and even some physical characteristics, is produced by social custom. This maxim of Mead's delivered quite a blow to a well-entrenched belief system based upon domestic ideology and popularized Freudian explanations of the "female character." The sting and vitality of Mead's argument emerged from her focus on the cultural dynamics which contribute to the social construction of gender: "Whereas it would be futile to protest against unalterable laws (unjust though they may be), it was reasonable and advisable to protest against unjust customs."[23]

Mead's focus on dichotomized and culturally constructed gender roles not only reflected political disputes of her day, but directly anticipated the work of subsequent feminist theorists. Kate Millett later argued in *Sexual Politics* (1970) that profound sociopolitical change occurs only by re-examining traits such as strength and weakness, violence versus passivity and intellect versus compassion— traits typically categorized respectively as masculine and feminine.[24]

Earlier, significant attention to Mead appeared in Betty Friedan's 1963 critique, *The Feminine Mystique*. Friedan was well aware of Mead's work—and quite offended by it. Friedan's interpretation of Mead has certain transitive qualities: via *The Feminine Mystique*, Mead comes to resemble a monster-like Freudian anti-feminist. Although Mead ostensibly rejected the old adage "biology is destiny," stated Friedan, she conducted her anthropology through a Freudian lens. In *Male and Female*, argued Friedan, Mead's "truly revolutionary vision of women" was subtly transformed into a celebration of woman in the female role—defined by her sexual biological function.

> At times [Mead] seems to lose her own anthropological awareness of the malleability of human personality, and to look at anthropological data from the Freudian point of view — sexual biology determines all, anatomy is destiny. At times she seems to be arguing in functional terms, that while woman's potential is as great and various as the unlimited human potential, it is better to preserve the sexual biological limitations established by nature. At times she says both things in the same page . . .[25]

According to Friedan, Mead's influence had been paradoxical. While postwar ideas of womanhood might have taken from Mead her visions of the "infinite variety of sexual patterns" and "women's great untested human potential," glorification of the female sexual function instead became a cornerstone of the feminine mystique.[26]

The product of Mead's lifetime dedication to her research is visible when we look closely at its influence upon Second Wave feminist ideas about women's cultural and political subordination, yet it tends to be implicit. While Margaret Mead is considered quite influential in the field of anthropology, her explicitly feminist contributions tend to go unrecognized by more recent theorists. Mead's thesis rejecting innate sex roles, for example, is no longer a startling revelation. A more compelling point is that while concepts of innate versus learned behavior and the problems of gendered dualism were vigorously discussed during the 1970s, it was also quite common for theorists to overlook (or misinterpret) Mead's contributions to our knowledge about the cultural or social construction of gen-

der roles and the relation between sex divisions and women's political status—observations Mead made well before the Second Wave of feminism emerged. Given Friedan's interpretation (and the popularity of *The Feminine Mystique*), however, Mead had less of an explicit influence on Second Wave feminist theory than she might otherwise have had.

Viola Klein: How We Know What We Know About Women

In Britain, Mead's contemporary, Viola Klein (?-1973) was beginning to investigate the structure and sociology of knowledge. By approaching her discipline with attention to what she termed "the back and forth relation between scientific knowledge and social change," Klein was able to focus on ideologically constructed notions about women while remaining in the mainstream of sociology. Klein pointed out that theories of femininity are as varied as the scholars who devise them. Descriptions of the feminine character and a list of her traits, wrote Klein, "could be extended almost indefinitely, in proportion to the number of authors considered." What is considered essential to any concept of womanhood "depends to a large extent on personal bias and valuations, and on the social-historical vantage-point of the observer."[27] Quite simply, Viola Klein questioned how social scientists could extricate the "truth" from the social environment since social science theories reflected the ideologies of one's generation and "the idiosyncrasies of their time."[28]

Klein's survey of various accounts of womanhood by intellectuals such as Havelock Ellis, Sigmund Freud, and Alfred Adler was framed by her belief that theories of femininity form the basis of debate over "practical activities in the most various departments of social life," from questions of etiquette to problems of employment policy, political campaigning, and the advertising and selling of ideas.[29] As far back as Aristotle, wrote Klein, theories of womanhood had been constructed in dualist opposition to the meaning of manhood. Although epistemological dualism is an "effective principle for reducing chaos to a system," deducing a bi-polarity of human beings destroys not only chaos but variety.[30] To mistake "categories of thought for norms governing reality means forcing life into a straight-jacket. It is as impossible to do justice to human existence by applying to it epistemological criteria as it is to judge organic life by the application of geometrical norms."[31]

Klein's argument against epistemological dualism was not, of course, a plea for androgyny. Focusing on the reciprocal relation between scientific knowledge and social change instead enabled Klein to make the point that "the understandings people carry around in their heads" and their notions about ideal

social arrangements are interdependent concepts. Klein therefore asked how academic disciplines could be objective and fair to women given the fact that knowledge is related to perception, and perceptions about women have not tended to be very fair.

To resolve the problem of gender-biased presuppositions, Klein sought first to isolate physiological influences on sex difference by excluding sex-related traits which could be attributed to social function, historic tradition, and prevailing ideology.[32] Klein thought that only after accounting for these cultural patterns could one make a well-founded assessment of the "elusive feminine character." Klein's approach to "the woman question" also drew from the understanding that individuals may participate in two different cultural systems, "one of which is, by prevailing standards, regarded as superior to the other."[33] From this perspective, personality traits of women might be compared with other groups such as immigrants, Jews, conquered people, "American Negroes" and "intellectuals who break away from the social groups and classes in which they originated without completely being free from their allegiance to them."[34] Klein observed, however, that the issue is somewhat obscured in the case of women since over "the course of centuries women have developed many substitute gratifications which they consider privileges and to which they cling emotionally more than to equal rights."[35]

Klein's scholarly efforts were not merely confined to questions regarding the philosophy of knowledge and science. *Women's Two Roles* (1956), co-authored with Alva Myrdal, *Working Wives* (1960), and *Employing Married Women* (1963), directly addressed issues of employment and opportunities for women primarily in terms of dominant ideological trends, but also based on survey data. Klein's study revealed that as of 1960 many of the generalizations made about wage-earning women were based upon sentiment, not fact. Determining more clearly why married women entered the labor force, and how these women carried out their dual roles of part-time employment and full-time motherhood was important not only in terms of understanding society, but also because of the implications for practical aspects of various public policy decisions.

During World War II, and again during Britain's economic crisis of 1947, increasing numbers of women left home to work. By 1957 fully one-third of British wives were gainfully employed.[36] There was, however, no trace of feminist impetus behind this employment rate. According to Klein's survey respondents, home and family remained the focal point of women's daily lives. The increasing number of working wives was the result of trends toward smaller families and a sense of obligation to work—not due to an urge for emancipa-

tion. Klein therefore determined that taking up work outside the home was not politically premeditated but the consequence of economic and personal circumstance.

Although postwar British women were greatly burdened by the demands of their dual roles, the sexual division of labor went unchallenged. Woman's dual role was presented as a solution to Britain's economic difficulties rather than as a problem in itself. The conflict between women's two roles, as wage earner and housewife, was a consequence of partial shifts in behavioral expectations in which two feminine ideals, two distinct ways of life, continued uneasily side by side.[37] Women had not achieved satisfactory political freedom, access to education, and opportunity for employment, stated Klein, because "women were generally retarded in their adjustment to the Industrial Revolution." Discrimination was merely part of the social and economic evolutionary movement through time: "Women should be regarded as latecomers in the evolutionary process rather than as one half of mankind kept in subjection by the other half."[38] Whether or not Klein's notion of women's "political retardation" is correct, she certainly captured the essence of feminist disputes not only in Britain, but in the United States in terms of equal rights issues, protective labor policies, and women's roles as mothers.

In Britain, post-World War II debate centered around married women's right to work, the right to equal pay, and the role of the welfare state in supporting family life. Although British activists, like their American counterparts, sought to increase opportunities and eliminate blatant legal and economic discrimination, they nevertheless moved within the confines of an ideological boundary associating women primarily with the role of nurturing family, hearth, and home. American and British politics presumed that motherhood and caregiving was a woman's primary job. The issue of how to reconcile motherhood with professional responsibilities was therefore never successfully solved. This omission was not surprising given the 1940s and 1950s attraction to role-conflict theory. This conceptual social sciences framework focused attention on the conflict between women's two roles and diverted attention from underlying presuppositions about gender. Viola Klein's work illuminating the conflicts between women's public and private roles was therefore consistent with broader trends in academia and politics both at home and abroad during the postwar years.

Klein's solution to the problem of combining motherhood and employment, answered in part, was for industry to modify labor policies by means such as flexible work hours and extended maternity leave. She stated that when attitudes and ideologies were gradually brought into line with technical and social

developments, greater participation by women in the economic, political, and cultural activities of the communities would result. Transforming the status of women and displacing the primacy of domestic ideology would require that the responsibility for making positive contributions to the national economy be shared by both women and men.[39]

Simone de Beauvoir: Essential Woman/Constructed Woman

A third, and quite prominent, figure in post-World War II feminist intellectual history is Simone de Beauvoir (1908-1986), best known for her comprehensive analysis of women in Western society, *The Second Sex* (1949). Simone de Beauvoir maintained an important public role throughout the Second Wave, signing a 1971 Manifesto along with other well-known women who had obtained illegal abortions, spearheading the campaign for free contraceptives, and eventually joining the *Mouvement de Liberation des Femmes* (MLF). Yet prior to the 1970s, de Beauvoir had distanced herself from feminism. De Beauvoir initially shied away from organized feminism because she believed the woman question would be automatically solved by socialism, and because women's groups before the MLF were generally reformist and legalistic. In 1972, de Beauvoir publicly came out as a feminist during an interview published in the French weekly, *Le Nouvel Observateur*. During later conversations with Alice Schwarzer, de Beauvoir specifically discussed her alliance with feminism, the goals of feminist politics, and dispelled charges of essentialism by clearly rejecting the notion that there exists a "feminine nature."[40]

Written under the influence of World War II, *The Second Sex* turned upon philosophical issues of personal freedom and examination of social constraints on liberty, specifically in regards to the female sex. The book began with a question: "Woman? What is woman?" In her answer, de Beauvoir stated that woman is her biological capacity to reproduce and mother. She is an Hegelian "Other"; woman is her physical body. But de Beauvoir qualified this position toward the end of her famous treatise by observing that, "woman is made not born." Thus *The Second Sex* is also an account of the social and historical causes of woman's oppression. The text is a philosophical (and, some would argue, essentialist) work, explicitly influenced by Hegelian (and Sartrean) phenomenology and its language of dualistic opposition.[41] Woman is that which is not man: "She is defined and differentiated with reference to man and not he with reference to her; she is the incidental, the inessential as opposed to the essential. He is the Subject, he is the Absolute — she is the Other."[42] This tension between de Beauvoir's essentialist (i.e., "Woman is her biological capacity to reproduce")

and social constructionist arguments (i.e., "Woman is made not born") is an appropriate starting point for reading her work, as well as the source of sustained critique. (Many have read *The Second Sex* as yet another sample of anti-feminist, male-identified philosophy.)[43]

"Males and females," wrote de Beauvoir, "are two types of individuals which are differentiated within a species for the function of reproduction."[44] The egg, motionless and passive, awaits the free and agile sperm. The ovum, it is sometimes said, has the qualities of immanence, the sperm having the qualities of transcendence, meaning that men are presumed to be active and able to transform their environment, while women are considered passive, existing within themselves. The biological allegory must not be pushed too far, however, because "the truth is that these notions are hardly more than vagaries of the mind." Although "it would be foolhardy indeed to deduce from such [biological] evidence that woman's place is in the home"—there are such foolhardy persons.[45]

The task, claimed de Beauvoir, was to "view the facts of biology in the light of an ontological, economic, social, and psychological context." De Beauvoir confronted the question of woman's experience by contrasting the image woman has of herself with the image of woman projected on her. She noted that "the enslavement of the female to the species and the limitations of her various powers are extremely important facts; the body of woman is one of the essential elements in her situation in the world. But that body is not enough to define her as woman; there is no true living reality except as manifested by the conscious individual through activities."[46] Where relations were based on equality, each reciprocally recognized that the Other was equally free. Where Otherness existed through relations of social or political inequality, however, reciprocity was abolished and replaced by relations of oppression and subjection. Biology was not a sufficient answer, therefore, to the question that she posed: "why is woman the *Other*? . . . We are concerned to find out what humanity has made of the human female."[47]

For de Beauvoir, if women were Other it was because they had been defined as different by men in a system where Otherness and difference meant inferiority. It was therefore not woman's Otherness per se but her subjection—the objectification of woman by man and the nonreciprocity of male and female relations—that de Beauvoir set out to explain. The problem "is not only that woman is the Other; she is the unequal Other."[48] Since de Beauvoir had already made clear that deducing justifications for social inequality from biological premises was a foolhardy venture, then how did inequality come to be if not inscribed in nature?

De Beauvoir's constructionist account of womanhood was based on her view that femininity is not "an unchangeable essence or a biological destiny."[49] The "character" of woman is not dictated to her "by her hormones nor predetermined in the structure of the female brain: *they are shaped and molded by her situation*."[50] Womanhood is a constructed experience. When woman's body comes to signify Otherness, "female" becomes a metaphor for the incapacity to give meaning to experience. Hence, woman is precluded from becoming "the meaning-creating bodily subject of phenomenology."[51]

De Beauvoir's understanding of the causes of women's oppression began with an essentialist analysis of woman's physical difference yet incorporated elements of social constructionist exploration as well. Throughout *The Second Sex* de Beauvoir presented the female body as inherently passive, "caught within the iron grasp of the species," with a philosophical analysis of how and why women are trapped by their bodies. For de Beauvoir, it is true that womanhood is socially constructed, but this construction is built upon the basis of an oppressive female biology. Because of the constructionist aspect of de Beauvoir's philosophy, however, she is able in her later chapters to discuss the social forces that keep women in subjection, or how "woman is made not born." De Beauvoir looked first at material reality to understand consciousness, and then toward consciousness to analyze material reality.

In contrast with Margaret Mead and Viola Klein, de Beauvoir received a great deal more attention for the feminist theoretical aspects of her work. This attention (particularly by Americans) has been fairly recent, however, as de Beauvoir's work went virtually unmentioned in post-World War II United States. The recent revival of interest in de Beauvoir dates to the 1980s, coinciding roughly with the author's death in 1986. Despite her legacy as guide and guru of modern feminist theory, *The Second Sex*, like the Bible, "seems to have been much worshipped, often quoted, and little read" by American women at the time of its publication during the postwar era.[52] One reason for this initial postwar inattention to the French philosopher may be due to the fact that McCarthyism and anti-Communist frenzy in the United States meant that relatively few social thinkers openly risked professional marginalization and public condemnation during this era of conformity and careful conservatism. In this sense, de Beauvoir was a suspect intellectual figure because of her alliance with socialism and Left politics.

Simone de Beauvoir's later influence on Second Wave feminist theory, although significant, appears to be peculiarly implicit. For example, Second Wave theorists such as Shulamith Firestone and Kate Millett, intellectual figures who

we might expect to draw from de Beauvoir, are curiously silent about her. Notwithstanding her pronouncement of *The Second Sex* as "the definitive analysis of sexism," Firestone (1970) devoted little more than one page to de Beauvoir in *The Dialectic of Sex* in spite of their similar views on reproduction and technology; Millett (1970) gave only cursory mention to de Beauvoir in *Sexual Politics* even though both authors approached feminist theory in part using literary analysis. Describing Simone de Beauvoir's influence on her work twenty years after writing *Sexual Politics*, Kate Millett admitted that she inadequately acknowledged her great debt to Simone de Beauvoir's work. "I think de Beauvoir realized that I probably cribbed a whole lot more in what I was doing," Millett recalled in 1989. "I had a section on D.H. Lawrence [in *Sexual Politics*] which was, I now realize, painfully indebted to [de Beauvoir's] analysis of Lawrence in *The Second Sex*. Now I realize that I owed a great deal to what she had said."[53]

Limited reference to postwar theorists by Second Wave feminists presents an interesting conundrum. Ellen DuBois reminds us that women's liberation of the late 1960s and 1970s was blind to its own historical antecedents partly due to the determination of a movement characterized by youth and radicalism to reject any prior influence, and to see itself as something new on earth.

Conclusion

By 1972 the women of France, Britain, and America had fully embarked upon the journey into Second Wave feminism. The writings of Juliet Mitchell, Kate Millett, Germaine Greer, and Shulamith Firestone, now considered among the classics of modern feminist theory, were in wide circulation by this time. In France, the Women's Liberation Movement (MLF) of the late 1960s marked the inception of the Second Wave. Simultaneously, politically-minded groups formed in the United States and Britain to raise feminist consciousness, to counter female subordination, and to fight against inequalities in the law. Prior to Second Wave activism, the intellectual contributions of Margaret Mead, Viola Klein, and Simone de Beauvoir created a cohesive conceptual framework focusing on the social features of sexual difference, dominant ideology, and the political status of women. This general perspective would eventually inform public opinion and policy considerations, feminist political theory, and ultimately—if obliquely—feminism's Second Wave.

The work of each woman comprises a significant contribution to the feminist intellectual tradition. Margaret Mead is a major, if controversial figure in anthropology. Yet Mead's specifically feminist element—her evidence rejecting innate sex roles and her focus on gender socialization—tended to go unmen-

tioned by subsequent Second Wave feminist theorists. Viola Klein dedicated her work to the study of conflicting sex roles and labor issues, the social construction of knowledge, and epistemological dualism. Klein, too, is rarely quoted by initial Second Wave theorists, and her work remains somewhat buried in obscurity. Kate Millett and Juliet Mitchell, for example, wrote during the early 1970s that undermining women's financial dependence would pave the way for destroying the authority and economic structure of patriarchy. Yet they made only scant reference to Klein, who anticipated economic aspects of Second Wave theory when she wrote about women and labor during the 1950s and early 1960s.[54] In contrast, Simone de Beauvoir is more readily associated with feminist political theory. *The Second Sex* received limited attention from the American public during the years immediately following World War II, however, and even though her work had a powerful influence on feminist ideas, the theorists of the Second Wave made almost no explicit mention of de Beauvoir.

An obvious question confronts us: Why didn't Mead, Klein, and de Beauvoir's *feminist* political theory take stronger hold on postwar minds? In what ways were they ignored? Although *The Second Sex* was well-received in France, when the English translation of *The Second Sex* first appeared in the United States it had to contend with various social and political obstacles. Sandra Dijkstra suggests that American intellectual and ideological predilections did not readily lend themselves to the density of de Beauvoir's book. Similarly, her Leftist leanings in the McCarthy era did not help in making her writings accessible in America.[55] Margaret Mead and Viola Klein were noted academicians, both influencing and reflecting ideological aspects of political conflict and public policy considerations regarding women. Yet Klein's focus on role-conflict theory meant that she never questioned whether womanhood and motherhood ought to go hand in hand—that would have to wait for the Second Wave. Mead's significant contributions to feminist thinking were easily perverted by Friedan into arguments glorifying women's sexual/biological function. Undoubtedly the post-1945 social and political climate in America, Britain, and France constrained feminist theorizing and was inhospitable to more radical attention to social and political inequality.

Mead, Klein, and de Beauvoir themselves initially rejected explicit affiliation with feminism. During the immediate postwar years, the social climate made feminist identification difficult or undesirable for several reasons. The legacy of 1920s feminism evoked unpopular images of militancy, sexual prudery, stridence, and selfishness. American labor organizers thought of feminists as members of the professional or leisured middle class, and therefore out of touch with

the realities of the working class. Postwar antifeminists labeled feminists as narcissistic at best, or neurotic at worst, which meant that only a brave few willingly risked such identification. Especially in Cold War America, disagreement with the mainstream during an era generally preoccupied with conformity left one fair game for dangerous charges of Communist sympathy.

If this trio of intellects initially distanced themselves from feminist politics, then why does it matter if Margaret Mead, Viola Klein, and Simone de Beauvoir were somewhat ignored (to varying degrees) by the Second Wave? What makes their theories significant? And what makes their theories distinctly feminist?

An important theme in the work of Mead, Klein, and de Beauvoir is their ideological commitment to individual self-realization for women. Women must take responsibility for transforming the dynamics of sociopolitical dominance by challenging governing ideology, destroying internalized self-hatred, and becoming economically self-reliant. Yet Mead, Klein, and de Beauvoir explicitly linked women's social status to men's power over them, calling attention to the relation between dominant ideology and the political condition of women while also acknowledging the institutionalized obstacles confronting women.[56] In other words, both material reality *and* consciousness must change.

Most importantly, each of these scholars questioned dominant concepts of womanhood and challenged the notion of "innate femininity," directing attention toward social influences on the construction and perceptions of gender. Mead's vision was that of unlimited and malleable human potential devoid of constricting sex role expectations. Klein's message was that we must sift through prevailing ideologies which limit perceptions about women's nature and capacities. For de Beauvoir, a new woman could only appear with the transformation of moral, social, cultural, and economic conditions. For her, difference and Otherness did not mean innate weakness and inferiority.

The feminist ideas emerging from America, Britain, and France during the postwar period anticipated contemporary tensions within modern feminist theory between Anglo-American "individualist" feminism (social constructionism) versus French "relational" (essentialist) feminism. As early as the eighteenth century, Claire Goldberg Moses argues, French and Anglo feminist theory was invested with both individualist and relational elements.[57] Attention to the roots of modern feminist theory in comparative perspective will perhaps lead to new ways out of this dichotomous theoretical dilemma. Margaret Mead, Viola Klein, and Simone de Beauvoir's theories certainly contain kernels of essentialism, but they also emphasize the social construction of gender as the cause and cure for women's subordinate status.

Finally, in focusing on the advancement of feminist political theory during the mid-twentieth century, I do not mean to suggest that the history of feminist thought has progressed in a strictly linear fashion. Perhaps there exist greater consistencies between the post-World War II years and Second Wave feminism than is commonly recognized. To some extent, ignoring certain developments in feminist theory and struggle during the "mid-wave" period clouds the strength, legitimacy, and consistency of the long feminist tradition.

Notes

1. Marty Jezer writes, for example, that "between World War II and the publication of Betty Friedan's *Feminine Mystique* in 1963, only two feminist books appeared in print to offer an alternative vision of women's place in the world [Ruth Herschberger's *Adam's Rib* and Simone de Beauvoir's *Second Sex*]." This claim, and others like it, is patently untrue. Marty Jezer, *The Dark Ages: Life in the United States, 1945–1960* (Boston: South End Press, 1982), 227–228.
2. Ferdinand Lundberg and Marynia F. Farnham, *Modern Woman: The Lost Sex* (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1947). See also, Janet Angela Flammang, *The Political Consciousness of American Women: A Critical Analysis of Liberal Feminism in America* (Ph.D. dissertation, UCLA, 1980), chapter 5: "Postwar Death and Rebirth of Feminism"; and Elisabeth Houghton Hazard, *Women on the Right: Fighting for a New Social Contract* (Ph.D. dissertation, UCLA, 1987), chapter 3: "A New Definition of Womanhood."
3. This observation is at the crux of Elizabeth Wilson's evaluation of post-World War II British feminism. Elizabeth Wilson, *Only Halfway to Paradise, Women in Postwar Britain: 1945–1968* (New York: Tavistock Publications, 1980), 2.
4. Despite its efforts toward women's advancement, it is important to note that the National Woman's Party carried with it certain conservative tendencies. In contrast with the Women's Bureau, which intermittently embraced efforts to combat racism, the National Woman's Party had no interest in minority civil rights except to insist that women be included in government positions and measures to fight racist policies. The NWP position on race was neither passive nor innocuous: by arguing that black men should not have rights that were denied to white women, the NWP used racist arguments to garner support for the ERA. Working in isolation from a network of progressive causes, as the postwar women's movement did, invited the risk of reflecting and perpetuating the elitism, anti-Semitism, racism, and anti-communism of the larger society, all in the name of advancing women's rights. Richard Nixon, Barry Goldwater, and Strom Thurmond, for example, each supported the ERA at one time; curious bedfellows, indeed. For further discussion see Leila J. Rupp and Verta Taylor, *Survival in the Doldrums: The American Women's Rights Movement, 1945 to the 1960s* (Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1990).
5. Correspondence from William C. Hushing to George Riley, 24 April 1951, Legislative Reference Files, cited in Cynthia Harrison, *On Account of Sex: The Politics of Women's Issues 1945–1968* (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1988), 46.
6. Further compounding labor conflicts was the fact that union membership by men far exceeded membership by women. Rupp and Taylor, *Survival in the Doldrums*, 144–153. For discussion about the origins of conflict surrounding the ERA, see Nancy F. Cott, "Historical Perspectives: The Equal Rights Amendment Conflict in the 1920s," in Marianne Hirsch and Evelyn Fox Keller, eds. *Conflicts in Feminism* (New York: Routledge, 1990). Regarding ideological conflicts and the ERA during the postwar years, see Harrison, *On Account of Sex*,

especially chapter 1, "The Equal Rights Amendment and the Ambivalent Legacy of World War II."

7. Wilson, *Only Halfway to Paradise*, 15–16.
8. Claire Duchen, *Feminism in France: From May '68 to Mitterand* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1986).
9. Rosalind Rosenberg, *Divided Lives: American Women in the Twentieth Century* (New York: The Noonday Press, 1992), 156.
10. Joanne Meyerowitz, "Beyond the Feminine Mystique: A Reassessment of Postwar Mass Culture, 1946–1958," *The Journal of American History*, 79 (March 1993): 1457–1458.
11. Elaine Tyler May, *Homeward Bound: American Families in the Cold War Era* (New York: Basic Books, 1988), 208–209.
12. Margaret Mead, *Male and Female: A Study of the Sexes in a Changing World* (New York: William Morrow & Company, Publishers, 1950), 30.
13. Mead's *Coming of Age in Samoa* has specifically come under attack on the basis of a theoretical flaw that was actually quite common to anthropology at the time the book was written; namely, the expectation of finding "a pervasive kind of homogeneity" in a culture. Mead later developed techniques for thinking about patterned contrasts and dynamics within a culture rather than characterizing the style of a culture as a whole. See Mary Catherine Bateson, *With A Daughter's Eye* (New York: Washington Square Press, 1984), 285.
14. "Letter of Transmittal" from the Commission chairs to President John F. Kennedy, 11 October 1963. Margaret Mead and Frances Balgley Kaplan, eds. *American Woman: The Report of the President's Commission on the Status of Women and Other Publications of the Commission* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1965), 9–12.
15. Mead, *American Woman*, 4.
16. Mead, *American Woman*, 5–6.
17. Mead, *American Woman*, 6.
18. Mead, *Male and Female*, 8.
19. Mead, *Male and Female*, 30.
20. Mead, *Male and Female*, 372. In an uncharacteristically vehement tone, Mead claimed that American society's attempt to culturally and legally confine women to the home could be understood, based upon "primitive" exhibitions of envy, simply as men's efforts at preventing women from having too much power. See Mead, *Male and Female*, chapter 4, "Even-Handed, Money-Minded, and Womb-Envying Patterns," and chapter 18, "To Both Their Own."
21. Bateson, *With a Daughter's Eye*, 169. Given the urgency of Nazism as well as racism in America, Mead along with Franz Boas and Ruth Benedict instead devoted their anthropology to affirming the common potential of all people.
22. Mead, *Male and Female*, 7.
23. Dale Spender, *Women of Ideas* (1982; reprint, London: Pandora Press, 1992), 717–718.
24. Kate Millett, *Sexual Politics: The Classic Analysis of the Interplay Between Men, Women, & Culture* (1970; reprint, New York: Simon & Schuster Inc., 1990), 62. Millett makes only brief reference to Margaret Mead.
25. Betty Friedan, *The Feminine Mystique* (New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 1963), 137.
26. Friedan, *The Feminine Mystique*, chapter 6, "The Functional Freeze, the Feminine Protest, and Margaret Mead."
27. Viola Klein, *The Feminine Character: History of an Ideology* (1946; reprint, Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1975), 168.
28. Klein, *The Feminine Character*, 3.
29. Klein, *The Feminine Character*, 163.
30. Klein, *The Feminine Character*, 170.
31. Klein, *The Feminine Character*, 169

32. Klein, *The Feminine Character*, 171
33. Klein, *The Feminine Character*, 172.
34. Klein, *The Feminine Character*, 171. Sociologist Helen Mayer Hacker was yet another intellectual of the postwar years who advocated minority group theory in order to understand women's cultural and political status, issues of marginality, and group self-hatred. See Helen Mayer Hacker, "Women as a Minority Group," *Social Forces*, 30 (October 1951): 60–69.
35. Klein, *The Feminine Character*, 174.
36. Because of biased wording of census questions, the Population Census had seriously underrated the number of wage-earning women in Britain. The General Register Office readily admitted responsibility for this error. See Viola Klein, *Working Wives: A Survey of Facts and Opinions Concerning the Gainful Employment of Married Women in Britain* (London: Institute of Personnel Management, 1960), 9.
37. Alva Myrdal and Viola Klein, *Women's Two Roles: Home and Work* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul Ltd, 1956), 10.
38. Myrdal and Klein, *Women's Two Roles*, 7.
39. Myrdal and Klein, *Women's Two Roles*, 196–197.
40. Alice Schwarzer, in Marianne Howarth, ed. *After The Second Sex: Conversations with Simone de Beauvoir* (New York: Pantheon Books, 1984).
41. In contrast with arguments claiming that Simone de Beauvoir's philosophical analysis merely drew upon the work of her companion, Jean-Paul Sartre, new evidence concludes that it was in fact Sartre who relied on de Beauvoir's intellectual insights. See Kate Fullbrook and Edward Fullbrook, *Simone de Beauvoir and Jean-Paul Sartre: The Remaking of a Twentieth-Century Legend* (New York: Basic Books, 1994).
42. Simone de Beauvoir, *The Second Sex* (1949; reprint, New York: Vintage Books, 1989), xxii.
43. Catriona Mackenzie, for example, argues that de Beauvoir attempts to counter the masculinism of philosophy "by using certain philosophical concepts to *think* woman's experience. Her text thus works to expand the limits of philosophy while remaining within a specific conceptual problematic." Mary Evans objects to de Beauvoir's essentialist reading of woman's body, while Carole Pateman points out that de Beauvoir uncritically uses masculinist, or fraternal language. An inadequate translation is responsible for at least some objections to *The Second Sex*. According to Margaret Simons, a former student of de Beauvoir, over ten percent of the original French text was deleted during translation. Seventy-eight women originally mentioned by de Beauvoir have vanished. Simons observes that although the translator "didn't care to have discussions of woman's oppression belabored, he was quite content to allow de Beauvoir to go on at length about [man's superiority], as the pattern of deletions in the first history chapter shows." See Catriona Mackenzie, "Simone de Beauvoir: Philosophy and/or the Female Body," in Carole Pateman and Elizabeth Gross, eds. *Feminist Challenges: Social and Political Theory* (Boston: Northeastern University Press, 1986), 146; Mary Evans, "Simone de Beauvoir: Dilemmas of a Feminist Radical," in Dale Spender, ed. *Feminist Theorists: Three Centuries of Women's Intellectual Traditions* (London: The Woman's Press, 1983), 348–365; Carole Pateman, *The Disorder of Women: Democracy, Feminism and Political Theory* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1989), 41; Carole Pateman, *The Sexual Contract* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1988), 78; and Margaret A. Simons, "The Silencing of Simone de Beauvoir: Guess What's Missing From *The Second Sex*," *Women's Studies International Forum*, 6 (1983): 559–564.
44. De Beauvoir, *The Second Sex*, 4.
45. De Beauvoir, *The Second Sex*, 13.
46. De Beauvoir, *The Second Sex*, 37.
47. De Beauvoir, *The Second Sex*, 36–37.
48. Sonia Kruks, "Gender and Subjectivity: Simone de Beauvoir and Contemporary Feminism," *Signs*, 18 (Autumn 1992): 100–101.

49. Kruks, "Gender and Subjectivity," 94.
50. De Beauvoir, *The Second Sex*, 597 (italics added).
51. Mackenzie, "Simone de Beauvoir," 147.
52. Mary G. Dietz, "Introduction: Debating Simone de Beauvoir," *Signs*, 18 (Autumn 1992): 78.
53. Penny Forster and Imogen Sutton, eds. *Daughters of de Beauvoir* (London: The Women's Press, 1989), 23.
54. See Millett, *Sexual Politics*, and Juliet Mitchell, *Woman's Estate* (Great Britain: Penguin Books, Ltd., 1971).
55. Sandra Dijkstra, "Simone de Beauvoir and Betty Friedan: The Politics of Omission," *Feminist Studies*, 6 (Summer 1980): 290–303.
56. Claire Goldberg Moses distinguishes between compassionate theorists— those who argue for increased opportunities for women, and feminist theorists— those who specifically link women's status with men's power. See Claire Goldberg Moses, "Debating the Present, Writing the Past: 'Feminism' in French History and Historiography," *Radical History Review*, 52 (1992): 79–94, especially p. 85.
57. See Moses for her argument that attention to the conflict between individualist and relational feminism is misdirected and that equating French feminist writing with difference is a uniquely American conclusion.

Culture From Camelot: The Origins and Goals of Arts Policy in the Kennedy Administration

Donna M. Binkiewicz

"Babbittry is behind us. We live in an era of impressive artistic achievement. Our painters, sculptors, musicians, dancers and dramatists are the envy of the world."[1] Such was John F. Kennedy's assessment of the arts in America as he responded to a *Musical America* questionnaire sent to him and to Vice President Richard Nixon during the 1960 presidential campaign. His reference to Babbitt proved pointed in more ways than one. It immediately drew attention to the United States' artistic success during the post-World War II era. Kennedy's admiration for excellence made him proud of what he considered some of the highest achievements in American culture and pleased at the worldwide attention they generated.[2]

Yet much more than idle praise for the arts resounds in Kennedy's remarks to *Musical America*. Besides the overt cultural commendation lay a subtle challenge for American culture. Essentially, the Babbitt reference was rife with meaning. It evoked images of early twentieth-century nouveaux riches Americans who believed that they had achieved a certain level of prominence. However, those familiar with Sinclair Lewis's characters would also realize that these arrivistes were more interested in wealth and social climbing than in genuine cultural progress. On this level Kennedy's reference may be taken as criticism of perceived growth in American materialism and complacency during the 1950s. In his campaign Kennedy promised to reinvigorate America, selecting the arts as one means to raise the level of American civilization. His remarks to the magazine went on to explain the purposes art could serve in both domestic and foreign arenas to elevate American image and culture, particularly in the Cold War context.

Kennedy's letter to *Musical America* reveals his desire to improve the quality

of life in the United States through increased intellectual and cultural achievement, which he believed a federal art policy could encourage. He pointed out historic eras in which great advances were made in politics and culture and expressed hope that his tenure as president would inspire similar results. Musing on the interconnections between success in public life and artistic progress, Kennedy pointed out that the age of Elizabeth was also the age of Shakespeare. He then maintained that:

> The New Frontier for which I campaign in public life, can also be a New Frontier for American art. For what I descry is a lift for our country: a surge of economic growth, a burst of activity in rebuilding and cleansing our cities. . . an age of Discovery in science and space; and an openness toward what is new that will banish the suspicion and misgiving that have tarnished our prestige abroad. . . For we stand, I believe, on the verge of a period of sustained cultural brilliance.[3]

Kennedy recognized that to achieve long-lasting international recognition as a great culture, America would first have to raise its own level of achievement. He believed that the arts could play a part in programs designed to reengage American ingenuity in combatting domestic problems. By their very nature, they could instill a higher sense of purpose to American endeavors and inspire superior achievements. This would ultimately produce an American culture worthy of world acclaim.

Not only were the arts important for domestic welfare, Kennedy also considered them a foreign policy measure to showcase American leadership and freedom. He believed in 1960 that the American government should support the arts, "for art. . . speaks a language without words, and is thus a chief means for proclaiming America's message to the world over the heads of dictators."[4] He reiterated these sentiments in a *Saturday Review* article advocating expanded international exchange programs and State Department cultural programs, arguing: "[If] every student of the USSR and the satellites could tour the United States and compare what they see with what they have been told, I would have little fear of future wars."[5] Clearly, Kennedy acknowledged the importance of arts and culture in promoting his drive to make the U.S. the leader of advanced civilization. He vowed that he wanted to become the President who "not only held back the Communist tide but who also advanced the cause of freedom and rebuilt American prestige."[6] Kennedy's competitive attitude was well known in the Cold War world and spanned many aspects of his campaign and administration. Eventually, he would elevate the arts to a level of national importance

closely tied to military and political measures. Indeed, these domestic and foreign policy applications of the arts would become a vital selling point for the formulation of the National Endowment for the Arts.

This article examines the unprecedented attention brought to the arts under the administration of John F. Kennedy. The President and Jacqueline Kennedy transformed the White House into a theater and museum that focused a spotlight on the arts brighter than at any previous time. More importantly, during the Kennedy and subsequent Johnson administrations a drive for an institutionalized arts policy was clearly developed and maneuvered through both the executive offices and Congress. This article explores the origins and goals of the arts policy struggle during the Kennedy administration that ultimately would set the tone for federal arts policy administration to date. While there had been some governmental forays into arts policy prior to the 1960s, the National Foundation for the Arts and Humanities created by Kennedy and Johnson achieved permanence as a federal cultural agency previously unknown in the United States.[7] Its genesis in the early 1960s resulted from greater public interest in the arts and enlarging federal programs. But more significantly, it developed out of an intellectual tradition informing Kennedy's and Johnson's liberalism and their desires to elevate national goals and win the Cold War. These important aspects of art policy development, which continued to influence NEA operations through the 1980s, have been overlooked in scholarly assessments of the agency.[8]

American intellectuals during the 1950s had in large part coalesced around two ideological frameworks that became central to the Kennedy vision: one of Cold War consensus and one which urged an uplifting of the quality of American life in an age of abundance. Consensus developed in American liberal thought during the postwar era as intellectuals, who had once espoused Marxist or socialist utopian ideals, became horrified by Stalinist totalitarianism and turned to a defense of American-style capitalist democracy in light of its survival during the Depression and its economic successes during and after World War II. Their turn away from socialist politics was also exaggerated by Joseph McCarthy's anti-communist crusade, which demanded support of American democracy and capitalism.[9]

Yet, amidst the affluence of the 1950s, something seemed amiss. American intellectuals began to express a belief that undesirable undercurrents permeated American society. Many of them suggested ways to handle these problems which would impact Kennedy's and, later, Johnson's developing political programs, including arts policy. The trouble, intellectuals pointed out, centered on increasing conformity as a result of a loss of individual freedom both in the work

place and new suburban housing as well as the American public's misuse of its expanding leisure time.[10] In *The Lonely Crowd* David Riesman expressed these fears when he lamented that Americans were becoming "soft" as the economy shifted from production toward consumption and the populace diverted their focus from the rewards of work to the pursuit of image. Riesman argued that to achieve autonomy outside of the workplace, leisure would have to be more than undirected play or conspicuous but hollow consumption. Rather, it must create a meaningful style of life and sound character by "uplifting the mind."[11] Accordingly, Americans needed to focus less on technological and personal skill enhancement and more on pure intellectual activity that would expand their minds. Humanities and culture were being unduly neglected.

The disturbing trends exposed by Riesman continued to be the focus of other intellectuals' writings throughout the 1950s. In 1952 economist and future Kennedy advisor John Kenneth Galbraith had defended the stability of the American economy and argued that it was virtually self-regulating. At that time, the gross national product (GNP) was growing at an unprecedented rate of 3.9% each year and the masses were prosperous.[12] However, after contemplating the excesses of McCarthyism and increasing criticism of American materialism, Galbraith also found postwar prosperity paradoxical. In his 1958 publication *The Affluent Society*, he argued that it created not only economic abundance but also a low quality of life among Americans which in essence left "the bland leading the bland."[13] Galbraith traced the problem to the false assumption that continued economic growth and cultural health were required ever-expanding production and purchase of commodities rather than necessities. He argued that the encouragement of consumer spending by business created imbalances in American culture—that the idea that private spending on desirable consumer goods was positive, but that public expenditures on services was unsound was actually counterproductive. It allowed for families with beautiful, "air-conditioned, power-steered and power-braked automobiles" to take drives through cities that [were] "badly paved, made hideous by litter, blighted by buildings, billboards, and posts for wire that should long since have been put underground."[14] Such a scenario revealed a society lacking in thoughtful goals, long-range cultural health, and even economic prosperity.

Galbraith proposed that the state should step in to halt the potentially destructive downward spiral of American culture, as it had done to regulate the economy in modern times. By expanding investment in research beyond military development and encouraging civilian goals, the government could create a healthier society. Specifically, improved education could redress the moral and

economic loss seen in declining work hours and could enable Americans to learn the skills necessary to make the best use of leisure time and improve the overall quality of American life.[15] The ultimate aim of such a policy would be "less the effectiveness of our material investment than the effectiveness of our investment in men" who would be called upon to apply their intelligence and creativity to solving American problems, thus advancing American civilization in the future.[16] John F. Kennedy found many of Galbraith's arguments convincing and frequently consulted with him for economic advice while planning his political endeavors.

Arthur Schlesinger, Jr.'s *The Vital Center* was also of fundamental importance in expounding the postwar intellectual thinking that became an integral part of President Kennedy's political culture. In this important work Schlesinger proposed that, rather than dream of utopias, intellectuals should strive to improve society within the American political system. Furthermore, he urged support for American policies of containment and aid to progressive regimes to ensure the continued strength of anti-communist forces.[17] According to historian Christopher Lasch, Schlesinger's views represented a new brand of liberal pragmatism that combined realism with calls for political action.[18] Schlesinger hoped to elevate political issues to a level of philosophical debate and he would later encourage Kennedy's adoption of such a style.[19]

Arthur Schlesinger, Jr. went a step further than Galbraith by transforming warnings about the perils of prosperity into objectives for an active government to achieve a viable welfare state. He believed government should use its powers to extend the virtues and rewards of American life to all its citizens. Expressing commitment to the public interest in "The Challenge of Abundance," Schlesinger called for "qualitative liberalism" "to improve schools, hospitals, cities . . . the public domain," which included cultural activities.[20] He specifically advocated a greater role for the federal government in arts policy, since he believed the arts lent value and thoughtfulness to true civilization.[21] Also a close advisor to Kennedy, Schlesinger was able to funnel a wide body of intellectual criticism calling for the promotion of higher cultural standard into the White House and to lobby for the implementation of arts policy.

Schlesinger's arguments drew upon the works of such notable cultural critics as Clement Greenberg and Dwight Macdonald who claimed that American leisure was increasingly dominated by a mass media which promoted mediocre products and deplorable aesthetics. Greenberg railed against "kitsch" in his essays while defending the achievements of artistic modernism and the avant-garde. Macdonald noted that, on the one hand, the rise of mass culture was

"desirable politically" because it was democratic and closed the gap between the wealthy and the common man. On the other hand, however, it caused "unfortunate results culturally" by destroying men's sense of community and encouraging their production and consumption of "junk." Nevertheless, Macdonald seemed to believe such cultural decline could be isolated, if not reversed, by a conscious cultivation of higher cultural achievement—as long as "midcult" would not be allowed to swallow up the distinctions between "masscult" (or kitsch) and "High Culture."[22] Paul Goodman also argued in *Growing Up Absurd* that something must be done to promote higher cultural standards in the U.S. He criticized the American leadership in the late 1950s for reneging on its responsibility to stimulate artistic excellence. He lamented:

> Our present President (Mr. Eisenhower) is an unusually uncultivated man. It is said that he has invited no real writer, no artist, no philosopher to the White House. Presumably he has no intellectual friends; that is his privilege. But recently he invited the chief of the Russian government [Chairman Khrushchev] to a banquet and musicale. And the formal music of that musicale was provided by a Fred Waring band playing 'Oh, What a Beautiful Morning' and such other numbers. This is disgraceful.[23]

Goodman stressed the potential international prestige America could gain with a display of high cultural achievement, an idea that Kennedy and his advisors embraced.

The chorus of challenges by American intellectuals nearly coincided with a series of disconcerting events for the United States. The first surrounded the 1957 launch of the Soviet satellite, *Sputnik*. Rocket scientist Wernher von Braun had warned prophetically that it "would be a blow to U.S. prestige if we did not do it first."[24] As a second Soviet satellite orbited the earth, Khrushchev boasted that the USSR would surpass the U.S. in economic output within fifteen years. *LIFE* magazine printed "Arguing the Case for Being Panicky," Arthur Trace published *What Ivan knows and Johnny Doesn't*, and Americans from all walks of society feared that the U.S. was losing the race with the Russians. Lyndon Johnson, then Senate Majority Leader, blamed the problems of American affluence and complacency for the failure to match the Soviets and quipped, with a reference to Detroit auto manufacturers, "It is not very reassuring to be told that next year we will put a better satellite in the air. Perhaps it will even have chrome trim and automatic windshield wipers."[25] Such cumulative reproach helped to shock Americans out of their self-satisfaction and to renew their interest in achievement—not only in military terms but also intellectual and cul-

tural endeavors. No one was more attentive than the Democratic nominee in 1960.

John Kennedy's campaign pledge to "get the country moving again" was dedicated not only to closing the perceived missile gap and restating American commitment to containing communism, but it was also a vow to promote intellectual values and renew American commitment to cultural excellence. Kennedy embraced the ideals of consensus liberalism, courted academics, sought their advice, and brought many directly into his new administration. Galbraith served as the American Ambassador to India, while Schlesinger became an important White House speech writer, presidential aid, and link to the intellectual community as he continued to shape Kennedy's rhetoric and programs.

The Kennedy administration's efforts to recharge the tone of American politics and to invigorate American culture began as soon as he took office. In January 1961, Robert Frost stood at the podium in an unusually cold capital city and read the poem he wrote for the occasion of John F. Kennedy's inauguration. He pronounced:

> Summoning artists to participate
> In the august occasions of the state
> Seems something for us all to celebrate. . .
> It makes the prophet in us all presage
> The glory of a next Augustan age. . .
> Firm in our free beliefs without dismay,
> In any game the nations want to play.
> A golden age of poetry and power
> Of which this noonday's the beginning hour.[26]

After Frost's recitation, the new President took his oath of office and stood to speak. Kennedy delivered his now-famous oration vowing American military strength in the face of a worldwide communist threat and calling upon Americans to join together in a struggle to redefine the U.S. as the world leader not only in military force but also in scientific progress and aesthetic excellence. Kennedy invited the Soviet Union to cooperate with the U.S. to "invoke the wonders of science instead of its terrors . . . explore the stars, conquer the deserts, eradicate disease . . . *and encourage the arts.*"[27] Yet he also left no doubt that he believed Americans could triumph in any contest and thereby provide the world with the best example of freedom and democratic success.

Kennedy's inaugural address expressed themes that would characterize his

presidency. First, it stated his concern for foreign policy and his dedication to the preservation of American democracy and world freedom in a continuing Cold War struggle. At the same time, his speech professed a belief in change and announced a new approach to world conflict—that of joining social and cultural advancement to the single-minded militarism of the Cold War. His call to work with the Soviets towards scientific and artistic advancement suggested a calmer approach to the Cold War that later would be reflected by his support for bilateral test ban treaties and his efforts to ease domestic Cold War McCarthyism. Kennedy's faith in American potential for energetic progress would also auger well for the arts.

Indeed, among the thousands gathered to hear Kennedy's inaugural address in the seats set aside for his friends and political advocates were a number of prominent artists, including abstract painters Mark Rothko and Franz Kline, and museum directors Alfred Barr and René d'Harnoncourt of the Museum of Modern Art (MOMA).[28] Never before had so many artists and intellectuals been included in the usual crowd of dignitaries. The President elect and Mrs. Kennedy wished to honor individuals representing the quality and excellence of American culture, especially in art and music, and to recognize representatives of leading Washington cultural institutions. This gesture began what Kennedy had only hinted at during his campaign, that "the New Frontier . . .[could] be a New Frontier for American art."[29]

A Kennedy friend who lived in Georgetown, Kay Halle, in consultation with Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., drew up the list of inaugural invites. She arranged for artists and cultural institution heads to participate and planned that they would also inscribe their sentiments in a book to be presented to the President and First Lady.[30] The expressions recorded on that morning were overwhelmingly laudatory and supportive of the new administration, as were the numerous telegrams and letters received from the art world. Declaring his pride and pleasure in Kennedy's recognition of artists and the optimistic tone of the inauguration, Archibald MacLeish wrote that the address "left me proud and hopeful to be an American—something I have not felt for almost twenty years. I owe you and send you my deepest gratitude." An even more enthusiastic message came from John Steinbeck. Recalling that artists had been attacked in the past for their leftist politics, he wrote to Kennedy: "[W]hat a joy that literacy is no longer prima facie evidence of treason."[31] The reintegration of artists into the good favor of the federal government was indeed a significant move by Kennedy to alter what had become burdensome social and cultural constraints imposed by the Cold War. Defying a McCarthyite mentality which had blacklisted artists

suspected of communist sympathies, Kennedy deliberately invited them to collaborate fully with the government to raise American culture to new heights.[32] Even more than in his public speeches, Kennedy's actions expressed his desire to diffuse the accusational tendencies in government's dealings with those who criticized U.S. social and economic policies and to infuse politics and culture with a higher purpose.

Initially, however, Kennedy's gesture of inviting prominent artists to his inauguration was conceived to be more symbolic than substantive. August Heckscher, the President's Special Consultant on the Arts, later recalled that when the artists attended, "I don't think [Kennedy] had any idea of the stir it would cause."[33] Indeed, public recognition of artists raised expectations in the artistic community that Kennedy would truly support the arts on a national level—a hope shared by key Kennedy staff members, such as Schlesinger, Stuart Udall, and Pièrre Salinger. Salinger moved a step further after the inauguration and solicited ideas on arts policy that he later gave to special art consultant, Heckscher. Once embarked upon the path toward an official arts policy, Heckscher surmised that "it was the inauguration which really had begun everything."[34]

Kennedy advisors agree that the President worked in a series of small trial steps: he would test the waters with a small gesture, gauge the response, and if positive, proceed in a somewhat bolder fashion. Such was the case with the arts during the Kennedy administration. The President and First Lady were extremely pleased with the admiration and support showered upon them by the art world after the inauguration. They were also genuinely pleased with the book of messages compiled by Kay Halle and responded with a personal letter of thanks to each artist. As in most presidential letters, the President began in perfunctory prose, "Mrs. Kennedy and I have had extraordinary pleasure in going through these volumes. . . I am hopeful that this collaboration between government and scholarship will continue and prosper." He continued with a plea for concrete ideas, however, stating "I would be particularly interested in any suggestions you may have in the future about the possible contributions the national government might make to the arts and scholarship in America."[35] Kennedy was testing the waters and finding them warm.

As an arts patron himself and a man groomed to higher culture and education, Kennedy needed little convincing that the arts were worthy of his attention. His education at Choate and Harvard as well as his European tours instilled in the future president a familiarity with the fine arts and an appreciation for their place in any sophisticated individual lifestyle or national culture. In

terms of his own artistic preferences, Kennedy most enjoyed reading history and classical novels or viewing eye-catching broadway musicals, ancient Greek or Roman sculpture, and seascape paintings.[36] While some of his private tastes reflected those of mainstream American arts audiences, Kennedy also appreciated more avant-garde modern art styles in an intellectual sense if less a personal one. Kennedy believed that exposure to excellence in arts and culture were important means to elevate one's own cultural level as well as that of American society as a whole, and he was willing to go out of his way to support highbrow culture.[37] He was certainly encouraged in this regard by his wife.

Surprisingly little notice has been given to the important role of First Lady Jacqueline Kennedy when, in fact, she was responsible for suggesting the invitation of artists to the inauguration. More so than the President, Mrs. Kennedy set a tone of style and grace for the new administration and encouraged the development of arts events and policy. She channelled many of her ideas through Pièrre Salinger who, as a formally trained classical pianist, shared her tastes and ambitions, and later through August Heckscher.[38]

Without a doubt, Jacqueline Bouvier Kennedy exerted a great deal of pressure on her husband to patronize the fine arts and by so doing set an example of American cultural maturity. Education at Vassar and the Sorbonne as well as with her stepfather Hugh Auchincloss's experience as an art collector imbued Mrs. Kennedy with a wide familiarity with and affinity for ballet, symphony and chamber music, and modern art. She was particularly fond of seventeenth- and eighteenth-century antiques and of impressionism, post-impressionism, and abstraction in the visual arts.[39] Thus, the First Couple shared a certain cultural breeding and were both long-standing patrons of the arts.

Among their private dinner guests at the White House were artists and arts patrons. One important influence was their friend and frequent visitor painter Bill Walton, whose own aesthetic style had evolved from representational to abstract by 1960. The first people invited to the mansion were poet Robert Frost and New York city ballet director Georges Balanchine—of whom Mrs. Kennedy asked what she as First Lady could do for the ballet. Mrs. Kennedy also conferred with Isaac Stern, who would later serve on the National Council on the Arts, about arts policy development. Indeed, it was her initiative that transformed the White House into a showcase for art and artists during the Kennedy administration. Mrs. Kennedy encouraged President Kennedy to replace stodgy state receptions with elegant cultural soirées in the executive mansion. During the Kennedys' tenure at the White House a stage was built that could be stored and erected on short notice. Pages of handwritten memos attest

to her detailed planning of White House events and cultivation of the President's and America's public image.[40] Both she and President Kennedy understood the importance of image as well as example, liberally patronizing high culture.[41]

Following the positive public reaction to the participation of artists in the inauguration, the Kennedys began to showcase the arts in a series of dinners and performances and in Jacqueline Kennedy's televised tour of the newly redecorated White House. One of the most famous occasions was a November 1961 evening honoring Puerto Rican Governor Muñoz Marín that included a performance by Pablo Casals, who had previously refused to play his cello publicly in the United States to protest American recognition of Spanish dictator Francisco Franco. Introducing Casals, Kennedy announced that "[we] believe that an artist, in order to be true to himself and his work, must be a free man."[42] Thus, the President acknowledged Casals's freedom to criticize U.S. policy towards Spain and admired his stance in favor of freedom. Then, stressing freedom in the relationship between the arts and politics, he continued, "I think it is most important not that we regard artistic achievement and action as a part of our armor in these difficult days, but rather as an integral part of our free society."[43] Thus, Kennedy's frequent references to freedom and democracy directly connected the arts to position of the United States in the Cold War. In his view, the arts were meant not only for beauty and entertainment, but for political purposes as well. Casals' recital drew very positive responses from a national audience. The *New York Times* announced that in the area of culture "The White House is rising to its responsibilities and—in one respect at least—coming of age." Such praise encouraged Kennedy's growing endorsement of artistic excellence.

Another result of the Casals concert was that it almost instantly gave the President the reputation of being a serious lover of classical music. This perception proves the success of the Kennedys' orchestration of their refined image, yet the irony was not lost on the First Lady, who was the true classical music dévotee. In one incident, Jacqueline Kennedy apparently tired of the somewhat misplaced admiration, quipped to a friend about her husband that "the only music he likes is 'Hail to the Chief.'"[44] Nevertheless, her remarks remained private at the time and much of her work to orchestrate the event went quietly unknown. In fact, Mrs. Kennedy played a prominent role in conceiving and arranging the Casals concert and other events—from large-scale program planning and publicity down to details of flower and seating arrangements. Mrs. Kennedy chose to remain behind the scenes because she believed that her husband, as president, should claim the spotlight. In fact she feared being seen as

seeking public acclaim for herself and distracting attention from her husband's public work. Previously, she had stated her priorities when she professed in a campaign interview that if John Kennedy were elected "I'd be a wife and a mother first, then First Lady."[45] Jacqueline Kennedy understood the widespread norms about the proper place of women in public as secondary to that of men. As Elaine Tyler May suggested in *Homeward Bound*, an intense desire for security during the Cold War era translated into an idealized vision of home and family that subordinated women and contained them within the domestic sphere.[46] Unwilling to publicly challenge this perceived status quo and draw criticism upon the White House, Mrs. Kennedy eschewed a more public role in arts policy development while encouraging the arts from her position as First Lady and enlarging her stewardship of the White House.

The most time consuming of Jacqueline Kennedy's aesthetic endeavors proved to be the restoration of the White House. Mrs. Kennedy formed a Committee of Fine Arts to officially oversee the project and devoted untold hours to researching and reacquiring, or copying, historic furnishings and art work for the mansion. In this respect, Mrs. Kennedy resembled certain early twentieth-century women whom historians of culture have identified as playing a prominent role in cultural institution building.[47] Like Abby Rockefeller, the founder of the Museum of Modern Art, Jacqueline Kennedy appointed prominent men to head the cultural projects while she played a less visible, though nonetheless significant, role. She corresponded personally by handwritten memos to commission members and staff, further diminishing the record of her White House projects.

The First Lady did gain national attention in a televised tour of the White House which was broadcast in prime time by all three television networks in February 1962. The one-hour program includes a narrated history of the White House and a room-by-room tour. Dressed in her trademark two-piece wool suit with a three-strand pearl necklace, the First Lady described each piece of furniture, painting, and art work. Speaking in her soft, breathy voice, she explained who originally purchased each piece, in what style and when it was made, and how it was copied, reacquired, and restored. It was evident that she was very aware of and rather uncomfortable about having a camera following her around the mansion, yet her excitement about the art and her pride in her achievement were clear. In one particularly revealing moment of the tour, the CBS commentator noted the special place the arts had achieved in the Kennedy administration and inquired as to whether she felt that there should be a particular connection between the arts and the national government. Mrs. Kennedy

smiled and replied, "Oh that's so complicated. I don't know. I just think everything in the White House should be the best."[48] Then she casually moved on to describe the East Room candelabra. By deliberately shunning an opportunity to remark on political matters, the First Lady relegated herself to the private arena and presented an image of herself as apolitical, leaving the public and political realm to her husband. President Kennedy arrived at the end of the television program to bestow his blessing on his wife's project and to remark on the importance of reclaiming history and American culture. He ended the program by encouraging children to visit the White House so that they would be excited by history and perhaps even inspired to live there themselves one day. "Even the girls," he said with a grin. In this closing scene the President essentially stole the show and presented himself as firmly in charge and looking to the future. He held the tools for molding policy and shaping the American cultural sensibilities while his wife preserved tradition and the first home.

Another prominent occasion that enhanced the cultural aura of the White House and the agenda of the Kennedy administration was a reception for French Minister of Culture, André Malraux in May 1962. The Kennedys specifically emphasized culture for this event rather than the traditional diplomatic focus of state dinners for foreign dignitaries. Jacqueline Kennedy had toured French art galleries with Malraux on the Kennedy's state visit to France in 1961. Thus, the Kennedys wished to impress the Minister of Culture with an American show of talent on his visit to the White House the following Spring. Guests for the evening included painter Andre Wyeth, poet Robert Lowell, playwrights Arthur Miller, S. N. Behrman and Tennessee Williams, actress Geraldine Page, ballet director Georges Balanchine, Metropolitan Museum of Art curator James Rorimer, White House arts consultant August Heckscher, and business and culture magnates John Loeb and David Rockefeller. Guests were treated to a French dinner and to a classical recital of Shubert's Trio in B-flat major, opus 99, by Eugene Istomin, piano, Isaac Stern, violin, and Leonard Rose, cello. In his remarks to the White House guests that evening, John Kennedy scoffed at the idea that the life of an artist is "soft," borrowing a word from Riesman's critique of American organization employees in the fifties. "Actually," the President asserted, "creativity is the hardest life there is."[49] His statements once again proved his admiration for artists as hardworking individuals who devoted hours of difficult and often lonely and unrewarded practice to perfect their talents. Kennedy believed such dedication was an important component of individual accomplishment and a quality society should value.

Following this glamorous dinner, an unprecedented cultural exchange took

place between France and the United States. In 1963 Jacqueline Kennedy personally arranged with Malraux a tour of Leonardo da Vinci's *Mona Lisa* from the Louvre to the National Gallery of Art in Washington and the Met in New York. The painting was designated a "guest" of the President and travelled under his personal protection. At a reception for the President and Mrs. Kennedy held at the French Embassy prior to the exhibition of the *Mona Lisa* in Washington, Kennedy expressed his gratitude to France as the "leading artistic country" for its loan of the priceless portrait. Moreover, he used this occasion to argue that the United States would "continue to press ahead to develop an independent, artistic force of its own."[50] Not coincidentally, the Kennedy administration was orchestrating U.S. State Department support for the American painting exhibition at the 1964 Venice Biennale whose prizes historically had been France's domain. Kennedy hoped that American success there would announce the United States' cultural presence on the European continent.[51] Kennedy's calculated encounters with the arts were amounting to more than image-making opportunities, and the President soon took the lead in creating a new federal policy concerning the arts.

With the encouragement of his advisors, Kennedy had already begun taking determined steps toward devising a federal arts policy. In July 1961, Pièrre Salinger, Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., Max Isenberg, and Phillip Coombs met for a lunch to discuss art policy. The meeting focused on Isenberg's policy paper, "A Strategy for Cultural Advancement."[52] A State Department official interested in American cultural expansion, Isenberg proposed that Kennedy evaluate the realm of government and the arts and examine the possible improvement of existing government art programs and expansion of federal efforts into new areas both at home and abroad. Reminding the President of his inaugural commitment to cultural advancement, Isenberg called for fulfilling this commitment for two reasons. First, he believed it would improve the quality of American life in the United States. He argued that the "pursuit of happiness" should be restored to its proper place in American thought—Americans should be reminded through aesthetic endeavors that striving for peace and material well being were not ends in themselves but means to a higher quality of life. Remembering these ideas would "do no less than transform the national character and open, for the whole world to see, an exhilarating new chapter in the American Revolution for the nineteen sixties."[53]

Underlying Isenberg's ideas on American life were equally salient concerns about how American life would be perceived abroad. His second reason for promoting arts policy explicitly stated that:

> [It] would make the less developed nations think better of us as a model; and to the nations of the Soviet bloc, it would show devotion on our part to a humanism transcending political differences, a demonstration which holds more promise than any other approach tried thus far of bringing forth affirmative, even conciliatory, response from their side.[54]

The potential for arts as a foreign policy tool were duly noted by Kennedy staff. Moreover, the timing of this proposal was significant, for it came on the heels of tense international incidents at the Bay of Pigs in Cuba and in Berlin.[55]

The Bay of Pigs invasion resulted in a great deal of public criticism of the Kennedy administration. Among those denouncing the President's repression of a small, independent country were a number of American artists, who carried protest signs against repression at a demonstration in Washington. One young poet directed her outcry to the First Lady with a placard reading, "Jacqueline: vous avez perdu vos artistes!" (You have lost your artists), appealing to her cultured persona and signalling these artists' rejection of strong arm tactics.[56] The whole experience painfully taught Kennedy to back away from hard-line military means to secure U.S. power and to carefully consider how U.S. actions would be perceived around the world, especially by small Third World countries caught between United States and Soviet struggles.

An important element of military policy was analyzed by Henry Kissinger during the Berlin crisis. He advised President Kennedy that firmness should not be proven by shying away from diplomacy that would leave only military options.[57] Kennedy agreed that more flexibility was necessary in Cold War confrontations to avoid total warfare; therefore, he increased his options by abandoning Eisenhower's policy of massive retaliation in favor of flexible response military tactics.[58] His approach to world crisis came to include not only nuclear threats, but Special Forces recruits and Peace Corps volunteers enlisted to outperform the Soviets around the world. With the President's concern for total mobilization militarily and socially, it took him only a short time to incorporate cultural endeavors.

By the fall of 1961, the unofficial Isenberg paper became the basis for the next step towards developing an official arts policy as Kennedy's advisors recommended the appointment of a special White House consultant. Arthur Schlesinger suggested August Heckscher, who had written a paper for Eisenhower's Commission on National Goals titled "The Quality of American Culture" advocating federal arts policy. Heckscher was then working on a book proposing involvement in the arts as an antidote to the alienation of modern

life—a philosophy akin to both Schlesinger's and Kennedy's beliefs.[59] Assured by Schlesinger in November that "no editorial writer has used the Casals dinner to accuse you of fiddling while Berlin burns," Kennedy was ready to act.[60] He wrote to Heckscher in December 1961 that the time had come for "a more systematic approach" and asked him to come to Washington to conduct a survey and recommend presidential actions on matters of culture.[61] Heckscher, recruited to work on a part time basis for six months, soon found his place among the busy and ambitious full-time White House staff.

A great deal of importance fell upon this first official "Special Consultant on the Arts to the President." His responsibilities included more than simply maintaining the first cultural office in the White House, and Heckscher understood the significance of his position. The very appointment of a Special Consultant on the Arts indicated a new interest on the part of the federal government. Heckscher believed "all [Kennedy] had to do was ask me down there and then that set in motion waves which carried quite far."[62] Indeed, Heckscher's arrival made the front page of the *New York Times* and received nationwide attention. Soon, letters from across the country kept the office busy responding to Americans' cultural concerns, as did Heckscher's agenda of writing articles and delivering speeches promoting a closer relationship between government and the arts.

Upon assuming his position in March 1962, Heckscher's main goal was to assess the relationship of government and the arts and report to the President on means to improve federal policy. After more than a year of conducting work and research in an unprecedented capacity, he submitted his report, "The Arts and the National Government," to the President in May 1963. Heckscher's introduction reiterated 1950s ideas on Cold War culture. He argued that the 1960s would be a decade in which Americans needed to address the issue of increasing leisure time. He also acknowledged the growing importance of the cities and recognized that there was far more to American life than the acquisition of material goods. His opening lines asserted, "The United States will be judged and its place in history ultimately assessed—not alone by its military and economic power—but by the quality of its civilization." Evoking the foreign policy applications underlying his work, Heckscher also noted "the evident desirability of sending the best examples of America's artistic endeavors abroad." Significantly, he recognized that this aim had forced American leaders to reexamine U.S. achievements in the field of aesthetic creativity and to realize that more needed to be done at home to cultivate excellence both within American culture and in its representation abroad. It seemed that the time was ripe for

domestic arts policy to preserve American cultural assets and promote "an environment within which cultural values can be realized."[63]

Prior to his official report, Heckscher's statements on the arts often revealed his commitment to elevating the best of American culture. In a speech before the Conference on Aesthetic Responsibility in 1962, for example, Heckscher commended the widespread interest in the arts developing in the United States at that time. Still, he warned that Americans must beware of blurring the distinction between "the excellent and the second-rate, between the genuine and the spurious, between the artist and the amateur." Only by striving for excellence in the arts could the U.S. hope to attain outward beauty and fulfillment akin to that of Athens in the classical age. With ancient Greece as his model of civic and aesthetic achievement, Heckscher advised American officials to "make sure, as we build for ourselves, that men and their cities prove of equal worth. It is not, after all only beauty itself, but the striving for beauty that lifts up men and makes a civilization."[64] These words resurfaced often in Congressional debates over arts policy and became a mantra among those advocating aesthetics as a responsible means to uplift society.

Addressed in the report to the President was a complicated question: how should this cultural goal be achieved? The report and Heckscher's cover letter pointed out inadequate support by the government for the arts and the existence of policies impinging upon their development, such as certain tax and tariff laws. The report emphasized the importance of government research and interagency cooperation in matters of culture and recommended a number of wide-ranging actions be taken up by the federal government. Heckscher's research, in large part corroborated by the Bureau of the Budget, first indicated that there was already varied and extensive government involvement in the arts through the uncoordinated efforts of numerous agencies. He counselled a categorical assessment of agencies' use of art and a streamlining of separate efforts under a defined federal policy. His recommendation included the following: increased acquisition of art, including more visual arts for the Smithsonian Museums, the National Gallery, and the Library of Congress; commissioning of more art for public buildings under the General Services Administration; exhibition of art in American Embassies; the elevation of design standards for government posters, bulletins and stamps; historic preservation; increased urban renewal efforts under Public Housing Administration; the development of a National Cultural Center (for which Congress had passed legislation in 1958: Kennedy had appointed Roger Stevens Chairman of the Board in September 1962); increased funds for international exhibitions; beautification of Washing-

ton D.C. (for which Kennedy established the Pennsylvania Avenue Advisory Council in May 1962); greater funding for arts and humanities education; the recognition of artists with national merit awards; and the rewriting of tax laws to lighten the burden on artists.

More fundamental than these overall concerns were Heckscher's three most direct recommendations. First, he advised the appointment of a full-time, permanent Special Consultant on the Arts, who should be available to advise the President on all matters pertaining to the arts, in addition to performing the policy, planning and review functions which formed the major part of the original assignment. Second, he favored the establishment of an Advisory Council on the Arts reporting directly to the President. He argued that its function would be to expand the duties of the Special Consultant. As part of the federal government apparatus, the Council would be responsible for gathering information about the arts, reviewing federal policies and making recommendation for improving design and long-range programs, and encouraging the active participation of the artistic community in the government effort.[65] Third, Heckscher called for the establishment of a National Arts Foundation. This agency would administer grants to states, generally on a matching basis, and for projects proposed by artists or cultural organizations. It would thus be able to support "experiments designed to increase attendance, to foster creativity and introduce contemporary works to new audiences, or to offer services on an experimental basis."[66] The arts foundation would be commissioned to encourage the innovation and excellence that both Heckscher and the President so esteemed. Upon submission of the report, Heckscher resigned his post as the Special Consultant to the President so that he could resume his duties at the Twentieth-Century Fund. He agreed to remain until a successor was named and to serve on the Advisory Council once that body was established.[67]

Kennedy considered the report "a milestone" that would open up "a new and fruitful relationship between the government and the arts."[68] He embraced the federal government's leadership in aesthetic achievement to promote the pursuit of happiness, but the Kennedy circle envisioned the arts as something more than entertainment.[69] Economic growth was a major factor enabling any arts policy implementation. Heckscher's report reinforced Kennedy's fears about the decadence that accompanied increased leisure time in what Galbraith had termed an "affluent society".[70] Kennedy's remarks at a dinner promoting the National Cultural Center and an article he wrote for *Look* magazine pointed out that with economic abundance and "with peace, too often comes an exclusive preoccupation with material progress and private pleasures." Kennedy extolled the

artist—who worked amid deprivation and loneliness to hone his skills and realize his vision—as a virtuous individual and the alternative to decadent materialists. He admired the discipline, willingness to take risks, and pursuit of excellence that artists displayed and believed his government should encourage such qualities. Kennedy believed those values would enrich the lives of American audiences as well as the artists. He wrote:

> [the] suburban housewife harassed by numerous children, the husband weary after the day's work, young people bent on having a good time —these might not appear to enjoy a very high level of intellectual pursuit. Yet . . . the appreciation of cultural and intellectual values has a place. To further this appreciation of the arts among all the people, to increase respect for the creative individual and to stimulate participation by those of even modest gifts, is one of the great and fascinating challenges of these days.[71]

Always willing to accept a challenge, Kennedy prepared to implement the Heckscher report recommendations.

Still, there was a long-standing debate between Kennedy and his advisors over exactly how to act on art policy. Essentially, the dilemma was whether the President should wait for congressional legislation or exert executive action. After he was sure there was no promise of action on Capitol Hill, Kennedy resolved the issue by signing Executive Order 11112 in June 1963. This order established the President's Advisory Council on the Arts, giving the United States for the first time a formal government body to survey the arts in America and to recommend to the President ways to encourage them.[72]

In a statement accompanying the release of the executive order, Kennedy expressed his value of excellence in art and culture. Kennedy began by announcing his discontent that many American children were growing up without ever having seen a professionally acted play, which he felt deprived them of important cultural opportunities. Then, echoing Heckscher's public statements, he emphasized the importance of the professional artist because "[w]ithout the professional performer and the creative artist, the amateur spirit declines and the vast audience is only partially served . . . The concept of the public welfare should reflect cultural as well as physical values."[73] Kennedy's call for professional excellence in his promotion of American culture exhibited elitist predilections, yet it also expressed an interest in promoting the arts for all Americans as part of the "public welfare." This reference was a deliberate way to legitimize federal arts policy and make it more palatable for congressional opponents who

did not see its relevance for their constituents.

Although he had acted in an unprecedented manner, promoting the arts by organizing an Advisory Council on the Arts, Kennedy ultimately resisted establishing an arts foundation without congressional approval. Presidential historians have long noted Kennedy's reluctance to press his adversaries on domestic issues. Kennedy's narrow electoral victory had not given him the political clout he had hoped for and this kept him from risking his prestige on bills that were uncertain of passage.[74] In addition, his hands-off style and aristocratic airs at times clashed with the manners of career congressmen, making it difficult to negotiate legislative measures. One down-to-earth representative from Tennessee who found the President distant pronounced, "[All] that Mozart string music and ballet dancing down there [at the White House] and all that fox hunting and London clothes. He's too elegant for me. I can't talk to him."[75] Thus to avoid the impression of imposing his will, Kennedy insisted that Congress give the Arts Council a statutory basis to assure a broad base of support and strengthen federal encouragement of the arts. He told Congress that "If we are to be among the leaders of the world in every sense of the word this sector of our national life cannot be neglected or treated with indifference . . . A bill (H.R. 4172) already reported out of the House would make this possible."[76]

Kennedy's initiative toward arts policy gave new life to arts advocates' struggles in Congress. Senator Jacob Javits and Representative Frank Thompson had been leading a struggle to obtain federal aid for the arts throughout the 1950s. With support from the White House they joined forces with Senators Claiborne Pell and Hubert Humphrey on the Committee on Labor and Public Welfare to propose arts measure designed to accomplish three goals: 1) the establishment of a federal advisory council on the arts, 2) financial aid to state arts projects, and 3) the funding of a national arts foundation. Kennedy's call for Congress to pass arts legislation directly endorsed their arts bill.

Congressional leaders also fought for arts policy with Cold War rhetoric and pleas for advancing the quality of American civilization. Thompson took his arguments to the public in articles published in various journals, such as one entitled "Are the Communists Right in Calling Us Cultural Barbarians?" In language even more direct than Kennedy's, Thompson asserted that making Washington the "cultural center of the world would be one of the best and most effective ways to answer Russian lies and defeat their heavily financed effort to have communism take over the world."[77] Senator Pell also stressed that the United States must keep up with the Soviets, but warned that art should not be used as propaganda. Rather, America should keep hold of the cultural realm

"which has been the domain of free societies." He went on to contest assertions that government support of the arts might be a waste of funds, arguing that it should be viewed as a measure akin to appropriations for space program funding.

> Our Scientific research, for which we spend billions annually . . . to maintain the posture of strength . . . will mean very little, if the culture of our people . . . is allowed to erode . . . we must contribute to the world something better than [materialism], something more lofty, something that is in tune with free men.[78]

With the blessing of the White House, these congressional arts advocates were able to secure a bill in Congress during the fall of 1963 that authorized a United States arts foundation, complete with provisions for aid to the states, and implemented of Advisory Council on the Arts established by Kennedy's executive order.

In a speech dedicating a memorial to the late poet Robert Frost, Kennedy made what would be his last call for arts legislation. He asserted:

> The artist, however faithful to his personal vision of reality, becomes the last champion of the individual mind and sensibility against an intrusive society and an officious state . . . I look forward to an America which will steadily raise the standards of artistic accomplishment and which will steadily enlarge cultural opportunities for all of our citizens. And I look forward to an America which commands respect throughout the world not only for its strength but for its civilization as well.[79]

Kennedy wanted this speech to be his manifesto on federal arts policy. He had clearly concluded that in the Cold War era the freedom of artists represented a fundamental American value posing an alternative to totalitarianism. Kennedy intended to say this directly in this speech. His original draft read, "In Soviet Russia, Chairman Khrushchev had informed us, 'It is the highest duty of the Soviet writer, artist and composer, of every creative worker, to be in the ranks of the builders of communism . . . to fight for the triumph of the ideas of Marxism-Leninism.'" Kennedy deleted this on the plane to Massachusetts, Schlesinger recalled, because he did not wish to appear too antagonistic just before impending arms talks with the Soviet Union.[80] Nonetheless, his point was made. Americans recalling *New York Times* articles on recent Soviet denunciations of abstract art exhibits in Moscow would further draw the conclusion that, by contrast, American modern artists were to be praised for their style and Americans

were to be congratulated for their tolerance and vision (however constricted that vision also might be).[81]

The President's efforts and cold warrior determination created an atmosphere of acceptance for the arts unparalleled by any other executive. But Kennedy would not see the passage of arts legislation. A month after his assassination, the Senate passed an arts bill for which Javits, Humphrey, Pell, and Thompson had pressed. Yet the House would not consider the measure until the following spring. Appointments of Arts Council members would also be postponed. Ironically, though, Kennedy's death became a contributing factor in Lyndon Johnson's achievement of a federal arts agency as supporters invoked the image and wishes of the late President.

Although not yet incorporated as a full-fledged federal program, the Kennedy administration gave the arts unprecedented recognition. Prominent displays in the Kennedy White House validated the arts as indicators of American civilization worthy of national support. Kennedy's art policies grew through a series of successful trial steps into an administrative program intended to institutionalize arts support at the federal level. Underscoring the value of artistic achievement in American culture, these policies reflected a desire to celebrate American artistic excellence and superiority in the cultural Cold War. In accordance with the prevailing liberal ideology, Kennedy officials believed government should act to improve the quality of American life. Domestically the arts would be an effective tool to raise aesthetic standards and stimulate intellectual activity which would counterbalance popular acceptance of more mundane and material commodities. Internationally, this achievement would demonstrate the success and desirability of American democracy. At the height of the Cold War and prior to burgeoning conflicts over American foreign policy in Vietnam, intellectuals, politicians, and artists could rally together around an ideology of American liberty and international leadership. The high cultural ideals and achievements of Kennedy's New Frontier were instrumental in setting the stage for the ideological and administrative development of the National Endowment for the Arts as manifested in the mission statement and goals of the agency. The goals of art policy and the ideological consensus behind them that emerged during Kennedy's administration, thus, outlasted his tenure in the White House. It remains significance that both the Cold War and a bipartisan agreement on the active use of government to enrich the quality of American life enabled the institutionalization and expansion of federal arts policy under the auspices of the NEA. Nonetheless, because the original rationale for federal arts support was built upon a compromise between advocacy of the arts for their own sake and their value as a cultural weapon, it is not surprising that in our current post-

Cold War and anti-welfare state era that the consensus for federal arts policy has collapsed.

NOTES

1. John F. Kennedy letter to Theodate Johnson, publisher of *Musical America*, Sept. 13, 1960, in *Musical America*, October, 1960, 11.
2. For the visual arts this included the abstract painting and sculpture that were then champions of the New York and international art scene. Kennedy respected the discipline and free expression of the modernist genre, although his own stylistic preference remained on representational painting and classical art works.
   Art historians generally agree that American modernism, particularly abstract expressionist painting, had achieved prominence in the world art market after the Second World War. Serge Guilbaut argued further that this genre became the darling not only of art critics (of whom Clement Greenberg is the best example) but also of political figures interested in exporting the ideals of American cultural freedom. Modern abstraction could be seen as the perfect vehicle for this because of its free forms and lack of potentially controversial subject portrayals. The showcasing of American abstraction in U.S. State Department sponsored exhibitions abroad has been well documented by Eva Cockcroft. See Serge Guilbaut, *How New York Stole the Idea of Modern Art: Abstract Expressionism, Freedom, and the Cold War* (Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1983), and Eva Cockcroft,"Abstract Expressionism, Weapon of the Cold War," *Artforum*, 1974, 39–41. Kennedy himself was schooled in cultural appreciation and encouraged in the area of modern art by his wife, Jacqueline, and close friend and painter Bill Walton.
3. Kennedy, *Musical America*, October, 1960, 11.
4. Ibid.
5. Kennedy letter to Irving Kolodin, Associate Editor, *Saturday Review*, October 29, 1960, 44.
6. Richard Reeves, *President Kennedy: Profile of Power*, (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1993), 54.
7. Arts patronage has always been a minor role of the U.S. government. The most significant attempt to develop a formal arts policy, however, came under the auspices of the New Deal Works Progress Administration. Nevertheless, these were not meant to be long-lasting programs. Rather, they were designed to provide temporary relief for out of work artists and were quickly dismantled at the end of the 1930s.
8. No critical historical analysis has been done on the NEA. The best discussion of art policy development in the Kennedy years, albeit a brief one, is Milton Cummings' essay "To Change a Nation's Cultural Policy: The Kennedy Administration and the Arts in the United States, 1961–1993," in *America's Commitment to Culture: Government and the Arts*, editors Kevin V. Mulcahy and Margaret Jane Wyszomirski, which provides an overview of the NEA as a federal agency from a political science perspective.
   Art historical or art managerial studies have assessed certain aspects of the agency's activities. For arts managements perspectives see: Fanny Taylor & Anthony Barresi, *The Arts at a New Frontier: The National Endowment for the Arts*, (New York: Plenum Press, 1984); and Dick Netzer, *The Subsidized Muse: Public Support for the Arts in the United States*, (New York: Cambridge Univ. Press,1978). Art historical studies of various NEA art programs include: Amy Galligan, *The National Endowment for the Arts and Humanities: An Experiment in Cultural Democracy*, (New York: Columbia Univ. Teachers College, 1989); Robert Jonasse, *The National Endowment for the Arts and the Public Sphere*, (Master of Arts, University of Oregon, 1992); Elaine King, *Pluralism in the Visual Arts in the United States, 1965–1978: The National Endowment for the Arts, an Influential Force*, (Northwestern Univ.: Univ. Microfilms Interna-

tional Dissertation Service, 1986); Mary McCombie, *Art and Policy: The National Endowment for the Arts's Art in Public Places program, 1967–1980*, (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Texas at Austin, 1992); and John Wetenhall, *The Ascendancy of Modern Public Sculpture in America*, (Stanford Univ.: Univ. Microfilms International Dissertation Service, 1988).
Some historical assessment of art policy development may be found in Gary O. Larson, *The Reluctant Patron: The United States Government and the Arts, 1943–1965*, (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1983); and Charles Mark, *Reluctant Bureaucrats: The Struggle to Establish the National Endowment for the Arts*, (Debuque, IA: Kendall/Hunt Publishing Company, 1990). Other works which provide historical background on the NEA include memoirs by former agency officials, such as Livingston Biddle, *Our Government and the Arts: A Perspective from the Inside*, (New York: ACA Books, 1988). The most recent publication on the NEA is more of a polemic than a serious historical study, see Alice Golfarb Marquis, *Art Lessons: Learning From the Rise and Fall of Public Arts Funding*. New York: Basic Books, 1995).

9. Dwight Macdonald was one prominent thinker who renounced his Marxism and lashed out against Soviet dictatorship and argued that the American system allowed greater freedom. In "Why I Chose the West," for example, he argued that the American political and economic system allowed freedom and growth for intellectuals and ordinary citizens. Dwight Macdonald, *Memoirs of a Revolutionist: Essays in Political Criticism*, (New York: Farrar, Straus and Cudahy, 1957), 236. He also stated that artists and intellectuals in the United States had the potential to ignore the commercial market and produce decent work; whereas in the USSR "there are no loopholes—the artist cannot create independently of the Central Committee's directives." Macdonald, "USA v. USSR" *Memoirs of a Revolutionist: Essays in Political Criticism* (New York: Farrar, Straus and Cudahy, 1957), 312. The essay originally appeared in *Partisan Review*.
10. David Riesman, *The Lonely Crowd: A Study of the Changing American Character* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1950). Intellectual assessments of work and leisure also appear in William Whyte, *The Organization Man*, (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1956). For anti-suburban themes, see John Keats, *A Crack in the Picture Window* (n.p.: Riverside Press, 1956).
11. David Riesman, *The Lonely Crowd*, 21, 161; and William Whyte, *The Organization Man*.
12. John Kenneth Galbraith, *American Capitalism: The Concept of Countervailing Power*, (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1952).
13. John Kenneth Galbraith. *The Affluent Society*. (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1958), 4.
14. Ibid., 192.
15. Ibid.
16. Ibid., 273.
17. Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., *The Vital Center*, (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1949).
18. Christopher Lasch, *The New Radicalism in America, 1889–1963: The Intellectual as a Social Type*, (New York: Vintage Books, 1965), 308–311.
19. Interestingly, both Dwight Macdonald and Schlesinger had attended the inaugural conference of the Congress for Cultural Freedom in Berlin in 1950, where they and other prominent thinkers expressed the values of American intellectual life and culture in hopes of wooing Europeans into full agreement that the American system was preferable to the Soviets'. Although Macdonald and Schlesinger were not aware of it at the time, the CIA had funded the Congress with laundered money. Schlesinger was only involved in the initial conference at a time when it had a great deal of support among American intellectuals. The Congress continued to meet well into the nineteen sixties; however, it lost the support of artists and intellectuals as U.S. involvement in Vietnam escalated and became less accepted and once the CIA funding source became known. Schlesinger noted that the Ford Foundation later picked up funding for the Congress. Author's interview with Schlesinger, September 19, 1995; and

Richard Pells, *The Liberal Mind in a Conservative Age: American Intellectuals during the 1940s & nineteen-fifties,* (New York: Harper & Row Publishers, 1985), 128–129.

20. Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., "The Challenge of Abundance" *Reporter* (May 1956). Also see discussions of Schlesinger in Pells, *The Liberal Mind in a Conservative Age*, 131–146; and Allen Matusow, *The Unraveling of America: A History of Liberalism in the nineteen-sixties.* (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1984), Chapter 1.
21. Author's interview with Schlesinger, September 19, 1995, New York.
22. Clement Greenberg, "Avant-Garde and Kitsch" *Partisan Review*, VI (Fall 1939); "Work and Leisure Under Industrialism" *Commentary*, XVI (July 1953); and "The Plight of Our Culture" *Commentary*, XV (June 1953). Dwight Macdonald, "Masscult and Midcult" in *Against the American Grain*, (New York: Random House, 1952), 34.
23. Paul Goodman, *Growing Up Absurd: Problems of Youth in the Organized System,* (New York: Random House, 1956), 109.
24. Italics in original. Wernher von Braun as quoted in Walter A. McDougall, *The Heavens and the Earth: A Political History of the Space Age*, (New York: Basic Books, Inc., Publishers, 1985), 119.
25. Lyndon Johnson is quoted in David Halberstam, *The Fifties*, (New York: Villard Books, 1993), 625. The reference to *LIFE* appears on 626. Also integral to this discussion of American know-how are Rudolf Flesch, *Why Johnny Can't Read—And What You Can Do About It*, (New York: Harper & Brothers, Publishers, 1955); Arthur S. Trace, Jr., *What Ivan Knows that Johnny Doesn't*, (New York: Random House, 1961). These texts gained notoriety for their comparisons of American students' academic laziness to the prowess of their Russian counterparts in literature, history, and foreign languages. They also enlivened cultural policy debates over the benefits of Ivan's exposure to opera, theater, and art versus Johnny's intake of American television. Rep. Kearns quotes from the Trace book in a debate on national cultural policy, *The Congressional Record: House, 1962*, 5201.
26. Robert Frost, "The Next Augustan Age" *The New Enlarged Anthology of Robert Frost's Poems*, Louis Untermeyer, editor, (New York: Washington Square Press, 1971), 276–278. See notes on Frost's inaugural participation in Arthur Schlesinger Jr., *A Thousand Days: John F. Kennedy in the White House,* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1965), 671.
27. Emphasis mine. John F. Kennedy, "Inaugural Address" *Public Papers of the President of the United States: John F. Kennedy*, (Washington, D.C.: United States Government Printing Office, 1961), 15.
28. August Heckscher, Oral history interview conducted by Wolf von Eckhardt, December 10, 1965, for the John F. Kennedy Library, 3. Also see listings of the invites in Folder 8, Box 40, August Heckscher Papers, JFK Library.
29. Kennedy letter to Theodate Johnson, Publisher of Musical America, Sept. 13, 1960, in *Musical America,* October, 1960, 11.
30. File memo dated January 1961, Folder 8, Box 40, Heckscher Papers, JFK Library. For a discussion of those involved in drafting the list of invites, see Heckscher, Oral History, 6. Pierre Salinger later solicited comments and suggestions from these artists on arts policy which were delivered to art consultant Heckscher.
31. Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., papers for *A Thousand Days* , Box w-3, Schlesinger Papers, JFK Library.
32. There are other important instances in which Kennedy deliberately disregarded the social tabu on fraternizing with those deemed enemies of the United States for their communist sympathies or general criticisms of the government. For instance, the President-elect and his brother Robert, crossed an American Legion picket line in 1960 to see *Spartacus* —the film based on a novel by former communist Howard Fast (who had won the Stalin Peace Prize in 1954) and screenplay by ex-Hollywood Ten convict, Dalton Trumbo. Kennedy also intended

to resurrect the reputation of J. Robert Oppenheimer by bestowing upon him the Fermi Prize for his achievements in nuclear energy. Johnson presented this is December of 1963, removing the pall cast over the celebrated physicist when the Eisenhower administration revoked his security clearance in 1953 and the Atomic Energy Commission declared him a security risk because of his opposition to the development of the hydrogen bomb. See Stephen Whitfield, *The Culture of the Cold War*, (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Univ. Press, 1991), 181, 211, and 219.

33. Heckscher, Oral History, 3.
34. Ibid.
35. Kennedy letter to Prof. Jacques Barzun, Sept. 13, 1961, Folder 12, Box 40, Heckscher Papers, JFK Library.
36. For comments on John Kennedy's artistic tastes see for example: Jacqueline Kennedy, Oral history interview conducted by Joseph B. Frantz, January 11, 1974, JFK Library; Paul B. Fey, Jr., *The Pleasure of His Company*, (NY: Harper & Row, Publishers, 1966), 181.
37. Arthur and Barbara Gelb, "Culture Makes a Hit At the White House," *New York Times Magazine*, January 28, 1962, p. 64–66.
38. Author's interview with Pièrre Salinger, Nov. 1, 1995, Los Angeles. Numerous memos in the Heckscher papers at the JFK Library also point to a prominent role by the First Lady in cultural policy.
39. See Gelb, "Culture Makes a Hit At the White House," 66; Mary Van Rensselaer Thayer, *Jacqueline Kennedy: The White House Years*, (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1967); and Thayer, *Jacqueline Bouvier Kennedy*, (New York: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1961).
40. Thayer, *Jacqueline Kennedy: The White House Years*, and G. L. Hall & A. Pinchot, *Jacqueline Kennedy: A Biography*, (New York: Frederick Fell Inc., 1964). According to Doris Kearns Goodwin, it was Jacqueline Kennedy's idea to invite Frost to read at the inauguration. See Goodwin, *The Fitzgeralds and The Kennedys*, (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1987), 813.
41. It has been widely quoted that John Kennedy's father, Joseph Kennedy, had frequently stated to his son that "image is everything" in public life. See Doris Kearns Goodwin, *The Fitzgeralds and The Kennedys*.
42. Schlesinger, *A Thousand Days*, 672.
43. Anne H, Lincoln, *The Kennedy White House Parties*, (New York: Viking Press, 1967), 57.
44. Jacqueline Kennedy as quoted in Pièrre Salinger, *P.S.: A Memoir*, (New York: St Martin's Press, 1995), p. 104.
45. G. L. Hall and Ann Pinchot, *Jacqueline Kennedy: A Biography*, 151, and Thayer, *Jacqueline Kennedy: The White House Years*, 31.
46. Jacqueline Kennedy accepted the generally held belief that women's place was in the home rather than the public sphere. For conventional depictions of women in the nineteen-fifties to which she conforms, see Elaine Tyler May, *Homeward Bound: American Families in the Cold War Era*, (New York: Basic Books, 1988).
47. Kathleen McCarthy, *Women's Culture: American Philanthropy and Art, 1830–1930*. (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press. 1991); and Karen Blair, *The Torchbearers: Women and their Amateur Arts Associations in America, 1890–1930*. (Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1994).
48. "A Tour of the White House with Mrs. John F. Kennedy," Feb 14, 1962, Produced by Perry Wolfe, CBS. Available in the Film and Television Archive, UCLA.
49. Lincoln, *The Kennedy White House Parties*, 112–125; and Thayer, *Jacqueline Kennedy*, 183–184.
50. See Thayer, p 196. Kennedy remarks at French embassy.
51. The American activity in the Venice Biennale and French opposition to American "cultural imperialism" are documented by Laurie J. Monahan, " Cultural Cartography: American Designs at the 1964 Venice Biennale," in *Reconstucting Modernism: Art in New York, Paris, and Montreal 1945–1964*, Serge Guilbaut, editor, (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1990), 369–416.
52. "A Strategy for Cultural Advancement," Folder 10, Box 35, Heckscher Papers, JFK Library.

53. Ibid., 1.
54. Ibid.
55. For an account of the Berlin Crisis, see Reeves, *Profile of Power*, 185–208 and Schlesinger, *A Thousand Days*, 353–370.
56. Schlesinger, *A Thousand Days*, 286. For a detailed discussion of the Bay of Pigs see 219–249 and Reeves, *Profile of Power*, 88–106.
57. Schlesinger, *A Thousand Days*, 362.
58. The policies of massive retaliation and flexible response are detailed by John Gaddis in *Strategies of Containment*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982).
59. See August Heckscher, "The Quality of American Culture" in *Goals for Americans: The Report of the President's Commission on National Goals*, (New York: Columbia University, The American Assembly, 1960); and Heckscher, *The Public Happiness*, (New York: Atheneum, 1962).
60. Schlesinger memo to Kennedy, "Moving Ahead on the Cultural Front," November 22, 1961, Folder 3, Box 16, Schlesinger Papers, JFK Library.
61. Kennedy letter to August Heckscher, December 5, 1961,"Role and Assignment" Folder 15, Box 6, Heckscher Papers, JFK Library.
62. Heckscher, Oral History, 48.
63. August Heckscher, "The Arts and the National Government," Report to President Kennedy, May 28, 1963, Folder 2, Box 40, 1–9, Heckscher Papers, JFK Library.
64. August Heckscher, "The Challenge of Ugliness," Address at the Conference on Aesthetic Responsibility, at New York Chapter of the American Institute of Architects, April 3, 1962. Reprinted in the *Congressional Record: Proceedings and Debates of the 87th Congress*, January, 1962, to October, 1962, (Washington, D.C.: United States Government Printing Office, 1962), 8910–8912.
65. Heckscher Report, 27–28.
66. Ibid., 28.
67. Schlesinger believes that Kennedy intended to appoint Richard Goodwin to the post, *A Thousand Days*, 675.
68. Kennedy letter to Heckscher, June 10, 1963, Box 40, folder 2, Heckscher Papers, JFK Library.
69. Kennedy's references to the American pursuit of happiness and a discussion of Jeffersonian ideals in which the arts would combat accumulation of wealth that might encourage "course and vicious habits" can be found in Kennedy's "Remarks at the National Cultural Center Dinner," Nov. 29, 1962, Box 40, Folder 4, 3, Heckscher Papers, JFK Library.
70. Galbraith, *The Affluent Society*.
71. Kennedy, "The Arts in America," *Look*, draft, Box 40, Folder 4, 8, Heckscher Papers, JFK Library.
72. John F. Kennedy, *Executive Order 11112*, June 12, 1963, Box 122, Folder 4, White House Central Subject Files, JFK Library.
73. Kennedy, "Statement by the President Establishing the President's Advisory Council on the Arts," June 12, 1963, Box 122, Folder 4, WHCF, JFK Library.
74. Kennedy biographers, such as Reeves and Schlesinger, concur that JFK was unwilling to jeopardize promoting his primary foreign policy objectives by antagonizing conservative legislators on domestic issues such as civil rights or the arts, which he deemed less imperative. Nevertheless, it is also recognized that he did promote the arts in new ways. See John Wetenhall, "Camelot's Legacy to Public Art: Aesthetic Ideology in the New Frontier," *Art Journal*, (Winter 1989), 303–308.
75. Schlesinger, *A Thousand Days*, 710.
76. John F. Kennedy, "Special Message to the Congress on Education," February 6, 1962, Box 35, Folder 1, Heckscher Papers, JFK Library.
77. Rep. Frank Thompson, "Are the Communists Right in Calling Us Cultural Barbarians?" *Music*

Journal, July/August, 1955, 5.

78. Senator Claiborne Pell, quoted in *The Congressional Record: Proceedings and Debates of the 88th Congress, January 6, 1963 to December 20, 1963: Senate*, (Washington, D.C.: United States government Printing Office, 1963), 25265–25266.
79. Kennedy, "Remarks at Amherst College upon Receiving an Honorary Degree," October 26, 1963, *The Public Papers of the Presidents: John F. Kennedy*, 815.
80. Wetenhall, 306.
81. See John Canaday, "Art in the Soviet: Review of a Paradox" in his series on "Socialist Realism" *The New York Times*, beginning Sept. 30, 1963. Also "Khrushchev Scolds Abstract Painters," Dec. 2, 1962, and "Soviet Orders Disciplining for Cultural Avant–Garde," *The New York Times* , Dec. 4, 1962.

On Russian Populism

To the memory of Allan K. Wildman

M. Asim Karaömerlioglu

I was increasingly convinced that in Populism lay the roots, the deepest and truest origins, of contemporary Russia.
Franco Venturi, *Studies in Free Russia,* p. 221

The influence of Russian Populism in and outside of Russia has been great indeed. This is due to at least three important factors. First, as Venturi points out, the study of Populism constitutes the *sine qua non* of any investigation of Russian history since it contributed to the foundation of Soviet Russia. Secondly, any elaborate understanding of Russian Marxism, which tremendously affected the course of the twentieth-century history, requires a meticulous historical account of Populism, from which Russian Marxism was born. And finally, as Venturi points out in the preface to his magnus opus, *Roots of Revolution*, Russian Populism must be regarded as part of a wider European socialist intellectual tradition.[1] Although Russian Populists usually endeavored to prove how and why Russia was different from the West, usually their arguments were reactions and responses to the political controversies then prevailing in the European socialist milieu, especially within the First International.

In this paper, I intend to problematize the widely-accepted definition of Russian Populism. Instead of a "backward-looking," peasant-oriented and class-reductionist definition, I propose to understand Russian Populism by looking at the tension between the intelligentsia and the Russian state. I shall discuss some basic features of Russian Populism in broad terms in order to understand the motivations and ideological positions of the Russian intelligentsia. In particular, I will concentrate on the work of Peter Lavrov, the highly influential Populist revolutionary of the late nineteenth century Russia. I shall also discuss

the Russian Populists' attitude towards liberal democracy and the peasant commune which constituted quite important elements of their ideology.

My analysis begins with a critique of V. I. Lenin's widely-accepted definition of Populism as elaborated and supported by Andrzej Walicki:

> It was Lenin who gave it a more concrete historical and sociological connotation by pointing out that Populism was a protest against capitalism *from the point of view of the small immediate producers* who, being ruined by capitalist development, saw in it only a retrogression but, at the same time, demanded the abolition of the older, feudal forms of exploitation... It enables us to see Russian Populism as a particular variant of an ideological pattern which emerges in different backward societies in periods of transition and reflects *the characteristic class position of the peasantry*. It does not mean, of course, that Populism can be regarded as a *direct* expression of peasant ideology; it is an ideology formulated by a democratic intelligentsia who in backward countries, lacking a strong bourgeois class structure, enjoy as a rule greater social authority and play a more important part in national life than intellectuals in the economically more developed states. [Italics mine][2]

In my opinion, this definition needs to be questioned, since regarding Populism as an expression of small producers or peasants traps Lenin and Walicki into class reductionism. In other words, they perceive Populism as the ideological reflection of a particular social class. Instead, I would like to propose a characterization of Populism that takes, among other things, the emergence and needs of a particular kind of intelligentsia as the constituent element of the definition.

The most valuable part of Walicki's definition above is his emphasis on the role of a democratic intelligentsia enjoying greater social authority vis-a-vis their counterparts in the so-called "developed" countries of the time. In fact, Populism cannot be understood without analyzing the birth of a new kind of intelligentsia in the nineteenth century, a worldwide phenomenon concurrent with the rise of the "modern" nation-state. Especially in countries which came late to capitalism due to the weakness of the bourgeoisie and, accordingly, to the immense role of the state, intellectuals played an important role compared to their economic power. As internal and international conditions forced the "ancien regimes" to undergo a modernization movement, the role of the intellectuals increased. It was partly because in order to survive in the international state-

system and to govern a rapidly changing society, the states had to adopt reforms such as increasing the quality and quantity of educational facilities, broadening and modernizing the state apparatus, embracing technological development, military modernization, and the like, all of which required an increase in the number of intellectuals. In this respect, intellectuals were themselves the *direct* products of the modernization process, and their future social and material status depended on its success. However, the states faced the dilemma of trying to sustain the "ancien regime" while at the same time supporting modernization efforts. Such was the case in late nineteenth-century Iran, China, Russia, Mexico and the Ottoman Empire, all of which experienced revolutionary or constitutionalist events during approximately the same decade (1905-1917). This dilemma explains not only why bureaucrats such as the Russian *Decemberists* of 1825, who were to a certain extent a member of the ruling elite of the state and yet rebelled against it, but also why the Russian intellectuals, by and large, reacted against the emergence of the bourgeoisie, perceiving them as a new power center.[3]

When the Russian state insisted on the preservation of many of the features of the "ancien regime," but could not embrace the intellectuals, the alienation of the latter intensified and radicalized them.[4] This radicalization led them to search for possible allies from different strata of the society. This practical undertaking of the intellectuals explains the ambiguity and abstractness of the concept *Narod* (people), which was produced in the minds of the urban intelligentsia.[5] Likewise, the myth created around the concept of the peasant commune can be seen as arising from the necessities of the Russian intelligentsia rather than a reflection of what the commune actually was. (I will discuss the nature of the peasant commune, *obschina*, in detail below).

However, this is not to say that the views of the Populists represented a precapitalist outlook, although they do, to some extent. In itself, however, "backwardness" does not explain the emergence of Populism.[6] It is important to understand the *origins* of Populism first and foremost *in its relation to the state of the "ancien" regime, not to the interests of the peasants.* An examination of Peter Lavrov's *Historical Letters* allows us to substantiate the argument above, that Populism was basically a theory reflecting the necessities and interests of the intelligentsia. His theories of the state, of critically-thinking individuals, and of the subjective nature of knowledge help to contribute to understanding the nature of Russian Populism.

Most scholars of nineteenth-century Russian history agree about the great in-

fluence which Lavrov's *Historical Letters* had on the younger generation of the 1870s. Lavrov, a highly influential Russian Populist revolutionary, in this book touches upon nearly all the significant issues of the time in regard to Populism. At the political level, *Historical Letters* must be read as a critique of Nechaevism.[7] Unlike Serge Nechaev, a man of conspiracy and immediacy, Lavrov stressed the necessity of a long period of preparation for the education of the masses for social revolution.[8] In other words, preparation for major historical changes rather than an immediate historical upheaval was deemed more important at the time.[9] For this reason, the revolutionaries were to educate not only the masses but themselves as well. Secret conspiracies of a small number of professional revolutionaries could not pave the way for revolution. Lavrov insisted that the youth must be people of "learning and conviction." Since knowledge would become a revolutionary weapon in the hands of the revolutionaries.[10]

At the epistemological and philosophical level, Lavrov criticized both positivism and Hegelian logical abstraction. In the Russian context of the time, his critiques were directed against the nihilist Dmitry Pisarev.[11] Using a utilitarian point of view, he maintained that philosophical ideas "are important as forms of protest against the present in the name of a desire for a better and more just social order, or as forms of satisfaction with the present."[12] Moreover, Lavrov insisted that social scientists could not avoid ethical considerations.[13] In that respect, he viewed social sciences as quite different from the positive sciences, basically due to the Kantian recognition that the active contribution of man to knowledge leads to a sort of relativism. To Lavrov, subjectivity in the investigation of societies was inevitable "since the investigator is himself a man and cannot for a moment detach himself from the processes which he regards as characteristic."[14] Lavrov's critique of positivism must also be seen as part of a general critique of positivism in Europe, particularly in Germany, which marked a return to the subjectivity of Kant.[15] Unlike most Populists such as Nicholas Chernyshevskii, Lavrov was very sensitive to the intellectual developments in Europe.[16] In his focus on man, we also have to remember that Lavrov, like Chernyshevskii, was very much influenced by the anthropologism of the nineteenth century which placed man at the center of the universe.[17]

At the practical level, Lavrov's emphasis on subjectivity offered room for the revolutionaries to believe in their attempts to transform the world. Without it, one could hardly be convinced to take part in the endeavors to change the world. In a sense, this theoretical positioning gives impetus for "the people" to engage in revolutionary movements. Lavrov expressed the necessity of self-importance and belief in one's own historical mission. As he wrote "if the thinker believes that his moral ideal is actually realized now or will be realized in the future, he

will arrange the whole of history around the events which paved the way for this realization."[18]

Through Kantianism, Lavrov constituted a theory which, on the one hand, recognized the inevitable aspects of social phenomena, but on the other hand, postulated a theory of voluntarism and optimism.[19]

It is possible to see similar trends not only among other emigre revolutionaries but also among the others who, at the time, were inside Russia. Nicholas Mikhailovsky, for instance, in his famous *What is Progress?* stressed similar points regarding the subjective nature of sociological knowledge:

> Perhaps the objective point of view, obligatory for the natural scientist, is completely unsuitable for sociology, *the object of which -man- is identical with the subject.* Perhaps, as a consequence of this identity, the thinking subject can attain to truth only when he is fully merged with the thinking object and is not separated from him even for an instant...[Italics mine][20]

According to Mikhailovsky, the crucial question was how to measure moral superiority. In the sphere of positivism, this is not a question since concepts like pain, pleasure, and morality are totally irrelevant to the positivist philosophy.[21] For Mikhailovsky, however, such concepts constituted major elements in the lives of *real* men and women which could not be overlooked.

Both inside and outside of Russia, therefore, there were critiques of positivism similar to Lavrov's. There are other points within Lavrov's *Letters* that require analysis and one of the most important ideas appears at the historical level. To Lavrov, history had witnessed the unfolding dialectics between the critically-thinking individuals and the masses, or, in other words, between the scientific vanguard and the "backward masses," or between rationality and tradition.[22] It was only a "cultivated minority," the critically-thinking individuals, who could grasp the knowledge of historical progress and it was their duty to transfer this knowledge somehow to the masses.[23] Interestingly enough, such an elitist perspective was not the general trend among the Populists. In Lavrov's writings one can hardly find anything exalting the masses or archaic forms of any sort. For his colleague Mikhailovsky, however, the primitive man was considered superior in many respects. Mikhailovsky compared the qualities of individuals in primitive and modern societies and found that in the primitive society the producer had direct and complete control over his own labor and means of production. In Mikhailovsky's eyes, this made the primitive individual superior and heterogeneous compared to modern-day workers. Needless to say,

Lavrov's arguments about the relation between the intellectuals and the masses were quite different.[24]

The relationship between the critically-thinking individuals and the masses in Lavrov's work led to a very interesting conclusion on the psychological and ethical level. When intellectual privileges were gained at the expense of the material well-being of the masses, the critically-thinking individuals were obliged to repay the cost of their progress.[25] Lavrov intelligently and convincingly targeted his audience:

> A member of a small group within the minority, who finds pleasure in his own development, in the search for truth, and in the realization of justice, would say to himself: Each of the material comforts which I enjoy, each thought which I have had the leisure to acquire or to develop, has been bought with the blood, sufferings, or toil of millions. ...I shall relieve myself of responsibility for the bloody cost of my own development if I utilize this same development to diminish evil in the present and in the future...If I am a cultivated person I am obliged to do this, but for me this obligation is very light, since it coincides exactly with what constitutes pleasure for me.[26]

Lavrov's theory here interestingly reconciles the difficulties of the struggle and pleasure that could be gained from this struggle. It was in the seeking and disseminating the truth and thereby understanding the laws of motion of the societies and in the struggle to make the society better that one should find pleasure in life. In this individual endeavor to seek pleasure, one also coincides with the desires of the suffering majority. This coincidence, on the other hand, means that the individual endeavor to seek pleasure also leads to a collective consciousness and action.

The debt of the intellectuals, then, became the ethical motivation in the struggle for the emancipation of "the people."[27] Especially in the 1870s, repaying that debt became a major motivator to action for many Russian Populists. It was with this ethical appeal inspired by Lavrov that the young generations of Populists strongly took part in the revolutionary movement.[28] In the same manner, as Mikhailovsky argued, the debate was neither over the extent of the debt nor "over the means of liquidating it, but the debt lies on their conscience and they long to discharge it."[29] In the notion of repaying the debt, the Russian youth of the time found an ethical and psychological basis for their revolutionary actions.

But how could they struggle and repay the debt? Lavrov's answer is found in the section entitled "The Need for an Organized Party." In this section, we are

explicitly exposed to his theory of organization. According to Lavrov, "the voice of one man is the voice of no one."[30] For that reason, the unification of all the progressive forces was essential.[31] He even drew the picture of this organization in detail:

> Thus the party is organized. Its nucleus is a small number of highly developed, deliberate, vigorous people, for whom critical thinking is inseparable from action. Around them are members of the intelligentsia who are less highly developed. But the party's real foundation is its inevitable allies, the social groups suffering from the evil which the party has been organized to combat.[32]

Finally, Lavrov's ideas relating to the state deserve mention. Lavrov talked about the state toward the end of *Historical Letters*. In his opinion, "progress has had to consist in the reduction of the role of the state principle in social life." However, he also talked about the possibility that the state could be used as a weapon against the enemies of progress.[33] In fact, from the ideas we encounter in *Historical Letters*, it is hard not to perceive the Jacobean dimension of Lavrov's thoughts regarding political organization. Although scholars like Philip Pomper and Venturi give accounts of Lavrov's warnings against Jacobean-like ideas, the ideas previously mentioned represent a very Jacobean position.[34] Such a theoretical position is also very similar to that of Lenin's in *What Is To Be Done?* As the famous Russian intellectual historian Isaiah Berlin points out, the Populists invented the conception of the party as a group of professional revolutionaries without any private lives and with strong discipline, as opposed to mere sympathizers. This conceptualization did not spring from their inclination toward conspiracy however, but from the specific political conditions in Tsarist Russia.[35] In sum, regardless of whether one likes his ideas or not, Lavrov was probably the first Russian who extensively theorized the role of the intelligentsia in political struggle.

Yet, it is important to emphasize that Lavrov's position in *Historical Letters* changed as time passed, although he retained his basic principles. In the 1880s and after, as the Karakazov and Nechaev conspiracies frustrated the revolutionaries and increased the political polarization of the Russian political spectrum, Lavrov seemed to be more sympathetic to the underground extreme movements such as *Narodnaya Volya* because his emphasis on the commitment to the cause and party increased.[36]

Furthermore, Lavrov's ideas certainly do not reflect all the variants of the Populist movement. The Populist ideas were diverse and one cannot talk about

a homogeneous ideological position as far as Populism is concerned. In a sense, Lavrov symbolized a transitional figure who was also very sensitive to the European intellectual life.[37] In addition to the Populist movement, he had relations with the working class through the *Northern Union of Russian Workers.* After all, it was not Georgii Plekhanov, the father of Russian Marxism, but Lavrov who represented the Russian revolutionary movement in the First International of Karl Marx.[38] While most of the Populists could be characterized as "economic romanticist," Lavrov thought that industrialism was necessary for Russia but it had to be less painful, without dismantling the rural structure. In this respect, he was certainly within the rationalistic tradition of the "enlighteners."[39] In no sense, can one characterize Lavrov as a person of "backward-looking utopianism."[40] He offers us rich historical and biographical material to see the traces of later developments in Russia such as bypassing the bourgeois stage, distrust to liberalism, and the role of the party as a vanguard.

Interestingly enough, the revolutionary Populists, especially of the 1870s, considered themselves "apolitical," since politics meant for them participating in bourgeois manipulations.[41] The heart of the matter lay in their distrust and suspicion of liberal democracy. For most of the Russian Populists, liberal democracy, based on parliamentary politics, had been the direct outcome of the development of capitalism which they harshly rejected. In that respect, they perceived capitalism as a stage that could be bypassed, and so liberal democracy could also be avoided. More importantly, however, the success of liberalism would mean the atomization of individuals, the decline of solidaristic feelings, and a passive participation in bourgeois politics. In other words, if the hegemony of bourgeois ideology, understood in the Gramscian sense, were diffused to the masses, it could in turn prevent any chance of revolutionary politics. As Berlin has rightly argued, the outcome of capitalism in Russia would be the creation of "the breathing space" which "would enable the ruling class to develop a social and economic base incomparably stronger than that which it possessed at present."[42] The Populists thought that the development of capitalism would create employment opportunities for the radical intellectuals thus leading to their political conformity. The full-fledged development of capitalism would offer special privileges and opportunities for the intellectuals and "in this way the revolutionary cause would lose its most valuable recruits."[43]

This distrust and suspicion of liberal democracy also explain why the Popu-

lists "ignored" the political revolution, which meant for them a bourgeois revolution.[44] They were, however, ardent supporters of the social revolution, which would have resulted in a deep economic transformation of existing relations.[45]

The Populists, then, were even more suspicious of liberal democracy than of the autocratic state.[46] Until the 1860s, they were naive in their expectations of political freedom secured by the state, but this naivete derived from a persuasive premise. They were aware of the fact that the state had the political capacity to transform an economically backward country. Yet if it failed to do so, it was not surprising since, after all, the "absolutely absurd and absurdly absolute" Russian state barely possessed any roots in society. In that sense, it was "hanging in the air."[47] Consequently, the strength of the state was superficial, and compared to bourgeois hegemony in the West, overthrowing merely the state hegemony would be much easier.

In Populists' attitude towards the liberal democracy, we also find the traces of the theory of "uneven development." Lavrov was well aware of this phenomenon, which was later attributed to Leon Trotsky's and Parvus's names.[48] Lavrov believed that the experiences of other societies had had an impact and influence on Russia, which meant that "backward societies could shorten the process of transition through intermediary stages of development."[49] Without experiencing liberal democracy, he demanded socialism; without the development of capitalism, he wanted Russia to secure "an honorable place among the nations of the world."[50] For the most part, the course of the Russian Revolution and the later developments in the liberal democracies of the West vindicated the Populists' position. Most of the revolutions and social upheavals of the twentieth century did take place in countries which lacked liberal democracy and perhaps because of that lack.

The year 1848 witnessed revolutionary upheavals throughout Europe and marked a turning point in the history of the Russian intelligentsia as well. As the "Spring of Nations" failed, the confidence of Russian thinkers like Alexander Herzen in the progressive mission of Europe began to fade away irreversibly. Now the attention of the Russian intelligentsia turned toward the mission of Russia in world history. To some extent, the origins of Russian Populist ideas were attempts to discover the inherent differences between Russia and Europe. As Walicki argues, Populism also "reflected ... specific problems of a backward peasant country in confrontation with the highly developed capitalist states."[51] The

Populists perceived the role of the peasants, together with the existence of the peasant commune (*obshchina*) as one of the most important features prevailing in Russia and differing from the capitalist West. To analyze this "unique" feature, we have to start with the concept *Narod*, "the people."

The concept of "the people," as perceived by the Populists, constitutes both the strength and the weakness of their ideology. Their strength derived from the loose definition of the concept. Unlike the concept of class which has usually been more strictly defined, "the people," can be a sum of different social groups. The Populists argued that on the Russian soil "the people" could be defined very differently from Western concepts. According to Mikhailovsky, for instance, bourgeois liberals could never understand "the people" because they were thinking in terms of the West: "in Western Europe, after the colossal development of divergent, mutually conflicting interests, it is far more difficult than with us to clarify one's understanding of the people."[52] In his sense, the social spectrum from which mass support could come in Russia might *include* diverse elements, and this situation might be an advantage for a social movement like Populism. On the other hand, the ambiguity of the concept could create programmatic difficulties since the more loosely the audience of the ideology is defined, the less it would be consistent and convincing.

Although for most of the Populists, "the people" meant the peasants, their perception of the peasants was more of an undifferentiated totality.[53] By the second half of the nineteenth century, it was already possible to observe considerable differentiation among the rural population, especially after the penetration of capitalist relations into the countryside and after the beginning of the gradual dissolution of the commune.[54] The Populists gave special emphasis to the role of the peasant commune because it helped them to overcome the ambiguity. The existence of the commune not only enabled them to espouse the legacy of a historical phenomenon, but it also seemed to provide an "objective" basis upon which their egalitarian and subjective perspective could stand. But what was the commune and what did the Populists see in it?

The peasant commune in Russia embodied a medieval land tenure system together with a social organization which had performed a large set of functions. Formed "spontaneously on the basis of neighborhood residence and the need for community among peasants," the commune was a combination of households, each with a small plot of land assigned on a long-term basis by the collective of the commune.[55] Ownership of the pastures and forests was collective as was the provision of services. The commune was run collectively by an assembly of the heads of households which collected taxes and redivided the ar-

able lands from time to time. This redivision was made according to the needs of the expanding families and was especially important for the egalitarianism inherent in this redistribution.[56]

The commune carried in itself a dualistic structure, however. On the one hand, the commune served the interests of peasants by providing the peasantry with their vital needs and defending their interests before the state. On the other hand, it was used by the state for administrative and security reasons. The state collected taxes, recruited peasants, and held them in obedience by means of the commune. Historians have noted that as such the commune functioned as a link to the state apparatus, which not only recognized but also supported the commune." The "result was a social and functional dualism based on the contradictory tasks of the commune, and this dualism led to the formation of a dual structure —a formal (official) and an informal (unofficial) one."[57]

This contradictory and complex nature of the peasant commune led the Populists believe that the commune could be used for their revolutionary purposes. It is no wonder then for the Populists, the existence of the peasant commune was important in many respects. Most significantly, the Populists believed that the peasants innately and historically experienced a collectivist life and this tradition stayed alive despite the fact that the state, the liberals, and the landowners tried to suppress it. Secondly, the commune could provide the Populists with an already-existing organization for political mobilization against the Tsar. Last but not least, the Populists perceived the commune as the nucleus of the future democratic society.

Interestingly enough, the most important ideological support for the Populists' perception of the commune came from Karl Marx. Both in his letter to Vera Zasulic and in the preface to the 1882 Russian edition of the *Communist Manifesto*, Marx favoured the commune, attributing special positive features to it:

> Now the question is: can the Russian *obshchina*, though greatly undermined, yet a form of premedieval common ownership of land, pass directly to the higher form of Communist common ownership? ... The only answer to that possible today is this: If the Russian Revolution becomes the signal for a proletarian revolution in the West, so that both complement each other, *the present Russian common ownership of land may serve as the starting point for a communist development.* [Italics mine][58]

Marx, therefore, strongly advocated the Populists' theoretical and practical ideas about the peasant commune. To him, the commune had many superior fea-

tures. For example, it was based on locality rather than kinship, and it contained in itself contradictory property relations, communal and individual. Like the Populists, Marx maintained that although the state and the bourgeoisie were attacking and destroying the commune, it could manage to survive and enable Russia to go forward to socialism thanks to the communal habits of peasants. It is difficult to understand how Marx, as a theoretician of historical necessity, could argue in this way. While the Russian Marxists, following *Das Kapital*, were arguing about the inevitable collapse of the peasant commune and considering it a historically backward form of production, Marx himself sided with the Populists. This irony is probably related to his pragmatic and political views where Russia was concerned. Since he saw the Tsardom as a very strong base of European conservatism, anything that could harm the political authority in Russia should be supported. In other words, his position in the commune reflected his pragmatic desire to interfere with the support of Russian Tsardom to European conservative regimes. The peasant commune, if it could harm the Russian state, could be a weapon in the struggle against Tsardom which in turn could contribute to the struggle against the monarchies of Europe in general.

The emphasis on the peasant commune can be regarded as the crucial element in all variants of the Russian Populist ideology. This, however, does not mean that the Populists did not see anything negative in the commune nor did all the Populists understand the same thing from the peasant commune, and from the potentialities that the commune offered. Chernyshevskii and Lavrov, like Marx, for instance, saw the archaic aspects of the commune, but suggested that the dissolution of the commune was not inevitable since subjective struggles for its preservation could save it. For this reason, they argued that "to save the Russian commune one needs a Russian revolution."[59] Nevertheless, all the Populists thinkers, in one way or another, saw in the peasant commune something very substantial for their ideological cause. The author of *What is Progress*, Mikhailovsky, regarded the commune as something good that might prevent the development of division of labor, which he equated to capitalism. It is not that difficult to infer such a conclusion from his analysis of capitalism and from the negative feelings he attached to capitalism. Others found in the commune the reflections of the hitherto preserved positive characters of the Russian peasants in the form of inherited "instincts." According to Lavrov and his followers, for instance, the commune "could serve as the basis for a future society of small, cooperative associations, but he presumed that it was infected with the moral diseases of the old order."[60] To Lavrov, the commune should not be thought of as something that could replace the necessity for industrialization, but the prob-

lem was pursuing a kind of industrialization which would cause the least harm to the commune and take into consideration the interests of the peasants.[61] After all, Lavrov thought that the peasants themselves had to undergo a process of education. Such a perspective would have been at odds with any kind of inherited "instincts" since Lavrov was trying to change most of their "inherent" characteristics by education.

The peasant commune was perceived as a base not only by the collectivist but also by the conservative and reactionary ideologies. In other words, the Populists were not the only people who supported the persistence of the commune. Ironically, many conservatives and the Tsars, to some extent, valued the commune as well. The famous Russian conservative and the theoretician of an exalted state power, Leontyev, for instance, argued interestingly about the commune when he was criticizing individualism:

> ...the rebels are an acute disease which has aroused a saving reaction. But those who would destroy the *village commune*, naively imagining that everything rests in the *enrichment of the individual*, are destroying the last support, the last remnants of the former alignment, stratification, serfdom, and immobility, i.e., they are annihilating one of the main conditions of both our state unity and our national-cultural isolation, and to some extent of our heterogeneous internal development as well.[62]

For the Russian state, the commune played a role in conserving the backward features of Russian agriculture and its economic needs. As Hans Rogger points out "in addition to being an administrative and fiscal convenience, the commune became a repository for conservative hopes for rural tranquillity and for escaping the problems that a mass of landless rural proletarians would have posed."[63]

The nature and function of the peasant commune were controversial, and ambiguous, generating tension within the Populist movement and ultimately contributing to its failure. The commune certainly was not a creation in the minds of the Populists, yet its contradictory nature, together with its perpetual change and dissolution in a time of dramatic change at the end of the nineteenth century, complicated the issue for them. The confusion about the possibilities of the commune derived from its essential dualities. On the one hand, it was a product of the feudal or precapitalist era carrying all the historical deficiencies of its times, on the other hand, some equalitarian aspects were characteristic of its organization. This duality inevitably found its reflections in the minds and characters of Russian peasants and revolutionaries.[64]

From the 1890s on, the Populist ideology lost most of its support from the revolutionaries because of both its inner contradictions and the rapid socioeconomic changes in Russian society. Three significant conceptual tensions were never adequately resolved: the archaic collectivism of the peasant commune in contrast to individualism; the anti-Westernism of an intelligentsia that was, in fact, a product of Westernization; and the shifting emphasis on the importance of the intelligentsia and its relation to the masses. In addition to these tensions, the late nineteenth-century Russia was undergoing deep and rapid changes. Industrialization created completely different social and political forces combined with a growing dissatisfaction among the rural population. Russia was gradually beginning to resemble to the West in the sense that it was beginning to develop an urban population with a growing middle and working classes simultaneous with the dissolution of the rural socioeconomic structure. As the famous Minister of Finance Count Witte pointed out at the time:

> By the end of the 19th century, Russia had an industry which was characterized by relatively large scale factories. The interests of entire economy are closely tied to its future. This industry, however, has not yet reached such an extent and such technical perfection as to furnish the country with an abundance of cheap goods. Its services cost the country too dearly, and these excessive costs have a destructive influence over the welfare of the population, particularly in agriculture.[65]

In addition to all of the above factors, practical efforts to find in the peasantry a mass base for the revolution ended in frustration in the 1870s. The peasants refused to behave as the revolutionaries expected, and even the Populists began to organize the working class, an effort at odds with their theory. This in turn confirmed the validity of the Marxist theory.[66] Indeed, it was not only the Marxists who smuggled the books of Marx and Engels into Russia. There were many other groups doing the same thing.[67] The turning point came with the 1896 textile strikes, which proved that if any revolutionary popular base was possible, it could only be found in the urban working class.[68] In other words, the 1896 strikes provided the most important single effect on the direction of the revolutionary movement in Russia. Hence, the soil was becoming more and more ripe for the Marxist propaganda which later determined the course of Russian history.

Nevertheless, revolutionary Populism is Russia's main indigenous revolu-

tionary tradition. Regardless of whether their theoretical arguments were relevant or not, the Populists managed to create a revolutionary tradition on the Russian soil out of which the cadres of Russian Revolutions of 1905 and 1917 were born. Although they failed to get the support of the masses, especially of the peasants, without doubt they created a revolutionary spirit and tradition among the Russian intelligentsia. Yet later in the Stalinist regime the Populist tradition was harshly denounced. Not because they were seen as advocates of "backward" social and political projects, but because they devoted themselves to truth and justice and believed in the human will or "people's will," though often naively, against the evil "objectivities" of any kind, whether Tsardom or Stalinism. Russian Populism reminds us again and again of the importance of ideas, passion, emotion, devotion, and enthusiasm in the course of history. As Lavrov put it when exalting the revolutionary spirit of his followers, "the number of those who perish is not important here: legend will always multiply it to the limits of possibility."[69] Without grasping the mentality and feeling of his assertion is it possible for us to understand and write the history of revolutions and revolutionary movements which dramatically changed the course of world history?

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Notes

1. Franco Venturi, *Roots of Revolution—A History of the Populist and Socialist Movements in Nineteenth Century Russia* (New York: The Universal Library, 1960), xxxii.
2. Andrzej Walicki, *The Controversy Over Capitalism—Studies in the Social Philosophy of the Russian Populists* (London: Oxford University Press, 1969), 6, 9.
3. It is not coincidental that Venturi finds many features in Russian Populism inherited from the Decemberists such as the idea of "sacrifice". Venturi, *Roots of Revolution*, 2.
4. See Jack A. Goldstone, "Predicting Revolutions," *Contention* 2 (Winter 1993): 133, for a detailed essay on the tension between the state and the elites.
5. Peter Worsley, for instance, convincingly shows that Russian Populism was "pre-eminently an ideology about the peasantry, not one created by them, nor one rooted in the peasantry. It preached learning from, being guided by, the people, when everything in it was created by a segment of the urban intelligentsia." See Peter Worsley, "The Concept of Populism," in Ionescu Ghita and Ernest Gellner, eds., *Populism: Its Meanings and National Characteristics*, (London: The Macmillan Company, 1969), 221.
6. For the famous explanation of the "longue-duree" of Russian historical development and its repercussions on the intellectual thought by using the notion of "backwardness", see especially Alexander Gerschenkron, *Economic Backwardness in Historical Perspective* (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1965).
7. Philip Pomper, *Peter Lavrov and Russian Revolutionary Movement* (Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 1972), 96.

8. Lavrov's emphasis on the necessity of preparation was probably influenced by the evolutionary thought, "the intellectual arch-model of the nineteenth century as prominent in the works of Darwin as in the philosophy of Spencer, the positivism of Comte, and the socialism of Fourier and Saint Simon. Evolutionism's major attraction was that it offered a combined solution to the problems of heterogeneity and change in a world in which massive change was taking place and heterogeneity was increasingly evident. The diversity of forms —physical, biological, and social—was ordered and explained by the assumption of necessary development through stages which the scientific method was to uncover." See Teodor Shanin. "Late Marx and the Russian Periphery of Capitalism." *Monthly Review* 35 (June 1983): 15.
9. Samuel H. Baron, *Plekhanov, The Father of Russian Marxism* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1963), 13, and Pomper, *Peter Lavrov and Russian Revolutionary Movement*, 19.
10. Peter Lavrov, "Historical Letters." in James M. Scanlan and Mary-Barbara Zeldin, eds., *Russian Philosophy*, Vol II, (Knoxville: The University of Tennessee Press, 1994), 157.
11. Venturi, *Roots of Revolution*, 449.
12. Lavrov, "Historical Letters", 124.
13. Pomper, *Peter Lavrov and Russian Revolutionary Movement*, 89.
14. Lavrov, "Historical Letters", 127.
15. "... neo-Kantian philosophy, which was then grappling with similar problems in Germany, as one of the sources from which he [Lavrov] drew inspiration." Venturi, *Roots of Revolution*, 451.
16. I am aware of the fact that one can make a very convincing point in arguing that Chernyshevskii in fact should *not* be perceived in the intellectual tradition of Populism, but within the nihilist tradition. This depends on whether we use a narrow definition of Populism or not. At any rate, he was the outstanding political activist and his tremendous passion and ambition to transform the society at large must have resonated with the Populists. His call for the emancipation of the Russian serfs, his idea that "backwardness" may offer different avenues and opportunities, his naive expectation, like Mikhail Bakunin's, that the revolution was imminent in Russia and above all his deep hostility towards liberals and liberalism must have been welcomed by most Populists.
17. Pomper, *Peter Lavrov and Russian Revolutionary Movement*, 40.
18. Lavrov, "Historical Letters", 132.
19. Pomper, *Peter Lavrov and Russian Revolutionary Movement*, 31.
20. N. K. Mikhailovsky."What is Progress," in *Russian Philosophy*, Vol II, eds., James M. Scanlan & Mary-Barbara Zeldin (Knoxville: The University of Tennessee Press, 1994), 182.
21. Ibid., 184.
22. Pomper, *Peter Lavrov and Russian Revolutionary Movement*, 91-92.
23. Lavrov, "Historical Letters", 145-146.
24. At this point, Mikhailovsky gives the examples of the labor of the savage and of the contemporary worker. The savage was the person who enjoyed a full life in his workplace all the time. On the other hand, a worker in the "manufacture of pocket watches spends his entire life bent over the same wheels or screws or cogs and only the master watchmaker who puts the separate parts of the mechanism together knows how to do anything besides his own specialty". Mikhailovsky. "What is Progress", 178-179.
25. Lavrov, "Historical Letters", 138-144.
26. Ibid., 143.
27. Pomper, *Peter Lavrov and Russian Revolutionary Movement*, 24.
28. Venturi, *Roots of Revolution*, 450.
29. James H. Billington, *Mikhailovsky and Russian Populism* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1958), 91.
30. Lavrov, "Historical Letters", 152.

31. Lavrov says: "So that the force will not be spent in vain, it must be organized. The critically-thinking, determined individuals must be determined not only to fight but to win; to this end it is necessary to understand not only the goal toward which one is striving but also the means by which it can be attained. If the struggle has been in earnest, those who are combating outmoded social institutions will include not only individuals who are fighting in the name of their own suffering, which they have come to understand only through the words and thoughts of others, but also individuals who have thought through the state of affairs critically. They must seek each other out; they must unite, and bring order and harmony to the disorderly elements of the historical force which has arisen. Then the force will be organized; its action can be focused on a given point, concentrated for a given purpose." Lavrov, "Historical Letters", 154
32. Ibid., 156.
33. Ibid., 167-68.
34. In order to substantiate his argument, Pomper quotes the following sentences from Lavrov: "We place at the forefront the proposition that the reconstruction of Russian society must be accomplished not only with the people's happiness as its goal, not only *for* the people, but by means of the people." Pomper, *Peter Lavrov and Russian Revolutionary Movement*, 146 and see Venturi, *Roots of Revolution*, 466.
35. Berlin, "Introduction, " in Venturi, *Roots of Revolution*, xxv.
36. Pomper, *Peter Lavrov and Russian Revolutionary Movement*, 212.
37. Ibid., 79 & Walicki, *The Controversy Over Capitalism*, 36-7.
38. Ibid., 152 & 216.
39. Venturi, *Roots of Revolution*, 459 & Walicki, *The Controversy Over Capitalism*, 27.
40. Ibid., 37.
41. Walicki, *The Controversy Over Capitalism*, 82.
42. Berlin, "Introduction", xiv.
43. Ibid., xiv.
44. It was Chernishevskii who was "largely responsible for the fact that `liberal' became a term of opprobrium in advanced circles. '" See Avrahm Yarmolinsky, *Road to Revolution* (New York, The Macmillan Company, 1959), 98.
45. Walicki, *The Controversy Over Capitalism*, 81.
46. Ibid., 83.
47. Especially Peter Tkachev maintained such a position firmly. See Ibid., 98.
48. Alexander Helphand, most often known by his nickname Parvus, was a Russian Jewish who actively took part in the 1905 Revolution. He was the first to develop the theory of "permanent revolution" based on "uneven development." Parvus later became involved in political movements in Germany and the Ottoman Empire. For more information on Parvus, see Z. A. B. Zeman and Winfried B. Scharlau, *The Merchant of Revolution; the Life of Alexander Israel Helpland (Parvus) 1867-1924* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1965), and Oleg F. Solov'ev. "Parvus: Politicheskii Portret, " *Novaia i Noveishaia Istoriia* 1991: 162-185.
49. Pomper, *Peter Lavrov and Russian Revolutionary Movement*, 214.
50. Walicki, *The Controversy Over Capitalism*, 129.
51. Ibid., 26.
52. Mihailovsky quoted in Billington, *Mikhailovsky and Russian Populism*, 90.
53. Abraham Ascher. *Pavel Axelrod and the Development of Menshevism* (Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1972), 40.
54. Hans Rogger, *Russia in the Age of Modernization and Revolution 1881-1917* (New York: Longman, 1983), 108.
55. Boris Mironov. "The Peasant Commune After the Reforms of the 1860s," in Ben Eklof and Stephen P. Frank, eds., *The World of the Russian Peasant, Post-Emancipation, Culture and Soci-*

ety, (Boston: Unwin Hyman, 1990), 10.

56. Shanin, "Late Marx and the Russian Periphery of Capitalism", 13
57. Mironov, "The Peasant Commune After the Reforms of the 1860s," 10.
58. Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, *The Communist Manifesto, With an Introduction by A. J. P. Taylor*, (Middlesex: Penguin, 1985), 56.
59. Berlin, "Introduction:, xv. For Lavrov, see Walicki, *The Controversy Over Capitalism*, 58.
60. Pomper, *Peter Lavrov and Russian Revolutionary Movement*, 180.
61. "The position of the Populist economists of the eighties was characterized not so much by opposition to industrialization as such, but rather by a search for a distinctive, non-capitalist model of industrialization, a model which would take account of the interests of peasantry and of the specific features of the economic situation of Russia as a backward agrarian country in co-existence with the developed capitalist countries." Walicki, *The Controversy Over Capitalism*, 114.
62. Constantine Leontyev, "The Average European as an Ideal and Instrument of Universal Destruction," in James M. Scanlan and Mary-Barbara Zeldin, eds., *Russian Philosophy*, Vol II, (Knoxville: The University of Tennessee Press, 1965), 276.
63. Rogger, *Russia in the Age of Modernization and Revolution 1881-1917*, 80.
64. Venturi, *Roots of Revolution*, 71.
65. Witte quoted in Rogger, *Russia in the Age of Modernization and Revolution 1881-1917*, 108.
66. Allan K. Wildman, *The Making of a Workers' Revolution, Russian Social Democracy, 1891-1903* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1967), 32-33. When Axelrod was still a Populist, he accepted to work for the Northern Union of Russian Workers which was founded in 1878 in St. Petersburg. See Ascher, *Pavel Axelrod and the Development of Menshevism*, 42.
67. Baron, *Plekhanov, The Father of Russian Marxism*, 135.
68. Ascher, *Pavel Axelrod and the Development of Menshevism*, 127.
69. Lavrov, "Historical Letters", 153.

German Politics and the Burden of *Kultur*: Mann, Meinecke and the Psychology of the *Vernunftrepublikaner* in Early Weimar Germany

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In an essay intended for an American audience in 1923, Thomas Mann wrote that "the German citizen, impelled by a hard fate to catch up and to continue to learn, is on the point of recognizing that he decided too hastily and prematurely his idea of education, culture and humanity when he excluded from it the political element."[1] Such a forthright assessment of the "German problem" was characteristic of Mann at his most critical and perceptive. Yet it was hardly typical. Like so many intellectuals of his generation, Mann's development took place within a tradition that posited the idea of *Kultur* as something independent from and superior to rational ends or utilitarian value. For educated Germans the concept of *Kultur* involved an idealization and veneration of culture as the key to personal growth and self-awareness. In direct contrast to the Enlightenment emphasis on reason and the pursuit of practical knowledge, the German tradition stressed the inner cultivation of the individual (*Bildung*) as the highest goal of the educational process.[2]

This "mandarin tradition," as Fritz Ringer has called it, played a crucial role in the development of educated elites in Germany throughout the nineteenth century.[3] It also had several important consequences for the development of politics and culture—consequences that became especially important after the creation of a unified German state under Otto von Bismarck. On the one hand, the pull of this tradition led many German intellectuals to turn their backs on politics altogether, to leave politics to the politicians and to pursue their own inner development. A related, and equally important, development was the creation of the idea of a *Kulturstaat* [cultural state]. Here again the emphasis was on inner development, but the *Kulturstaat* included as well a specifically political dimension. In essence, educated elites in Germany agreed to support the

monarchical government; in return, the Monarchy "gave unstinting support to education, without demanding immediately practical returns, and without exercising too strict a control over the world of learning and of geist [intellect]."[4]

This tradition characterized the world of German learning and cultural development—as well as the relationship of intellectuals to politics—until World War I. There were, of course, challenges to this world-view prior to the war. Socialism, the rise of mass politics, and the spread of democratic ideals within the nation all questioned the hegemony of the mandarin tradition. It was military defeat, the abdication of the Kaiser, and the formation of a Republic under the Social Democrats, however, that forced this older generation of German intellectuals to reconsider their long-held assumptions and question their beliefs. Their search for answers in this changing world constitutes one of the most interesting features of the intellectual history of twentieth-century Germany.

The present work represents an attempt to examine the mental world of two prominent intellectuals in the early years of the Weimar Republic: the writer Thomas Mann and the historian Friedrich Meinecke. It is not an attempt to provide a complete intellectual biography of these thinkers, nor is it an effort to judge the strength of their respective commitments to the Republic. Rather the aim is to assess, within a particular political context, the emotional and psychological burdens faced by both as they made what was for them an extremely difficult turn toward democracy.

On one level, the choice of Mann and Meinecke is an odd one. There is no evidence to suggest they knew each other. They did not correspond, nor did they review or comment upon each other's work. Nevertheless, a study of their published writings reveals that they were responding to a similar set of problems, and their support for the Republic—as well as their significant qualifications and concerns—suggests important parallels. Several historians have pointed to similarities between Mann and Meinecke, but none has examined the close intellectual and psychological affinities between the two.[5]

Such an examination seems warranted for a number of reasons. Both Mann and Meinecke were among the most perceptive and intelligent observers of their day. Both were conservatives largely sympathetic to the monarchy, and both were educated and cultured members of the bourgeoisie who cultivated an elitist and "aristocratic" ideal within the authoritarian framework of the Wilhelmine state.[6] Despite differences in emphasis, moreover, both thinkers adhered to a German conception of culture that, as George Mosse has written, "centered upon an inward feeling rather than emphasizing those social and economic realities which to many are a prerequisite for orderly progress in the

world."[7] It was in essence an attitude toward life, and in an important sense Meinecke and Mann formed two poles of this cultural world-view that was typical of the German educated elite in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. A political historian with a strong interest in the *Kulturstaat*, Meinecke devoted his early career to an examination of the development of the power-state and its role in shaping a national and cultural ideal. An artist and explicitly nonpolitical aesthete, Mann cultivated a studious indifference toward politics in favor of the pursuit of culture through personal artistic achievement.

The crucible of war, and especially the shock of defeat and revolution, prompted both thinkers to reexamine their traditions and to assess their intellectual positions anew. At the same time, the creation of the Weimar Republic forced them to attempt to come to terms with new political realities. That the introduction of a republican government created a "conservative dilemma" is now a commonplace of historical scholarship.[8] Historians have especially stressed the importance of the split between younger "conservative revolutionaries" who rejected the Weimar Republic and an older generation of conservatives who transferred their loyalties to the government.[9] In spite of their support for the Weimar Republic, however, its creation challenged many of the fundamental beliefs and assumptions of this older generation, and scholars have not always appreciated the strong psychological burdens these "elders" faced as they made their way from the familiar world of the nineteenth century into the uncharted terrain of the postwar world. It is here that the writings of articulate conservatives such as Meinecke and Mann provide important insights. Torn between the pressing needs of the moment and the psychological pull of the past, both Meinecke and Mann tried to find their bearings in a new world, and their writings during this time clearly reveal the sharp inner conflict of the old struggling with the new. Taken together, their experiences form a prism through which to view the dilemma of a generation of conservative intellectuals in a world turned upside down.

In a letter to his wife during the last months of the First World War, Friedrich Meinecke wrote that "Conservative Prussia is irretrievably gone."[10] Germany, he realized, was clearly defeated. It now became necessary to throw overboard an "enormous ballast of conservative thought," to resist any attempt at a restoration, and to accept democracy in order "to preserve the Reich and national unity."[11] The alternative, he feared, would be anarchy and the spread of Bolshevism among the masses. A renowned historian and an astute student of the

political scene, Meinecke possessed a keen awareness of political realities. As his letter indicates, he realized at an early date that the loss of the war would necessitate dramatic political changes in Germany, including the introduction of democratic reforms. Yet Meinecke was also "a German nationalist politically and philosophically,"[12] and it was in large measure his own "ballast of conservative thought" that would have to be discarded. Not quite half a century old, the German Reich created by Bismarck now faced the prospect of military defeat and political upheaval, and German intellectuals who had rallied to the cause of the nation found themselves struggling to come to terms with the consequences of defeat. For Meinecke, as for other intellectuals, the acceptance of political realities proved vastly more difficult than the recognition that change was necessary.

The son of a minor state official, Friedrich Meinecke was born in the small Prussian town of Salzwedel in 1862. His father was both conservative and patriotic, and Meinecke's childhood was dominated by the Bismarckian wars of unification and the rapid rise of the new German Reich to the status of a world power.[13] Choosing a career in history, Meinecke studied at the so-called "Prussian school of history" in the University of Berlin, where he absorbed a blend of romanticism and nationalism under the influence of Johann Droysen and Heinrich Treitschke.[14] Following fourteen years in the Prussian State archives, he finally entered the academic world as a professor, first in Strassburg then later in Freiburg and finally Berlin. At the same time, he became an assistant editor, and quickly rose to the post of editor, of the prestigious *Historische Zeitschrift*.

Meinecke's early career was conventional and his development as a historian somewhat slow, but his major breakthrough came in 1908 with the publication of *Cosmopolitanism and the National State*.[15] Into this work, which was immediately recognized as a major contribution to German history, Meinecke poured all of his thinking about the development of the German state up to that moment. The primary aim of *Cosmopolitanism* was, as he expressed it, "to illuminate the true relationship of universal and national ideals in the growth of the modern German idea of the national state."[16] Meinecke outlined the tensions that had existed between the universal and cosmopolitan ideals of the Enlightenment and the national ideal that had steadily grown within German political circles during the nineteenth century. The *Realpolitik* of Bismarckian diplomacy had resulted in the creation of a strong, unified state under the domination of Prussia.[17] The success of Bismarck's policies had, in turn, led to the triumph of nationalism and "political egoism" as the highest ideals of the national state.[18]

On one level, *Cosmopolitanism and the National State* clearly revealed Meinecke's nationalistic outlook and his appreciation for the hard-nosed realities of modern world politics. At the same time, the relationship between power politics and cultural development constituted an undercurrent of his work that suggests an important dimension of his thought. Following the lead of fellow historian Leopold von Ranke, Meinecke maintained that the state had a moral obligation to insure the "inner freedom" necessary to allow the development of cultural and spiritual values. "The condition of [the state's] existence," he wrote, "is that it create an avenue of expression for the human spirit, that it articulate this spirit in unique form and reveal it ever anew."[19] In essence, Meinecke argued that political life and cultural development constituted a symbiosis in which the absence of one severely curtailed the possibilities for the full realization of the other. It was not, however, a relationship of equal parts. Cultural life and spiritual values served to legitimate the egoism of the state, but it was the strong, centralized state that created the conditions of order and propriety necessary for a national culture to flourish. Thus, in this fusion of politics and culture, statism emerged as the crucial component. It was this vision of the national ideal that dominated Meinecke's thinking in the years before World War I, and it was this vision that would be severely challenged by the events of the war.

In his memoirs, Meinecke maintained that the "dream" of his generation in the years before the war "was to realize a harmonious union of the heritage of Goethe and Bismarck through which to arrive at a new synthesis of spirit and power."[20] In *Cosmopolitanism and the National State*, Meinecke believed he had identified the crucial elements for this new synthesis, but political realities in the prewar years seemed to frustrate his hopes continually. In particular, class conflict and the emerging demands for political participation among the German masses created barriers to the realization of Meinecke's ideal of the state. Ever the political realist, Meinecke recognized the need for the state to respond to these developments, and he became involved with the National Liberals in the belief that they more fully represented the conservative interests of the state than the older, hide-bound Conservative party.[21] According to Meinecke, statism did not stand for reaction but for strong, progressive leadership in the best interest of the state. Yet it is important to note that Meinecke conceived of political participation from within an elitist framework that sharply limited the scope of significant liberal and democratic reform.[22] Accordingly, the task of national leaders was to respond to political pressures and to channel discontent into a renewed commitment to the state. Only in this way could Germany create a national consciousness suitable to the new age.[23]

These considerations are crucial in understanding Meinecke's response to

the events of 1914. The outbreak of war naturally came as a challenge to Meinecke's view of the state, but the initial response in Germany seemed to provide a realization of his hopes for a "new synthesis of spirit and power." Like many intellectuals, Meinecke responded to the war by rallying to the national cause, and there can be little doubt that nationalism and patriotic considerations played a significant role in his thinking. Yet Meinecke placed heavy emphasis on the unity within the nation that seemed to accompany the event. On August 3rd, Social Democrats joined with other parties in the Reichstag and voted in favor of war credits, and Meinecke later recalled this as "one of the happiest days of my life."[24] Finally, it seemed, the nation had found unity in a common cause. In an essay written early in the war, Meinecke wrote that "the time of the split between politics and culture" was over.[25] Henceforth, Germany would be known as a nation of people who unified both state and culture (*Staats- und Kulturvolk*), and this ideal—"the highest ideal of modern life"—would be upheld and defended against the world.[26]

For the most part, Meinecke resisted the bellicose rhetoric adopted by many German intellectuals during the war.[27] But the stress of the war, and particularly the anguish of defeat, left him struggling to adjust to new realities. By 1917, he had already begun to question his beliefs about the role of power and of the nation-state in the modern world.[28] Perhaps more importantly, military defeat signaled the end of his long-cherished dream of the ideal, unified state. Neither the state nor the *Volk* [people] had lived up to his ideal, and the result left Meinecke bitter and disillusioned. In late 1918, he lamented in his diary that the nation was too exhausted to resist further, and he ended his entry with a philippic that speaks volumes about the attitude of many German intellectuals and their fears of what defeat might mean for the German nation: "All of the heroes have been abandoned," he declared, "and now only shopkeepers remain."[29]

Meinecke's postwar writings starkly reveal the dilemma of a political realist attempting to come to terms with a new political world that he did not truly love. During late 1918 mass demonstrations and political violence plagued the new government, and in early 1919 abortive communist uprisings in Berlin and Munich led to bloody fighting in the streets. Faced with this unrest, Meinecke's orientation toward *Realpolitik* led him at an early stage to declare his support for the German Republic, and in 1919 he wrote his friend Siegfried Kaehler explaining that "in the conflict between statesmanlike conduct and inherited ideals, which we all face today, I believe we must follow with firm stride the demands of reason."[30] At the same time, his writings following the war contain an emotionalism and empathy with the irrational seldom found in his prewar

thinking. His elitist bias became, if anything, more pronounced, and throughout this period his reasoned defense of the Republic conflicted with the largely conservative "inherited ideals" that formed the core of his emotional and psychological makeup.[31] In an essay written immediately after the war, Meinecke formulated in precise terms the attitude he was to share with so many intellectuals of his generation: "I remain, in regards to the past, a monarchist at heart and am becoming, in regards to the future, a republican of reason (*Vernunftrepublikaner*)."[32]

The attitudes that led to Meinecke's emergence as a *Vernunftrepublikaner* are summarized in an early collection of essays published in 1919 as *Nach der Revolution*. Meinecke criticized the course of German political development in the years following the fall of Bismarck. In particular, he argued that national leaders had been slow to respond to political realities in a mass age and had failed "to practice the art of timely concessions."[33] Before the war, Meinecke had argued for limited political reforms that would more fully integrate the *Volk* and the nation. During the conflict, he even seemed to suggest that an enlightened bourgeoisie might become the standard-bearer of a national culture and carry forward the task of unifying the nation.[34] Military defeat and the abdication of the Kaiser, however, had made his calls for reform obsolete. In the aftermath of the war, social and political unrest represented the greatest danger, and the German Republic formed the best, and perhaps the only, bulwark against revolutionary upheaval.[35]

Written under the impact of defeat, *Nach der Revolution* demonstrated both a longing for the past and an anxiety for the future. In this work, Meinecke deplored the enervating effects of the industrial age upon the soul of the nation. Despite his defense of the Republic, he also raised doubts about the validity of parliamentary government in Germany. Such views were close to those of younger "cultural pessimists" such as Moeller van den Bruck, who despised the Republic and argued that industrialization and parliamentary democracy were destroying the cultural traditions and true spirit of the nation. As Robert Pois has written, "two souls now strove mightily in Meinecke's breast,"[36] and the concerns raised in *Nach der Revolution* clearly suggest limits to Meinecke's republican sympathies. In an imaginary dialog that ends the work, "Ein Gespräch aus den Herbste 1919," Meinecke's characters argue the merits of parliamentary government for Germany. The defender of monarchical values, Eberhard, describes himself as embodying an "aristocratic and humanitarian ideal of development" (*Bildungsideal*) and maintains that there is little in the idea of democracy to warm the heart. Significantly, the defender of the Republic, Reinhold,

declares that "I am not enthusiastic about democracy, but it is inevitable."[37] Taken together, these attitudes form the core of the *Vernunftrepublikaner* that Meinecke had become.

Throughout the early 1920s, Meinecke struggled with limited success to reconcile his commitment to the Republic with the elitist and "aristocratic" values that were central to his world view. The failure of the power state forced him to reevaluate his own views on politics. At the same time, the infusion of democratic ideals into national life forced him to rethink the relationship between state and culture. In *Die Idee der Staaträson*, first published in 1924, Meinecke addressed these issues within the context of a discussion on the historical role of morality in politics.[38] *Raison d'état*, Meinecke argued, was a necessary feature of statecraft, but it was one that was subject to abuse. "Whoever holds power in his hands is continuously subject to a moral temptation to misuse it and to overstep the boundaries of morality and justice."[39] Here, Meinecke is clearly reassessing his earlier views of *Machtpolitik* in *Cosmopolitanism and the National State.* Indeed, Meinecke maintained that he wrote *Die Idee der Staaträson* in order to trace the "tragic" impact of *raison d'état* as a corrective to the celebration of power politics in his earlier work.[40]

The details of Meinecke's lengthy analysis are less important than his realization that the "idealization of power politics" in Germany had led to a "false deification of the state."[41] Richard Sterling has argued that *Die Idee der Staaträson* marked an important turning point in Meinecke's thinking, and "the history of the idea of *raison d'état* was a heroic attempt to make the sense of duty to the moral law as insistent and immediate as the sense of duty to the state."[42] Such an analysis is true so far as it goes. Yet it remains equally true that Meinecke failed to resolve fully the contradictions within his own thought. In the last section of the work, Meinecke again expressed his reservations about parliamentary democracy. The "old type of monarchy" could not be restored, he argued, but a properly understood *raison d'état* now required that the democratic Republic accord the State "as great a measure of independence and self-reliance" as possible. Thus, Meinecke maintained, "the setting up of a strong plebiscite presidency offers more guarantees than does parliamentarianism for a form of government in accordance with purified *raison d'état*."[43]

As important and symptomatic as were Meinecke's reconsiderations on the role of politics, his views on the relationship between culture and the state are equally significant, and it is here that his divided sympathies found perhaps their most problematic expression. In *Die Idee der Staaträson*, Meinecke suggested that the encroachments of "civilization" had undermined the moral au-

thority of "true" culture, but his conception of what culture might mean in a new era remained vague at best.[44] Throughout the work, he loosely identified culture as a kind of spiritual and moral quality—the very quality, in fact, that should provide ethical restraints upon the potential abuse of *raison d'état*. In doing so, he took the important step of separating the fusion of culture and the power-state that had dominated his prewar thinking. Yet it is surely significant that he was unable to suggest a new unity based upon postwar political realities. In a world of parliamentary government, with political parties competing for special interests, Meinecke could find little scope for a new synthesis of culture and politics that would serve to unify the nation. In an essay from early 1925, he held forth the possibility for a new *Kulturideal*, but it was to be one that would transcend the divisiveness of parliamentary parties and unify culture and the state through a subordination of the individual to the whole.[45] In the realm of day-to-day politics, Meinecke defended the republic as the form of government that divided least, but he was unable to allay his suspicions that party politics and mass democracy were in some way foreign to the German mind and inimical to the development of true *Kultur*. In an important sense, the *Vernunftrepublikaner* remained the apostle of an aristocratic cultural creed.

Like Meinecke, and like so many European intellectuals in 1914, Thomas Mann rallied to the national cause at the beginning of the war. Also like Meinecke, he placed his prolific pen in the service of the State, and his spirited polemics on the superiority of the German nation were, if anything, even more strident and immoderate. In contrast to Meinecke, however, Mann's embrace of an openly political stance marked a sharp departure from his prewar attitudes and concerns. An artist and self-conscious aesthete, Mann before the war had been disdainful of politics and had shied away from political involvement in favor of the pursuit of his art. His about-face during the war came as a shock to many of his contemporaries and provides perhaps the most prominent example of what Fritz Stern has called "the political consequences" of the tendency of many prewar German intellectuals to ignore politics.[46]

At the outbreak of war, Mann was already the famous author of literary works such as *Buddenbrooks* and *Death in Venice*. An inheritor of the humanist tradition that he found embodied in Goethe, Mann was also deeply influenced by German romanticism and by the intellectual tradition that emphasized the inner development of the individual. Where Meinecke's early influences were

conservative academics like Droysen and Treitschke, Mann's influences were philosophical aesthetes such as Richard Wagner and, above all, the philosopher Friedrich Nietzsche, whose hatred of politics and contempt for bourgeois conventions profoundly colored both Mann's art and his attitude toward life.[47] In a letter of 1904 to his brother Heinrich, Mann offered a rare glimpse of his "political" views on the relationship of the individual to the state: "Freedom is a purely moral, intellectual concept, equivalent to 'honesty,'" he wrote, "but in political freedom I have no interest. The mighty literature of Russia surely grew up under an enormous pressure? Would perhaps not have grown up at all without that pressure? Which would at least prove that the struggle for 'freedom' is better than freedom itself. The mere fact that so much blood has flowed for the concept gives it, for me, something disquietingly unfree, something positively medieval."[48]

In his usual literary style, Mann reveals in this letter his affinity for a strong government of order, but, perhaps more importantly, he suggests his relationship to the concept of *Bildung*—his belief that the cultural development of the individual and the realization of "inner" freedom take place independently of the world of politics. True culture was the result of a lengthy process of inner growth and aesthetic maturation. Especially for Mann, this meant the pursuit of his own art, and he concluded his letter in characteristic fashion: "Am I striving for happiness? I am striving—after Life; and *thereby* after my work."[49]

Against this inward-looking background of aesthetic humanism, Mann's emergence as an ardent and vocal defender of the German nation came as a surprise to his contemporaries and, no doubt, to himself. Several months before the war he had resigned from the Board of Censorship on the grounds that he was "not fitted for political activity."[50] Nevertheless, another letter to Heinrich shortly after the declaration of war indicated the direction in which he was heading. Maintaining that he felt as if he were "dreaming," Mann asked "shouldn't we be grateful for the totally unexpected chance to experience such mighty things?" He continued: "My chief feeling is a tremendous curiosity—and, I admit it, the deepest sympathy for the execrated, indecipherable, fateful Germany which, if she has hitherto not unqualifiedly held civilization as the highest good, is at any rate preparing to smash the most despicable police state in the world."[51]

The bellicose patriotism that would mark his wartime writings is already apparent in this letter, and shortly thereafter Mann published the first of several works in which he would both defend the German cause and rationalize his own heated response. In an article for the *Neue Rundschau* in November 1914, "Thoughts in a Time of War," Mann developed the theme of the antithesis

between "culture" and "civilization." Culture, Mann maintained, "is unity, style, form, breeding and taste. It is, in a sense, the true organizing principle of the world, and this is so no matter how adventurous, scurrilous, wild, bloody or terrible." In contrast, civilization stood for "reason, enlightenment, softening, manners, skepticism, disillusionment—in short, for mind."[52] At least in part, such a shocking contrast was no doubt a rhetorical flourish in the deliberately provocative style of Nietzsche. At the same time, however, Mann's statement points to strong infusion of aggresive Treitschkean nationalism under the impact of the war and unquestionably reflected the views of many other German intellectuals.[53] In the current struggle, Mann made clear, Germany stood for culture and the belligerent "western powers" for civilization.

After defining the terms of the debate, Mann unleashed an impassioned defense of the values of German *Kultur* against the intrusions of western civilization, of "nature" against rationality and "mind." Taking up the theme of war, he compared Voltaire—"the father of the Enlightenment and of anti-heroic civilization"—with Frederick the Great. In the latter, Mann saw the embodiment of the warlike spirit and military values that he now identified as among the elemental sources of Germanic culture and art.[54] "Militarism," he declared, "is in reality the expression of German morality," and he concluded with an assessment of Germany's condition that is worth quoting at length:

> It is true the German soul has something deep and irrational which makes it appear disturbing, worrying, alien, yes offensive and wild to the feeling and judgement [sic] of other, less profound peoples. It is its "militarism," its moral conservatism, its military morality—an element of the demonic and the heroic which strives to attain civil "spirit" only as the last and most humanly worthy ideal.[55]

With this idea, Mann had come full circle. The nonpolitical artist had become the ardent defender of a romanticized power-state, and cultural development—the attainment of the ideal of "spirit"—was closely linked to the fate of the military and civil authorities.

In 1915, Mann elaborated these themes in a lengthy essay, "Frederick the Great and the Grand Coalition." Comparing Frederick's invasion of Saxony in 1756 with the events of the summer of 1914, Mann drew upon the historical memory of Frederick to justify the German violation of Belgian neutrality.[56] "An attack may be of sheer necessity," he wrote, "but then it is not an attack but a defense."[57] The sophistry of such arguments aside, the essay is important because Mann identified the anger that Europe directed toward Frederick with

the anger currently directed at Germany—and at himself. "King Frederick is called Great, not only because of the audacity with which he laid siege to destiny, but also and especially because he had the strength to bear up—alone, with almost superhuman nervous strength—under so heavy a burden of hate."[58] The task of the nation was to face up resolutely to its destiny in war even if this meant breaking the accepted codes of international conduct; Mann's task was to defend the German nation, and himself, against the hatred of the world.

In an important study on Thomas Mann, Terence Reed has argued that Mann's writings during the war mark "the low point in his career as a critical intellectual." Nevertheless, Reed correctly maintains that, in order to understand fully Mann's later writing and attitudes, it is necessary to take his war writings seriously for what they were, "the expression of a whole-hearted emotional commitment desperately seeking to rationalize itself."[59] Nowhere, perhaps, is this more clearly revealed than in his *Reflections of a Nonpolitical Man.* First published shortly before the end of the war in 1918, the *Reflections* absorbed Mann's energies throughout the latter stages of the conflict even to the exclusion of his own art. Mann once more took as his starting point the antithesis between *Kultur* and *Zivilisation*, and then moved on to a lengthy discussion on the uniqueness of German cultural development and of his own position within that tradition. For present purposes, the most important sections of this work are those that elaborate Mann's views on the questions of politics and culture and their relationship to this German tradition.

Mann maintained throughout the *Reflections* that his views during the war were, in fact, a continuation of his prewar attitudes. In an early chapter on "Burgherly Nature," Mann wrote that "I am nonpolitical, national, but nonpolitically disposed, like the German of the burgherly culture and the one of romanticism."[60] He then identified himself with the romantic nationalism of Richard Wagner. In Wagner Mann saw an artistic genius who stood as the defender of the German ideal of culture against the intrusion of "foreign" and "un-German" concepts, namely Western democracy. Wagner hated democracy, Mann maintained, "because he *hated politics itself*, and because he recognized *the identity of politics and democracy*."[61] Political democracy was the antithesis of the "old-Germanic relationship between the absolute king and the free people." In an idea ascribed to Wagner but clearly his own, Mann wrote that "in the absolute king the concept of freedom is elevated to the highest, God-fulfilled consciousness, and the people are only free when *one* man rules, not when *many* rule."[62]

Here, in language strikingly similar to that of his 1904 letter to his brother

Heinrich, Mann reiterated his views on the inner development of the individual within an authoritarian framework. Now, however, he specifically defended this ideal against what he saw as the levelling tendencies inherent in Western democracy. In a later section of the *Reflections* Mann elaborated upon this theme. "The German concept of freedom will always be spiritual," he argued, because it developed independently of political institutions. "Never will the mechanical-democratic state of the West be naturalized with us. Let one Germanize the word, let one say 'national' instead of 'democratic'—and one names and grasps the exact opposite: for German-national means 'free'—inwardly and outwardly, but it does not mean 'equal'—neither inwardly nor outwardly."[63] German culture was nonpolitical and aristocratic, and Germans had to defend national culture and art against the intrusion of politics and the democratic spirit: "the politicization of the German concept of art would itself of course mean its democratization, a most important feature of the democratic levelling and assimilation of Germany."[64]

For all of its abstractions and self-deceptions, *Reflections of a Nonpolitical Man* is important as a document of Mann's attitudes and opinions during the final stages of the war. It was his last public attempt to defend the German war effort, and it was his most elaborate effort to explain his own position during the war. His tortured attempts at self-rationalization left him unable to admit that his own views were decidedly political, but the work is nonetheless crucial to understanding his attitudes and anxieties in the years following the war. As Mann would himself later describe it, *Reflections of a Nonpolitical Man* was "a last great retreat-action, fought not without gallantry, of a romantic bourgeoisie in the face of the triumphant new."[65]

If Mann's public pronouncements at the end of the war retained an aggressive quality, his private reflections suggest a more realistic assessment of political realities. It is here that one sees him attempting to come to terms with the "triumphant new," and it is here that one sees the first glimmer of his emergence as a *Vernunftrepublikaner*. In a diary entry for October 1918, Mann reiterated his hope that Germany would persevere in its opposition to "democratic civilization," but he clearly realized that the war was lost. It was now his view that "the worldwide triumph of democratic civilization in the political sphere is an accomplished fact." Consequently, he maintained, "if the German spirit is to be preserved, one must recommend the separation of cultural and national life from politics, the complete detachment of one from the other."[66] In an entry several weeks later, Mann clarified this distinction even more forcefully:

> All we can do is recognize and accept the political direction in which the world is moving, salute the democratic new world with good grace as a kind of world convenience that it will be quite possible to live with. . .and keep everything cultural, national, philosophical separate from politics and *free*, on a plane high above politics, something not in the least affected by democratic utilitarianism. This is the only viewpoint that is appropriate for me.[67]

This was the opposition to the fusion of politics and culture that Mann had advocated in the *Reflections*, and the elitist and aristocratic views of culture that he retained at the end of the war could not be more certain. His response to political developments, however, was clearly in transition.

The abdication of the Kaiser and the creation of the Republic in November prompted another curious diary entry from Mann: "My attitude toward the Greater German social republic that seems to be forming is completely reconciled and affirmative. It is something new, something appropriate to the German spirit. . . . The social republic is something well in advance of and superior to the idea of the bourgeois republic and plutocracy of the West."[68] Exactly what Mann meant by this odd formulation is far from clear, and it seems to provide an example of what Erich Heller has described as the "singing out of tune to which Thomas Mann was so prone whenever the song was a political one."[69] What is certain, however, is that Mann worried above all that anarchy would spread if order was not maintained. Like Meinecke, Mann feared that defeat could result in a revolution along Bolshevik lines, and his diary entries for late 1918 and early 1919 are filled with references to the unrest and mass demonstrations in the streets. In a letter to Joseph Ponten in March 1919, Mann revealed his fears of what Bolshevism might mean for Germany. Maintaining that there was no doubt "much that is good and human" in communism, Mann then suggested his major concern in typical style: "To be sure," he wrote, "I too cross myself twice and thrice at the prospect of 'proletarian culture.'"[70]

As these considerations suggest, Mann's concern over the need for order and the future prospects of German culture characterized his early response to the Weimar Republic. For Mann, as for Meinecke, the Republic seemed to offer the best safeguard against revolutionary upheaval, and his support—however hesitant and publicly non-committal—seems to have been genuine.[71] This is not to say, however, that Mann retreated from the conservatism that was so central to his psychological makeup. In early 1920 he wrote to his friend Hermann Keyserling that "I was very interested in your suggestion that in a little while the conservatives must once again have the main say in Germany. I

believe it myself; for nature in the end adjusts itself somehow, and, as Wagner correctly said, 'Germans are conservative.'"[72] To the conservative mind, democratic reforms and parliamentary politics might be distasteful, but the demands of the hour seemed to require allegiance to the Republic.

In these years immediately following the war, Mann refrained from public pronouncements on political affairs as he attempted to come to terms with a rapidly changing world. In his *Reflections*, he had written that "I do not want politics. I want objectivity, order, and propriety."[73] Yet as his diaries and letters of the period suggest, politics would not leave Mann alone. He had little taste for radical political adventures of either the left or the right. The right-wing Kapp Putsch of 1920 left him worried that this "premature act" would "seriously compromise conservatism" within the nation, and he was glad to see it fail.[74] For all of his conservatism, Mann could not countenance the rising tide of crude right-wing reaction within the country. The assassination in 1922 of the foreign minister Walter Rathenau by nationalist youths shocked the nation and prompted an important response from Mann. In a lengthy letter to Ernst Bertram he wrote:

> Rathenau's death was a great shock for me too. What benighted minds these barbarians have! Or are they misguided idealists? . . . The distortion of the German countenance causes me acute suffering. I am thinking of turning a birthday article on Gerhart Hauptmann into a kind of manifesto in which I appeal to the conscience of the young people whose ear I have. I am not going back on the *Reflections*, and I am the last to demand that young people should be enthusiastic about things like democracy and socialism that their inner development has left far behind. But I have already on a previous occasion called mechanical reaction sentimental coarseness, and the new humanity may perhaps after all flourish no worse on the basis of democracy than on that of the old Germany.[75]

This was the authentic voice of the *Vernunftrepublikaner*. Torn by his past and struggling to come to terms with the future, Mann realized that his vision of *Humanität* required a public statement appropriate to the new political conditions. The result was Mann's speech on "The German Republic"—his first public pronouncement on the Weimar Republic and an important key to understanding his own psychological dilemma.

Arguing that political reaction was "sentimental barbarism," Mann declared in his speech that his aim was to win converts to the Republic—"to the side of what is called democracy, and what I call humanity, because of a distaste I share

with you for the meretricious overtones of the other word."[76] It was, Mann maintained, "a Germanic instinct to cherish the idea of a state-shaping individualism" that was both "aristocratic and social" and that was far removed from the "radical and anarchistic individualism" of the West.[77] The Republic was the realization of a specific form of German democracy, the culmination of a tradition of German humanism that offered a middle way between "romanticism and enlightenment, mysticism and rationality."[78] This was, he argued, the idea of humanity that he had supported in the *Reflections*, and this was the idea he now found embodied in the Republic.[79]

As a statement of political realities, Mann's speech was as valiant as it was confused. His sincerity can scarcely be doubted, and given the political atmosphere of the day it was a courageous stance for a known conservative. Nevertheless, Mann's view of politics remained trapped within an aesthetic framework, and his attempts to reconcile democracy with the tradition of German romanticism—through a discussion of Wagner, Nietzsche, Novalis, and even the American poet Walt Whitman—was little short of ludicrous. It was highly symptomatic, however, because the conflicts that Mann noted within the Republic were conflicts within himself. For all of his groping toward a political expression, Mann remained an artist, and it was through his art that these conflicts would find their fullest and most complex expression.

In a letter to Ernst Bertram in 1923, Mann wrote that, in an age that called for "articles and manifestos," he was trying to complete a lengthy novel.[80] The work Mann referred to was *The Magic Mountain*, his long and complex creation that was nearly twelve years in the making and was first published in 1924. This multi-layered *Bildungsroman* has been the subject of numerous studies, both literary and historical, and a close textual analysis is beyond the scope of the present study.[81] What is important for present purposes, however, is the extent to which the many layers within the work represent the many layers within Mann's own thought and character. Part spiritual autobiography and part personal confession, *The Magic Mountain* is, as T. J. Reed has written, "the summa of [Mann's] life, thought, and technical achievement to the age of fifty."[82]

Mann first began work on the novel in 1912 and continued on and off through the first years of the war. In a letter to Paul Amann in 1915, Mann described the nature of the work in progress:

> Before the war I had begun a longish tale, set in the mountains in a T.B. sanatorium—a story with basically pedagogical-political intentions, in which a young man has to come to terms with the most seductive power, death, and is led in a comical and spine-

> tingling way through the spiritual antitheses of humanitarian and Romantic attitudes, progress and reaction, health and disease... The spirit of the whole thing is humorous-nihilistic and the tendency on the whole is rather towards sympathy with death.[83]

The novel that eventually emerged was a work that was profoundly shaped by the war and by Mann's own complex and often contradictory responses to the German Republic. Throughout the novel, the intellectual development of its protagonist, Hans Castorp, takes place within the framework of a debate between two key figures: Naphta, the apostle of Romanticism, nationalism, and reaction, and Settembrini, the advocate of reason, Enlightenment, and cosmopolitanism. The rich and philosophically-laden word battles between Naphta and Settembrini defy simple analysis. Neither view is the absolutely correct one, but both represent the emotional and psychological tensions within Mann.[84]

If this dialectical interplay suggests the two poles of historical development between which Mann was torn, the intellectual growth of Hans Castorp points to another possibility that increasingly occupied Mann's attention during the years following the war. Torn between the conflicting views of Naphtha and Settembrini, and constrained to choose between "East and West," Hans Castorp chooses neither. As Mann wrote:

> He said nothing. They forced everything to an issue, these two—as perhaps one must when one differed—and wrangled bitterly over extremes, whereas it seemed to him, Hans Castorp, as though somewhere between two intolerable positions, between bombastic humanism and analphabetic barbarism, must lie something which one might personally call the human.[85]

This was the middle way Mann had advocated in "The German Republic," the attempt to reconcile the new political realities with the ideal of German culture that was so central to his being. But the contradictions that haunted Mann—the conflict between the "death" of the past and the "life" of the future—and that are debated throughout the novel are never fully resolved. "Man is the lord of counter-positions," he wrote, and, through Hans Castorp's "dream of humanity," Mann gave voice to these tensions. "I will keep faith with death in my heart," Hans declares, "yet will remember that faith with death and the dead is evil, is hostile to mankind, so soon as we give it power over thought and action. *For the sake of goodness and love, man shall let death have no sovereignty over his thoughts.*"[86]

By the time he had completed *The Magic Mountain*, Mann's position clearly

suggested an orientation toward a vision of humanity and an affirmation of "life" that was closer in spirit to the cosmopolitan humanism of Settembrini than to the "sympathy with death" that Mann had first mentioned to Paul Amann in 1915. As with all of Mann's writings, however, *The Magic Mountain* provided no simple answers. His deeply-felt concern for Germany prompted him to reconsider his political ideas, but his attempt to locate a "middle way" for humanity was not so much a real political solution as a rationalization for his own inner conflicts. Throughout the early years of the Republic, Mann retained an aesthetic understanding of politics that prevented him from fully coming to terms with postwar political realities.[87] In a letter to Joseph Ponten in early 1925, Mann described the views of "the author" of *The Magic Mountain*: "He is in his heart no Settembrini, but he is resolved to be in his thinking free, rational, and good."[88] In language strikingly similar to Meinecke's earlier formulation, this was again the voice of the *Vernunftrepublikaner*. It was a voice—deeply steeped in the past—of a humanist, artist, and aesthete in a new and strange political world.

The central problem for Mann, as for Meinecke, was his inability to reconcile an essentially aristocratic vision of German cultural development with the realities of parliamentary government in a mass age. In the early years of the Weimar Republic, both Mann and Meinecke declared their support for a form of government that neither liked but that both truly felt was best for the nation. At the same time, however, they retained a deeply-rooted psychological commitment to an older ideal of German *Kultur* that divided their loyalties in ways that neither seemed to have fully understood. Meinecke, as we have seen, was never able to reconcile his understanding of *Kultur* with what he felt to be the divisive nature of parliamentary rule. Mann's idea of *Kultur* led to an aesthetic conception of politics and a vision of humanity that, however noble, had little to do with the real world of everyday politics.

This was the division of heart and mind that was the burden of Weimar Germany. In the scholarly literature on Weimar, the responsibility of conservatives for the collapse of the Republic and the rise of National Socialism remains a topic of considerable controversy.[89] In regards to the *Vernunftrepublikaner*, no simple answer is possible. Certainly, neither Mann nor Meinecke welcomed or supported the Nazi regime. For his part, Mann's stance was unequivocal and his vocal opposition to Nazism is well documented. Meinecke's relationship to

Nazism was more ambiguous if only because, as Robert Pois has argued, he continually underestimated the danger it represented.[90] Nevertheless, Meinecke, like Mann, abhorred the nihilism and anti-intellectualism of the Nazi movement, and his opposition to the Nazis cost him both his professional position and the editorship of the *Historische Zeitschrift* in 1935.

Still the question of responsibility cannot be easily dismissed. As prominent prewar intellectuals, Mann and Meinecke were ideally positioned to promote the idea of democracy in Germany, but the qualifications of their early support were highly symptomatic of the dilemmas facing the fledgling Republic. To emphasize this point is not to endorse the normative assumptions of much of the older scholarship on modern Germany—that, for example, German development was inherently "faulted," or that the Weimar experiment was doomed to failure.[91] As a number of recent historians have argued, there were political options available in Weimar, and any analysis of the failure of the Republic must take into account the specific historical forces operating in the postwar era.[92]

Yet it remains true that the viability of the Republic was tested from the beginning, not only by the active opposition of its opponents but also by the qualifications of its supporters. Neither Mann nor Meinecke fit easily into categories of historical analysis such "reactionary anti-modernism" or "cultural pessimism."[93] Moreover, both clearly believed they were supporting the Republic. Like many conservatives of their generation, however, both were subject to the pull of a past that was fundamentally at odds with many of the assumptions of democratic society in the postwar era. During the critical years following the war, neither thinker was able to reconcile fully the realities of this past with the needs of the day. Their attempts to do so, as well as their significant failures, highlight the "peculiarities" of a tradition of German intellectual development that haunted the Weimar Republic.

NOTES

1. Thomas Mann, *Aufsätze, Reden, Essays*, vol. 3, *1919–1925* (Berlin: Aufbau Verlag, 1986), 394.
2. Fritz Stern has noted that the German term *Kultur* has far wider connotations than the English word "culture," especially in regard to the reverence invested in the "mystery of the arts." For Germans, the pursuit of *Kultur* through inner development was both a philosophy of life and a way of understanding German identity. Its origins lay in German Idealist philosophy and in the *Aufklärung*, the specific German response to the Enlightenment in the late eighteenth century. Fritz Stern, *The Failure of Illiberalism: Essays on the Political Culture of Modern Germany* (New York: Columbia University Press, [1955] 1992), 5–7. See also, James J. Sheehan, *German History, 1770–1866* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989), 203–06.
3. Fritz K. Ringer, *The Decline of the German Mandarins: The German Academic Community, 1890–1930* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1969), chap. 2, passim.

4. Ibid., 116.
5. Comparing Meinecke's *Die Idee der Staaträson* with Mann's *The Magic Mountain*, Peter Gay has written that "Friedrich Meinecke is the Thomas Mann of German historical writing." *Weimar Culture: The Outsider as Insider* (New York: Harper & Row, 1968), 93–94. See also, Dagmar Barnouw, *Weimar Intellectuals and the Threat of Modernity* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1988), 13–14.
6. On the concept of an "open-yet-authoritarian" elite, see Walter Struve, *Elites Against Democracy: Leadership Ideas in Bourgeois Political Thought in Germany, 1890–1933* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1973), esp. 3–20. Struve does not discuss in depth either Meinecke or Mann, but the author nevertheless provides an important framework for understanding the idea of an "intellectual aristocracy" among the German middle class.
7. George L. Mosse, *The Culture of Western Europe: The Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries* 3rd ed. (Boulder: Westview Press, 1988), 1. See also Larry Eugene Jones, "Culture and Politics in the Weimar Republic," in Gordon Martel, ed., *Modern Germany Reconsidered, 1870–1945* (London: Routledge, 1992), 76–77.
8. See, for example, the classic study by Klemens von Klemperer, *Germany's New Conservatism: Its History and Dilemma in the Twentieth Century* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1957).
9. Ibid., chapter 2, passim. Detlev J. K. Puekert, *The Weimar Republic: The Crisis of Classical Modernity* (New York: Hill and Wang, 1989), 14–18. For a reassessment of the younger generation of conservatives, see Peter Fritzsche, "Breakdown or Breakthrough? Conservatives in the November Revolution," in Larry Eugene Jones and James N. Retallack, eds., *Between Reform, Reaction, and Resistance: Studies in the History of German Conservatism from 1789 to 1945* (Providence: Berg Publishers, 1993), 299–328. The best introduction to the importance of "generations" during this period is Robert Wohl's pioneering, *The Generation of 1914* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1979).
10. Friedrich Meinecke, *Ausgewählter Briefwechsel*, Ludwig Dehio and Peter Classen, eds, vol. 6, *Werke* (Stuttgart: K. F. Koehler, 1962), 95 (5 October 1918).
11. Ibid.
12. Richard W. Sterling, *Ethics in a World of Power: The Political Ideas of Friedrich Meinecke* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1958), 5.
13. A brief sketch of Meinecke's early years can be found in an essay by a former student, Henry Pachter, "Friedrich Meinecke and the Tragedy of German Liberalism," in *Weimar Etudes* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1982), 135–70.
14. Sterling, *Ethics in a World of Power*, 14–18.
15. *Weltbürgertum and Nationalstaat*. English translation, *Cosmopolitanism and the National State*, Robert B. Kimber, trans. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1970). Page references are to the English translation.
16. Meinecke, *Cosmopolitanism and the National State*, 21.
17. See, for example, Ibid., 64–70, 217–30, 341–63.
18. Ibid., 224–28. See also Sterling, *Ethics in a World of Power*, 75–79.
19. Quoted in Ibid., 123. The idea of Ranke as political theorist of the national state and Bismarck as its architect are closely linked in Meinecke's work. See, for example, *Cosmopolitanism and the National State*, chap. 12, passim.
20. Friedrich Meinecke, *Strassburg, Freiburg, Berlin, 1901–1919: Erinnerungen* (Stuttgart: K. F. Koehler, 1949), 284.
21. Ibid., 130. In a letter of 1911, Meinecke wrote that he wanted to "make Conservatism useful once again." *Ausgewählter Briefwechsel*, 35 (22 December 1911). For an understanding of Meinecke's prewar attitudes, I am indebted to Robert Pois, *Friedrich Meinecke and German Politics in the Twentieth Century* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1972), 14–17.
22. In *Cosmopolitanism and the National State*, Meinecke wrote that there were two strands of "modern individualism": "one branch, deriving from natural law and democratically oriented,

sought to achieve equal rights for all, while its other branch, aristocratically oriented in an intellectual sense, sought to achieve the liberation and elevation of the best minds." (p. 15). It is clear that Meinecke's sympathies lay with the latter strand, and this tendency became more pronounced following the war.

23. Pois, *Friedrich Meinecke*, 16.
24. Meinecke, *Strassburg, Freiburg, Berlin*, 137.
25. Friedrich Meinecke, "Politik und Kultur," in *Politische Schriften und Reden*, vol 2, *Werke* (Darmstadt: Siegfried Toeche-Mittler, 1958), 81.
26. Ibid.
27. See, for example, "Nationalismus und nationale Idee," in Ibid., 83–95. Meinecke argued that individuals should support the state as free and cultured men rather than as stereotypical patriots, p. 88. For more extreme examples of Meinecke's stance, see, "Deutschland und der Weltkrieg," Ibid., 96–100.
28. Meinecke, *Strassburg, Freiburg, Berlin*, 194–95, 233–39.
29. Ibid., 271.
30. Meinecke, *Ausgewählter Briefwechsel*, 335 (January 1919).
31. Pois, *Friedrich Meinecke*, 27–28. For a spirited critique of Meinecke's elitism, see Shulamit Volkov, "Cultural Elitism and Democracy: Notes on Friedrich Meinecke's Political Thought," *Jahrbuch des Instituts für Deutsche Geschichte* 5 (1976): 383–418. A valuable discussion of Meinecke's immediate postwar views, to which I am heavily indebted, is Sterling, *Ethics in a World of Power*, chap. 8, passim.
32. Friedrich Meinecke, "Verfassung und Verwaltung der deutschen Republik," *Politische Schriften und Reden*, 281.
33. Friedrich Meinecke, *Nach der Revolution: Geschichtliche Betrachtungen über Unsere Lage* (Berlin: R. Oldenburg, 1919), 22. See also, Pois, *Friedrich Meinecke*, 37–41.
34. See, for example, "Das Deutsche Bürgertum im Kriege," *Politische Schriften und Reden*, 247–251.
35. Meinecke, *Nach der Revolution*, 113, 118–119.
36. Robert Pois, *Friedrich Meinecke*, 41–48. The quotation is on page 46. On Moeller van den Bruck, see Fritz Stern, *The Politics of Cultural Despair* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1961). In an important reassessment of "revolutionary conservatism," Peter Fritzsche has recently argued that younger conservatives such as Moeller van den Bruck originally welcomed the November Revolution and only turned to reactionary conservatism and "cultural pessimism" after the revolution, in their view, failed to deliver its promise of "renewal." See Peter Fritzsche, "Breakdown or Breakthrough?, Jones and Retallack, eds., *Between Reform, Reaction, and Revolution*, 299–328.
37. Meinecke, *Nach der Revolution*, 110–111, 119.
38. Meinecke, *Die Idee der Staaträson*. English translation, *Machiavellism: The Doctrine of Raison d'état and Its Place in Modern History*, Douglas Scott, trans. (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1957). References are to the English translation, although I have chosen to retain the German title in the text.
39. Ibid., 13.
40. Ibid., 21–22.
41. Ibid., 429.
42. Sterling, *Ethics in a World of Power*, 231.
43. Meinecke, *Machiavellism*, 430. Here, Meinecke is echoing his earlier call for a strong presidency in Germany as a substitute for the Monarchy (*Ersatzkaisertum*). *Strassburg, Freiburg, Berlin*, 258–59. See also "Verfassung und Verwaltung der Deutschen Republik," *Politische Schriften und Reden*, esp. 292–98.
44. Meinecke, *Machiavellism*, 410–11.
45. Meinecke, "Die Kultur Frage und die Partien," *Politische Schriften und Reden*, 386. Pois, *Friedrich Meinecke*, 101–02.

46. Stern, *The Failure of Illiberalism*, 3–25.
47. On Nietzsche's early influence, see Terence J. Reed, *Thomas Mann: The Uses of Tradition* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1974), 17–21. During the war, Mann explicitly mentioned the importance of Nietzsche's apolitical attitudes on his own view. See note 62 below.
48. Quoted in Reed, *The Uses of Tradition*, 196–97.
49. Ibid., 197.
50. Nigel Hamilton, *The Brothers Mann* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1978), 158.
51. Thomas Mann, *Letters of Thomas Mann, 1889–1955*, Richard & Clara Winston, trans. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1975), 66–67 (7 August 1914).
52. Thomas Mann, "Gedanken im Kriege," *Von Deutscher Republik: Politische Schriften und Reden in Deutschland* (Frankfurt am Main: S. Fischer, 1984), 7.
53. Reed, *The Uses of Tradition*, 214–19. Throughout the nineteenth century, German thinkers had drawn a distinction between *Kultur* and *Zivilisation*, but especially during the war this idea acquired strong nationalistic and militaristic overtones. See Ringer, *The Decline of the German Mandarins*, 86–90, 180–88.
54. Mann, "Gedanken im Kriege," 14–15. See also Reed, *The Uses of Tradition*, 186–88.
55. Mann, "Gedanken im Kriege," 17 & 24. For the last quotation, I have drawn from Hamilton, *The Brothers Mann*, 162.
56. Thomas Mann, "Frederick The Great and the Grand Coalition," in *Three Essays*, H.T. Lowe–Porter, trans. (London: Martin Secker, 1932), 192–94. Mann wrote this essay, in part, as a polemical attack on the "internationalism" of his brother Heinrich. The rift between Heinrich and Thomas is beyond the scope of this study, but readers may profitably consult Hamilton, *The Brothers Mann*, chap. 9, passim.
57. Mann, "Frederick the Great," 171.
58. Ibid., 200. On Mann's self-identification with Frederick II, see Reed, *The Uses of Tradition*, 188.
59. Reed, *The Uses of Tradition*, 179.
60. Thomas Mann, *Reflections of a Nonpolitical Man*, Walter D. Morris, trans. (New York: Frederick Ungar, 1983), 81.
61. Ibid., 85.
62. Ibid. Mann described his other influences in a letter to Paul Amann in 1916: "The great Germans who shaped my nature" all adhered to the separation of "philosophy" and "politics": "Schopenhauer most decidedly, Wagner, after 1848 — he hated politics . . . and above all Nietzsche, who with great accuracy called himself the 'last unpolitical German.'" *Briefe an Paul Amann* (Lübeck: Verlag Max Schmidt, 1959), 50.
63. Mann, *Reflections*, 201.
64. Ibid., 229.
65. Quoted in Hamilton, *The Brothers Mann*, 191.
66. Thomas Mann, *Diaries, 1918–1939*, trans. Richard and Clara Winston (New York: Harry N. Abrahms, 1982), 12 (5 October 1918).
67. Ibid., 13 (12 October 1918).
68. Ibid., 23 (12 November 1918).
69. Erich Heller, *The Ironic German: A Study of Thomas Mann* (Boston: Little Brown, 1958), 12–21.
70. Mann, *Letters, 1889–1955*, 86 (29 March 1919).
71. The episode of the Bavarian Soviet served to strengthen this feeling for Mann. See, for example, the diary entries for 13 April, 1 May and 5 May, 1919 in *Diaries, 1919–1939*.
72. Thomas Mann, *Briefe, 1889–1936* (Frankfurt am Main: S. Fischer, 1961), 173 (18 January 1920).
73. Quoted in Struve, *Elites Against Democracy*, 35.
74. Thomas Mann, *Thomas Mann an Ernst Bertram: Briefe aus den Jahren 1910–1955* ([NP]: Verlag

Günter Neske, 1960), 16 March 1920, 88. *Diaries, 1918–1939*, 90 (15 March 1920).

75. Mann, *Mann an Ernst Bertram*, 112 (8 July 1922). For this translation I have drawn from Reed, *The Uses of Tradition*, 290.
76. Thomas Mann, "The German Republic," in *Order of the Day: Political Essays and Speeches of Two Decades*, H. T. Lowe-Porter, trans. (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1942), 10–11.
77. Ibid., 29.
78. Ibid., 24.
79. Ibid., 22.
80. Mann, *Thomas Mann an Ernest Bertram*, 117 (21 February 1923).
81. The best full-length study of the work is still Hermann J. Wiegand, *The Magic Mountain: A Study of Thomas Mann's Novel Der Zauberberg* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1965). On the political context see, Reed, *The Uses of Tradition*, esp. 226–274, passim.
82. Ibid., 226.
83. Quoted in Ibid., 237.
84. As T. J. Reed has pointed out, the dialogues between the two actually contain fragments from Mann's earlier writings, especially the *Reflections*. See Reed, *The Uses of Tradition*, 256–57.
85. Thomas Mann, *The Magic Mountain*, H. T. Lowe-Porter, trans. (New York: Vintage Books, 1955), 523.
86. Ibid., 496–97.
87. On Mann's "aesthetic" understanding of politics see, Keith Bullivant, "Thomas Mann and Politics in the Weimar Republic," in *Culture and Society in the Weimar Republic* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1977), 24–38.
88. Mann, *Briefe, 1889–1936*, 5 February 1925, 232.
89. For a recent survey of the literature, see Larry Eugene Jones and James Retallack, "German Conservatism Reconsidered," in Jones and Retallack, *Between Reform, Reaction, and Resistance*, esp. 18–27.
90. On Mann's opposition see Reed, *The Uses of Tradition*, 310–16 and especially Hamilton, *The Brothers Mann*, chapters 12 and 13, passim. For Meinecke, see Pois, *Friedrich Meinecke*, 116–30.
91. This was the perspective that informed many of the classic studies on the roots of Nazi ideology. Among the best known and most important are Fritz Stern, *The Politics of Cultural Despair: A Study in the Rise of German Ideology* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1961) and George Mosse, *The Crisis of German Ideology: Intellectual Origins of the Third Reich* (New York: Schocken Books, [1964] 1981). The literature on the German "Sonderweg" is enormous. See, for example, Helga Grebing, *Der "deutsche sonderweg" in Europa 1806–1945: eine Kritik* (Stuttgart: W. Kahlhammer, 1986) and David Blackbourn and Geoff Eley, *The Peculiarities of German History* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984).
92. Larry Eugene Jones, *German Liberalism and the Dissolution of the Weimar Party System, 1918–1933* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1988). Geoff Eley, "What Produces Fascism: Pre-Industrial Traditions or a Crisis of the Capitalist State?" in *From Unification to Nazism: Reinterpreting the German Past* (Boston: Unwin Hyman, 1986), 254–82. Several general histories that stress the options available in Weimar are E. J. Feuchtwanger, *From Weimar to Hitler: Germany, 1918–1933*, 2nd ed., (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1995) and Hans Mommsen, *The Rise and Fall of Weimar Democracy* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1996).
93. Fritz Ringer, for example, locates Meinecke among the "modernist" mandarins, e.g., *The Decline of the German Mandarins*, 210. For an interpretation linking Mann with the "Conservative Revolutionaries," but sensitive to their differences, see Keith Bullivant, "The Conservative Revolution" in Anthony Phelan, ed., *The Weimar Dilemma* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1985), esp. 56–57, 68–69.

Book Reviews

Where Left meets Right in Critical Responses to Mass Culture

PAUL R. GORMAN. *Left Intellectuals and Popular Culture in Twentieth Century America.* Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1996.

SCHOLARS of intellectual history and popular culture will appreciate Paul Gorman's contribution to the field in, *Left Intellectuals and Popular Culture in Twentieth Century America,* albeit less encompassing than the title suggests. In this monograph, Gorman explores the historical bias against popular culture in the American intellectual tradition from the turn of the century to 1960. Specifically, he addresses the contradictory beliefs held by American intellectuals on the left who at once championed the common man and denounced mass culture as debased. He proposes that American intellectuals essentially set themselves up as a "democratic clerisy" who justified their own superiority and expert opinion as essential to upholding democracy (p. 10). They believed that the public was predominantly passive and suasible, thus, in need of intellectual guidance in their cultural choices and protection from manipulation by the consumer driven mass media. While the intellectuals may have had noble motives, Gorman contends that they were flawed by their inability to see the public as active agents and preoccupied with maintaining their own place in a society experiencing phenomenal growth in mass entertainment. In the end, their presumptions led them to the same cultural critique that many right-wing paternalist intellectuals had espoused in the late nineteenth century.

Gorman's thesis adds complexity to historical interpretations of American intellectuals and expands scholarship on popular culture, particularly for the first two-thirds of the twentieth- century. In many respects his work picks up where Lawrence Levine's *Highbrow/Lowbrow* left off as Gorman reviews the late nineteenth-century establishment of hierarchy in the arts, reiterating the

Victorian disdain for popular culture at the outset but centering more on the left-leaning intellectuals of the early twentieth century.[1] Although he revisits scenes that previous historians have depicted (Richard Pells', Neil Jumonville's, and Terry Cooney's studies of the New York intellectuals come to mind), Gorman uses a wider brush to paint his study of American intellectuals in the modernist period.[2]

Rather than exploring a particular school of theorists, he uses a longue durée approach to illustrate the sweeping contours of American intellectual thought from the Progressive Era to the late 1950s. Such a construction provides the reader with a larger picture of multiple intellectual groups spanning most of the twentieth-century as well as more detailed portraits of influential individuals in certain periods. This method is particularly fruitful in allowing Gorman to compare and contrast intellectual traditions along the way, building up to his conclusions about the consistency of intellectual opposition to mass culture.

The reader should be aware that the arts considered in this work are primarily literary arts. If one is looking for insight into intellectual criticism of the visual arts or performing arts, it will only be found in brief snippets here.[3] Gorman centers his analysis on the published material in which intellectuals generally debate, including literary magazines, journals, monographs, textbooks, and newspapers. As his subjects rarely concerned themselves with other popular forms, neither does Gorman. This is unfortunate, since short sections on jazz (p. 133-135) and painting (p. 151-156) add depth to his assessments of the intelligencia's conflicting criticism and enjoyment of popular and high art forms.

The work opens with a chapter on the conservative Victorian outlook against popular entertainments and ends with a detailed look at Dwight Macdonald's writing, skillfully bringing the intellectual argument full circle to where far left meets right-leaning interpretations of mass culture. Roughly, the first half of the book traces the intellectual development of the mass culture critique and exposes its inherent ironies. First, Gorman looks at the "old order," finding that right-wing elite rejected popular arts as lowbrow entertainment that threatened the social order and failed to elevate its audiences. Since no improvement was thought to be forthcoming, the gentile critics advocated a hierarchy for the arts to maintain social distinction and preserve high culture. Levine's influence is most noticeable here. Yet Gorman quickly moves to expand into his own historical framework.

The second chapter presents another dimension to the intellectual tradition added in the Progressive Era. Gorman explains how reformers considered popular culture more a product of hard working conditions and poor living quarters

particular to the modern urban-industrial environment than a result of common people's moral depravity. Unlike their predecessors, Progressive reformers believed the masses could be uplifted by gaining knowledge of and exposure to more sophisticated cultural pursuits. Gorman credits the Progressives with finding a "new appreciation of environmental and social sources behind the popularity of entertainments," such as dance halls and sensational journalism, but faults them for settling on a "victim ideology" that objectified the common people and "underestimated the public's ability to choose its own most useful cultural communications" (p. 47). This assessment carries throughout the remainder of the book, as Gorman finds it reinforced by each generation of American intellectuals.

The third chapter elaborates on the irony of leftist intellectual beliefs as Gorman looks more closely at the radicals of the 1920s. This group of intellectuals offered the most promise of accepting popular culture because they had the greatest ambitions for overcoming Victorian sensibilities and changing what they perceived to be America's strict and limited aesthetic hierarchy. The radicals welcomed modernism and its efforts to join arts and everyday life experiences as much as they supported working class political movements. However, Gorman sees the potential for embracing popular culture squandered by intellectuals behind avant-garde journals like *Seven Art, Little Review, Soil, Dial,* and The *Seven Lively Arts* who dismissed the "facile tastes" of the masses (p. 61). Even cultural pluralists and defenders of democracy like Randolph Bourne not only rejected what they considered lowbrow popular culture but insisted that intellectuals would have "to resist the stale culture of the masses as we resist the stale culture of the aristocrats. It is easy to be lenient and pseudo-human, and call it democracy" nevertheless, critics should protect high culture for the benefit of all (p. 63). In the end, radical intellectuals shared with the old guard a paternalistic view of the common man and also neglected to take into consideration their cultural interests and role in shaping popular culture. The radical intellectuals succeeded in redefining aesthetic standards and took pleasure in shocking conservative Victorians with modernist forms, yet once again proved more interested in securing their own place in the social order than in reevaluating popular entertainment. By this point, Gorman has established the continuities in both right and left intellectuals' defense of the highbrow/lowbrow order.

The second half of this monograph deals more closely with the expansion of mass entertainments and intellectuals' responses in the interwar and, especially, post-World War II period. The fourth chapter centers on the social scientists'

view of popular culture. Chapters five and six focus on the communist thinkers of the 1920s and 1930s and the New York Intellectuals of the 1930s to 1950s. These two groups overlap considerably and Gorman reveals shared characteristics between them and the intellectual traditions previously surveyed. Like the Progressives, the Communists found the public victimized by larger forces beyond their control. In their view, capitalism was the countervailing factor encouraging popular indulgence in unsatisfactory consumer-oriented art and entertainment. On the other hand, sociologists and cultural critics of the New York intellectual group blamed modern urban life, with new conditions of affluence and proliferations of mass produced cultural items, for the abjectivity of public tastes. Many of these intellectuals added a new dimension to their critique by asserting that the common man was no longer only a victim of circumstances but also a hinderance to progress. They became some of the strongest proponents of protecting high culture from the corruption of popular forms.

Gorman's most engaging chapter is the final section on Dwight Macdonald, who serves as a microcosm of the intellectuals' developments throughout the bulk of this text and represents the death of hope that left intellectuals could reconcile their beliefs in democracy with their antagonism to popular culture. Gorman follows Macdonald's career from his work at the conservative *Fortune* magazine where he ironically established his more radical political viewpoints, to his editorial years for *Partisan Review* and *Politics* where he honed his particular brand of political and cultural thinking. Macdonald mirrors intellectual developments in earlier chapters since he begins his professional life at a conservative publication, but he himself goes through a transformation from being a radical communist to a stringent post-war adversary of totalitarianism and communism—all the while extolling the benefits of high culture and bemoaning popular culture as increasingly ignominious. He also neglects to consider popular opinions or the common audiences' role in shaping their preferred forms of popular culture. In this chapter Gorman swings the reader through a review of the major themes of the text and adds insight into radical thinking, aesthetic debates with art critic Clement Greenberg, and the influence of the Frankfurt School on Macdonald. The chapter serves as a unique summary and conclusion to this far-ranging work.

On the whole, the monograph suffers from two fundamental omissions. Clearly, Gorman considers it unfortunate that critics labeled common men "underdeveloped" and denied their role in choosing their own arts and entertainments; nevertheless he, too, overlooks the role of the audiences of mass culture that he considers so important. While trying to stress agency as an essential

component to accurate analyses of popular culture, Gorman neglects to incorporate popular views into his study. He gives some hope to the reader that his work will address this important counterpart to the story when he assesses Rheta Dorr's portrayal of an immigrant girl who falls victim to commercialized pleasures in a progressive reformer's expose. Gorman asks the reader to "consider how different Annie Donnelly story might have been, for instance, if it were taken from the girl's own perspective" (p. 48). Indeed. Of course, readers may look elsewhere for accounts of popular culture from the people's point of view.[4] Still, Gorman's argument might have benefitted from incorporation of cultural historians methods.

This work is also disappointing in its failure to assess developments in popular culture and intellectual responses to it beyond 1960. Omitting an era of vast social change which sparked greater appreciation of individual choices and actions, moreover one in which there was an explosion in pop arts, leaves the task of assessing new left and neoconservative re-evaluations of popular culture to other scholars.

These criticisms should not, however, detract from what Gorman has accomplished in this work. His study poses a fine synthesis of intellectual thought which gathers a patchwork of insightful vignettes on prominent characters and schools of thought into a well crafted quilt revealing the common ties that bind together critical views of popular culture. The contours of his argument linking left intellectuals and their critiques of mass entertainment to right leaning defenders of high culture is convincing. Moreover, Gorman provocatively asserts that intellectuals' concerns with status left them entirely out of touch with popular culture's real actors and audiences. This book should elicit greater debate on the nature and goals of both past and present cultural critiques.

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Notes

1. Laurence Levine, *HighBrow/Lowbrow: The Emergence of Cultural Hierarchy in America*, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1988).
2. Richard Pells, *The Liberal Mind in a Conservative Age: American Intellectuals During the 1940s and 1950s*, (New York: Harper & Row Publishers, 1985); Neil Jumonville *Critical Crossings: New York Intellectuals in Postwar America* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991); and Terry Cooney, *The Rise of the New York Intellectuals: "Partisan Review" and Its Circle*, (Madison: University of Wisconsin, 1986).
3. In this respect Gorman follows what Alberta Arthurs has recently described as a

disturbing pattern of excluding the arts and artists from definitions of "culture." See Alberta Arthurs, "Taking Art Seriously," *American Arts*, (Fall, 1996).

4. Kathy Peiss, *Cheap Amusements: Working Women and Leisure in Turn-of-the-Century New York*, (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1986) and Roy Rosenzweig, *Eight Hours for What We Will: Workers and Leisure in an Industrial City, 1870-1920*, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1983) are fine historical presentations of popular culture nearer the turn of the century.

Paul Groth. *Living Downtown: The History of Residential Hotels in the United States.* Berkeley: University of California Press, 1994. xxii, 401 pp. Illustrations, graphs, appendix, notes, bibliography, index. $35 Cloth.

Henry cisneros, Secretary of Housing and Urban Development, recently announced with pride that more than 65 percent of American families lived in privately owned homes. This astounding figure testifies to the enduring success of a sixty-year-old federal housing policy whose principal aim is to advance single-family home ownership. But this statistic also raises questions about the social costs of such a singular policy for, as persisently high foreclosure and housing turnover rates attest, mortgages are clearly failing to deliver adequate and appropriate shelter to many Americans.

In *Living Downtown*, architectural historian Paul Groth closely examines the history of the residential hotel, a housing alternative which flourished in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century by serving a remarkably diverse clientele. From opera divas and corporate executives on-the-make to single laborers and wage-earning women, Americans of many stripes found the prospect of a privately-owned home either personally undesirable or untenable and frequently chose instead to rent rooms (or just a bed) in city centers by the day, week, or month. Despite (or perhaps because of) its success in meeting diverse shelter needs of men and women who often valued their freedom from patriarchal family structures or domestic responsibilities, the residential hotel acquired an unseemly reputation in the dominant culture and ultimately met its demise at the hands of reformers intent on eradicating any "congregate form of living" within the twentieth-century American city (201).

Living Downtown traces the rise and decline of the residential hotel by combining the techniques and insights of conventional social history with those of architectural criticism, city planning, and public policy studies. Making ample use of photographic and other visual evidence, Groth supplements his readings

of housing administration and reform literature with detailed reconstructions of different hotel types. Through a systematic examination of insurance maps, building permits, city tax records, inspection reports, and water company archives, Groth skillfully reproduces composite layouts for hundreds of long-vanished hotels in order to illustrate the various design strategies of hotel owners.

Although *Living Downtown* effectively surveys hotel life on a national scale from 1800 to 1980, Groth achieves analytic depth and thematic focus by concentrating his coverage in three ways. First, Groth uses evidence mostly from San Francisco, where up to ten percent of early-twentieth-century residents lived in hotels, for his most detailed analyses of hotel business, reform, and subculture. Second, Groth addresses antebellum and contemporary hotel experiences only in passing, emphasizing instead the seventy-odd years between the Civil War and Great Depression when hotel living was at its peak. Finally, while the book examines the broad array of hotel residents, it attends mostly to working-class lodgers. Such a focus is appropriate because cheap rooming and lodging houses made up the vast bulk of residential hotels and therefore attracted the most persistent attention of reformers.

The book's first half comprises an introduction and four subsequent chapters each of which recounts the social and cultural history of a residential hotel type: the palace hotel, the "midpriced mansion," the rooming house, and the cheap lodging house. The four chapters which compose the book's second half then turn to the rise of an organized opposition to hotel life, especially that which targeted cheap lodging houses. Coming together most forcefully under the banner of Progressive reform at the turn of the century, this opposition eventually insinuated itself into law through the passage of local moral and building codes, zoning ordinances, and eventually Federal Housing Administration lending guidelines which systematically steered investors away from hotel construction. After World War II, as professional planners increasingly defined low-priced hotels as "blight," what Groth calls "the monolithic one-best-way approach" to housing policy justified ambitious urban renewal and suburban building projects that destroyed old hotel communities, created a low-cost housing shortage, and dramatically narrowed a previously pluralistic housing market that had once accommodated diverse tastes and needs (302).

While Groth successfully describes the process of the residential hotel's marginalization, he less successfully explains it. In fact, the closest Groth comes to an explanation is to blame reformers' "ignorance" of hotel life and its subcultures. (Indeed, the epigraph to *Living Downtown* is Goethe's dictum, "There is nothing more frightening than active ignorance.") But this explanation begs

the larger question of why generations of reformers, city planners, policy makers, and architects remained systematically insulated from real "knowledge" about hotels and their residents.

In addressing this question, Groth would have benefitted from the rich literature of urban geography and sociology which analyzes how changing political economies frame decisions on the part of governments and private capital to invest, disinvest, and reinvest in urban real estate. Scholars such as David Harvey, for example, have shown that the eradication of alternative housing forms through the twentieth century owed less to misguided notions of urban planning than to the structural logic of real estate markets which devalorized urban working-class neighborhoods through surburban development and later revalorized those same neighborhoods through urban renewal and gentrification. Moreover, as command over social space is a crucial element in any search for profit and social hegemony, decisions which decimated cheap hotel communities also served to fragment a potential source of working-class opposition and resistence.

Thus, the decline of the lodging house after World War II must be seen as part of larger transformations in the built environment precipitated by the changing needs of economic elites. Although Groth concludes his book on a hopeful note about contemporary hotel experiments for the homeless, such restructuring of inner urban space will undoubtedly remain limited as long as other forms of housing tenure command higher profits.

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David N. Mayer. *The Constitutional Thought of Thomas Jefferson.* Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1994. xiv, 397 pages. Bibliography, index. Cloth, $39.50.

Bucking the recent trend to locate Thomas Jefferson within the competing frameworks of civic republicanism and Lockean liberalism, David N. Mayer's new book offers a "fresh perspective" on early American ideology and a bold revision of existing scholarship. Mayer's project is to "explain comprehensively Jefferson's constitutional thought on its own terms," and as Jefferson described it (x-xi). The result of careful readings of both archival texts and Jefferson's published writings, this study of the founder's statements on how

government should be constituted yields a clear conclusion. Jefferson was, as he called himself, both a "federalist" and a "republican," and a "whig" above all else.

Jefferson's federalism manifested itself in his strong support for the division of power not only between independent legislative, executive, and judiciary branches, but also between states and the national government. While diplomatic service in France caused the Virginian to view energetic central government as a necessity, Hamiltonian attempts to consolidate power in the new nation's capital moved Jefferson to become a staunch defender of states' rights as well. Throughout America's formative decades, he held that the national government had legitimate jurisdiction over foreign and commercial policy, while the states—as he proclaimed in his first inaugural address—comprised "the most competent administrations for our domestic concerns, & the surest bulwarks against anti-republican tendencies" (185).

Those tendencies were evident in both the Washington and Adams administrations, and they constituted the antithesis of Jefferson's ardently democratic republicanism. He railed against a national bank, a national debt, high taxes, and the Alien and Sedition Acts—all because they monopolized power in the hands of a few Americans at the expense of the states and the people at-large. For Jefferson, Mayer argues, republicanism concerned less the structure of government than the question of who should control it, and he insisted upon a wide franchise and responsive representatives.

Most fundamental to Jefferson's constitutional thought, Mayer maintains, was his radical whiggism. In the tradition of Locke, Sydney, Coke, and English Whig historians, the Virginian detested anything but strictly-limited compacts based upon the maintenance of rights such as life, liberty, and property. Jefferson saw government as, at best, a necessary evil. At worst (and more typically) it was an invitation to tyranny and an instrument for oppression. For him, the Constitution served not only as a license for the rightful use of power, but also as a restraining order against its abuse.

Mayer demonstrates that Jefferson's political thought was no less evolutionary than revolutionary: "it evolved gradually, shaped by the circumstances of his time" (xi). In addition, and in part because of its changing nature, it was beset by several apparent contradictions. While Jefferson the opposition leader upheld a doctrine of strict constitutional construction in the 1790s, Jefferson the president justified purchase of the Louisiana territory as an exercise of constitutionally-implied powers. But the chief executive first called for an amendment to authorize the acquisition and, that not forthcoming, almost let the opportunity to double America's size slip through his fingers. "Rather than showing

hypocrisy," Mayer writes, "Jefferson's reluctant acquiescence in the Louisiana Purchase... demonstrate[s] the seriousness of his constitutional scruples" (216).

As Mayer points out, the Virginian's constitutionalism caused him to consider not only the body of government but also the body politic. If the Constitution restrained the government from trampling upon the liberties of the people, then education could prevent citizens from trampling upon the rights of each other. Through his advocacy of a system of public education for his native state and his ward system for participatory local government, Jefferson aimed to teach democracy to all citizens. He sought nothing less than an enlightened, reasonable republic where men were capable of protecting individual liberty and of responsibly governing themselves. This, according to Mayer, "was the preeminent hallmark of Jefferson's constitutional thought" (314).

This is a path-breaking, penetrating study. Well-researched and gracefully written, Mayer's book deserves recognition as our best intellectual biography to date of the third president. Shedding considerable light on Jefferson's constitutional thought, it goes beyond an explication of the Virginian's views on citizens' relations with their government to describe how Jefferson hoped citizens would relate to each other.

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